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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, AND DISSERTATION OUTLINE
Introduction
This research addresses a key question: Can an effort to systematically assess programs
improve performance? To examine this question, the study investigates the management tool of
performance measurement in the area of special education. There are several reasons why this topic
is important. These can be classified into three broad categories: the broad theoretical rationale for
measuring programs, the practical issues of how to measure program impacts, and finally, the issuespecific impacts of measurement on special education.
Considering the theoretical rationale for performance measurement involves two related
observations. First, efforts to measure and/or improve program performance (“performance
measurement”) are a key part of assessing the impact of public policies—answering what Smith and
Larimer call the “what have we done?” question (2009).

Second, although performance

measurement has achieved acceptance in the public sector since the late twentieth century,
practitioners and scholars do not always agree on its efficacy, the theoretical assumptions about it,
or the methods of implementing it.
Turning to the questions of how to measure program impacts, there are again two related
issues. The federal government’s performance monitoring system for special education relies on
intergovernmental relationships to implement its performance measurement plan.

This is

noteworthy because there is a gap in the literature that prevents us from understanding whether
and how intergovernmental performance systems can achieve their objectives in the American
federal system. Additionally, the special education performance system builds on a diverse and
substantial legal and political foundation. Its enabling legislation, the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (IDEA), calls for a public reporting system that spans diverse metrics ranging from
graduation rates to students’ placement in certain educational settings. In short, the statute
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presents a well-developed or “rationalized” system of intergovernmental performance
measurement, which may provide insights that less comprehensive or more controversial systems
may not.
Finally, there are questions that focus on special education itself, which include ongoing
debates over the federal government’s role in education policy. In December of 2015, President
Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which signaled Congress’ willingness to reduce
the federal role in intergovernmental performance monitoring. The repercussions of ESSA are not
yet clear, partly because there is incomplete knowledge of whether and how intergovernmental
performance systems can achieve their objectives. A study of the IDEA performance system offers an
opportunity to expand this knowledge about the effects of performance measurement special
education. There is a practical need to know whether IDEA is achieving its objectives. Not only
would this knowledge be important when and if Congress chooses to reauthorize the law, but also
for the approximately 6.5 million children in the United States and their parents who need the
services it attempts to provide.
As discussed later in this chapter, this investigation proceeds by first unpacking the
theoretical and political context of this highly complex performance measurement system. The study
then analyzes a very large set of performance data collected under the IDEA system in order to
address the primary research question above, as well as three smaller research questions:
1. Does feedback matter? That is, do the states make substantive changes as a result of
federal feedback1 pertaining to performance oversight under the IDEA framework? If so,
when, why, and how?

1

By “federal feedback”, I mean the indicator-specific annual written responses delivered to each state’s
Director of Special Education, including but not limited to the federal government’s (1) acceptance or nonacceptance of the annual methodology for measuring the indicator, (2) required actions the state must take
with regard to monitoring or improving performance, (3) identification of implementation or compliance
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2. What types of performance indicators, if any, produce the most change? What are the
characteristics of these indicators?
3. What states, if any, exhibited evidence of improvement under this federal monitoring
system? What are the common characteristics, if any, of those states?
Why it is Important to Answer these Questions
The Fact of Performance Measurement in Public Policy and Administration
One of the important conceptual tools in public administration is performance
measurement—that is, the combination of systems, tools, and data intended to quantify the effects
of particular programs in some way. It arises out of the somewhat recent shift toward what Berman
(2006) has called the “accountability strategy” (143). Performance measurement is a tool with
obvious appeal in the private sector, allowing companies to measure things such as aspects of
customer service, changes in sales as a result of a new marketing campaign, or the profitability of
new products. But as Graham Allison (1986) and others have observed, the context of public
management is quite different. In the public realm, for example, public administrators must concern
themselves with questions of equity, effectiveness, and efficiency; as well as the specific demands of
program stakeholders, constituencies, and political coalitions—all while being responsive and open
to the public. Indeed, the recognition of these differences, as well as elected officials’ increasing
interest in addressing constitutional issues that are largely absent from the private sector, scholars
crafted the “New Public Management,” which tries to emulate some facets of the private sector
while maintaining public administration’s distinctiveness from business administration (Denhardt and
Denhardt, 2000).

problems with respect to the state’s monitoring efforts, and the federal government’s (4) overall
determination.
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In the context of declining resources and increasing taxpayer skepticism, public officials have
been willing to accept management practices that appeared to benefit successful businesses.
Although it began as “bean counting”—involving only the documentation of program inputs and
outputs—performance measurement became increasingly sophisticated in the wake of the Great
Society programs. Importantly, there was a new focus on program theory, goals, outcomes, and
impacts. Public administrators increasingly used performance measurement to manage complex
programs, in the pursuit of what Stone (1988) has called the “rationality project”—an effort to rescue
public programs from the “indignities” of politics (4). This trend, along with the increasing triumph of
technology over the challenges of data collection and analysis, enabled performance systems to
become even more sophisticated, rapid, and complex into the twenty-first century.
The rationalization stream remains a major focus in large-scale ongoing discussions of public
administration. Performance measurement has been a theme (and concern) not only in the New
Public Management, but also in subsequent models of public administration such as the New Public
Service (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000), Digital Era Governance (Dunleavy et al., 2005), and
conjunctive administrative theory (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). As a means of assessing outputs
and outcomes, performance measurement is not going away in the foreseeable future.
Notably, Congress and other legislative bodies in the United States have embraced
performance measurement to address longstanding policy priorities.

Indeed, performance

measurement—especially monitoring systems that relied on the regular collection of data as
technology permitted—were increasingly prominent features of substantial legislative efforts and
reauthorizations. One major policy area in which performance measurement has visibly entered the
legislative and administrative spheres is public education, which makes it an ideal setting in which to
examine the effects of performance measurement.
The Intergovernmental Context of Education Policy

5

Throughout much of American history, public education has been a state responsibility.
During the latter half of the 20th century, Federal involvement in education policy was spurred by
changing national priorities, such as a concern for returning veterans, national security, and a
growing public and judicial demand to apply constitutional requirements for equal protection. The
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 is perhaps the most perceptible of these
congressional actions given its extensive provisions and renewals spanning half a century. Congress’s
subsequent reauthorizations of ESEA reflected a burgeoning national movement toward standardsbased education—a movement that increasingly emphasized student performance and, by
extension, the performance of states and school districts that receive funding under the act. These
performance measurement elements were central to the 2001 reauthorization of the act—No Child
Left Behind (NCLB)—and laid the foundation for considerable debate in the years that followed.
Perhaps less visible but equally consequential was the development of the Education for the
Handicapped Act (EHA), first passed in 1975. Like ESEA, the EHA saw a number of reauthorizations
over a long time period, and its core interests expanded beyond the basic provision of funds to states
for special education programs.

Equally significant was EHA’s reliance on performance

measurement, especially after it was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA)
in 1997.
The 2004 reauthorization of IDEA, passed in the wake of NCLB, enabled the U.S. Department
of Education to construct a performance monitoring system that attempted to set standards—many
of longstanding concern to education policymakers—by which each state would be held accountable.
The department, through the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), developed a monitoring
system characterized by quantifiable performance indicators.

Although OSEP would play an

oversight role through an annual determination process, the states retained the ability to set
performance targets for some indicators and additional leeway.

This multi-level system of
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performance measurement was to rely on articulated metrics (through state-level performance
plans) and annual descriptions of each state’s results and progress toward improvement (through
annual performance reports.) The monitoring system also relied on the regular flow of data and
information between OSEP and state education authorities.
What emerged has been a highly systematic approach to performance measurement—and
certainly one of the most comprehensive in the educational realm. The monitoring system is
systematic due to the annual performance reporting structure and the state-OSEP feedback loop,
and it is comprehensive due to its reach over three levels of government (federal, state, and local)
and its incorporation of major components of special education as Congress and the judiciary have
defined them since the 1970s.

Furthermore OSEP’s implementation of IDEA 2004 was aligned in

many ways with NCLB.
A Closer Look at the Problem
Despite its prominence and popularity in policy areas such as public education, performance
measurement has proven to be controversial. A number of scholars, for example, have noted some
intellectual and cognitive limitations of the performance mindset, while others have pointed to
problems that can arise when performance systems emphasize data collection over improvement.
Performance measurement may also suffer when data and metrics are inappropriately chosen—for
example, when invalid measures are used.
Performance measurement also presents a number of challenges when applied in the
context of American federalism. Systematic efforts to measure performance in the context of
federalism may also expose the tension between advocates of devolution and the centralizing
tendencies of performance monitoring regimes. Radin (2006), for example, describes the “classical”
approach in which the federal government, often acting as a funding source, requires grant recipients
to measure aspects of performance as a condition for receiving the funding. The success of this
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approach, however, may be contingent on the ability of federal actors to control performance
monitoring and improvement efforts in policy areas in which sub-national actors have historically
exercised authority—and autonomy.
This tool is also problematic because policy actors at multiple levels of government may not
share common strategies or values, despite actors’ relative positions, roles, and constituencies within
the performance system.

Posner’s (2002) notion of “third party government”—that is, the

collaboration of public and private actors at multiple levels—may come in to play as technical
assistance agencies and statistical consultants contribute to policy implementation. The problem is
complicated by the increasing complexity of data management and analysis, a reality that requires
additional procedures, actors, and regulations at multiple levels of government. The multitude of
actors risks a divergence of interests and approaches for meeting the performance criteria, possibly
obstructing the monitoring authority’s use of performance measurement to influence policy
outcomes delivered by sub-national actors.
In the last decade, a number of scholars and practitioners note that these inconsistencies
and variations thwart comparison of performance measurement across settings in federal education
policies, such as No Child Left Behind. Prior to NCLB, state governments had become acquainted
with what Gais and Fosset (2005) have called “executive federalism,” that is, collaboration with
federal agencies through a system of arrangements that tended to respond to the political,
economic, and demographic variation among states.

NCLB, with its standardized testing and

“adequate yearly progress” requirements, represented a departure from this arrangement and
toward a more centralized performance monitoring regime. A thorough investigation of state
characteristics, performance, and reactions to NCLB standards are absent from existing studies,
although some scholars such as Bryan Shelley have investigated the characteristics of states that
either formally protested (2008) or sought flexibility within (2012) the NCLB framework. This deprives
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the literature of what Frank Thompson and Burke (2009) call efforts to place state variation “under a
microscope” and the need to investigate “what explains the substantial difference among states in
their propensity to pursue”, among other things, accommodation within federal programs (41).
This research gap also obstructs efforts to link the implementation of multi-level
performance systems to some concerns associated with the performance movement in general. For
example, it is difficult to assert that state responses to federal performance systems are associated
with the design and implementation of those systems, certain state-level characteristics, or some
combination of these things. Expanding this knowledge may help us to better understand multi-level
performance measurement not only in the special education realm, but also in other realms where
intergovernmental conflicts exist.2
The deficiency in federalism and performance literature is even more evident in studies
considering IDEA. Although IDEA 2004 was aligned with NCLB in the sense that it required states to
measure and improve performance, it was concerned with a more specific policy area than NCLB—
one that Congress and the federal courts had developed and articulated in various ways since the
Civil Rights era. As a result of the relatively broad scope of IDEA’s implementation and coverage,
specialists who have considered its implementation have tended to focus on particular dimensions of
special education policy. As a whole, however, IDEA has received relatively little attention from the
perspectives of federalism and performance measurement. Together with its broad scope, the
complexity of IDEA’s implementation may help explain why it has not received such attention relative
to NCLB.
OSEP has chosen to use a highly rationalized approach to performance measurement, going
further down this path than previous performance monitoring efforts. For example, the office

2

One such realm is environmental policy, in which state and local relationships with the federal Environmental
Protection Agency are paramount. See especially Scheberle (2004).
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created a number of diverse performance indicators, each with a distinct policy origin, history, and
set of available methodologies. The resulting system relies on regular and consistent data and
information sharing between OSEP and state education authorities—as well as the regular
involvement of consultants and state advisory councils—in addition to school districts, teachers,
parents, and students. In recent years, IDEA data sharing and communication have become even
more standardized with OSEP’s adoption of a “Results Driven Accountability” system in 2014. The
monitoring system has also withstood the test of time, existing with relatively minor changes for
approximately a decade.
As a highly rationalized performance system, OSEP’s monitoring arrangement also presents a
number of potential problems. The system’s indicators seek to achieve multiple goals that are not
necessarily compatible with one another. For example, IDEA seeks to enhance equal access to
special education programs but also seeks to reduce excessive and inappropriate exposure to those
programs.

In addition, OSEP has distinguished between compliance and results, traditionally

emphasizing the former while moving toward the latter in recent years. The office extended this
“compliance vs. results” distinction to the performance indicators themselves, and this permits a
study of how the states have reacted to the distinction since IDEA 2004’s implementation.
Furthermore, to the extent that OSEP has permitted states to set their own “measureable and
rigorous” performance targets, the federal authority may have fostered some level of interstate
variation, while pushing states to improve results relative to the states’ own baselines. The effect
this has had on IDEA’s effort to improve program performance nationwide has remained largely
unexplored.
A better understanding of IDEA’s implementation of performance measurement should
contribute to testing theory in Political Science, because IDEA’s implementation is an example of
what Kenneth Wong has called “performance based federalism” (2008, S178). Under this model, the
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federal government uses its authority and inducements in the form of fiscal sanctions to influence
the performance of sub-national actors. As such, IDEA offers an opportunity to assess this approach
to federalism as well as claims by advocates and critics of the performance movement. Furthermore,
given the law’s implementation by means of specifically defined performance indicators and multiple
levels of service delivery, analyses of IDEA data can contribute to the debate about the challenges
associated with implementing performance regimes that involve multiple levels of government.
Overview of the Study
Hypotheses
Although they will be discussed in later chapters, the hypotheses that emerge from the literature,
policy, and document reviews of subsequent chapters are as follows:
1. Efforts to systematically assess program performance in the special education realm will
have mixed results with regard to improvement.
2. States will address the problems that OSEP identifies and will show evidence of
improvement for those performance indicators after OSEP has pointed out the problems.
3. States will meet compliance indicator targets more consistently than results indicator
targets, and states will exhibit improvement on the compliance indicators more
consistently than the results indicators.
o

States will, however, improve their performance on the results indicators in 2014
and 2015, when OSEP adopted a greater focus on results (Results Driven
Accountability).

o

Indicators that represent activities or outputs will show greater evidence of
improvement over time than those that measure outcomes.
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4. Across states, greater levels of state-local centralization, state education spending as a
percent of general expenditures, and racial/ethnic homogeneity will be associated with
more favorable indicator-level improvement and overall determinations.
Plan of the Study
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. This chapter has sought to describe the rationale
for the study and to introduce its key research questions. The next chapter investigates the
theoretical foundations of performance measurement and its growth in the public sector; and
identifies some of the controversies surrounding its underlying assumptions. That chapter reviews
the literature and several key federal statutes and executive actions. This review is necessary to
establish the theoretical and political context of the performance movement, especially at the
federal level where IDEA originated. It also helps develop the study’s assertions that performance
measurement is a tool for “rationalizing” of public policy.
The third chapter investigates public education policy in the United States by taking a closer
look at interstate studies, legal documents, committee reports, and other literature. This review is
necessary because IDEA is deeply rooted in the political, legal, and constitutional framework of U.S.
education policy, and that framework must be understood in order to the assess IDEA’s complex
performance measurement system.

Among other things, the chapter reveals that federal

involvement in this policy arena has sparked resentment from many states, especially in the wake of
No Child Left Behind. And, more importantly to the study, the resentment ostensibly hinged on the
federal government’s perceived use of performance measurement as a tool of centralization—that
is, a means to coerce states into adopting certain standards. In this way, the review also provides
guidance for answering the research questions that ask whether and how states have reacted to
IDEA.
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The fourth chapter is a review of documents, statutes, memoranda, literature, and
congressional and executive records to formally define the IDEA performance system. Building on
the complex assumptions and policy frameworks investigated in the previous two chapters, this
chapter formally articulates the study’s statute of interest, in particular the legal concept of Free and
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that drives its performance measurement system. The chapter
explores how the federal government developed the legislation and the subsequent performance
system, how that system was designed to work, and what that system hopes to achieve.
The fifth chapter restates the research questions and formally articulates the study’s data
and variables, paying special attention to the assembly of a large original dataset of state
performance, improvement, and demographic information. Chapters Six and Seven systematically
address the study’s research questions by presenting the results of the analyses, assessing whether
the study’s null hypotheses should be rejected, and discussing the findings.
The final chapter discusses the study’s broader findings. It attempts to answer the study’s
core research question: “Can an effort to systematically assess programs improve performance?”,
and discusses the implications of that answer for theory and practice. This chapter also suggests
some limitations of the study and directions for future research.
Conclusion
This chapter began by introducing the dissertation’s topic, research questions, and rationale.
It went on to suggest that performance measurement has become ubiquitous in the public sector
despite disagreements about its underlying assumptions. On their own, these controversies are of
interest to students of public policy and administration. But there is a research gap that prevents us
from connecting the controversies of performance measurement to some of the problems of
intergovernmental relationships in the United States. This, in turn, clouds our efforts to assess farreaching statutes such as IDEA, which rely heavily on intergovernmental relationships and principles
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of performance measurement. After noting these problems, the chapter provided an overview of
the study, first by laying out the hypotheses to be considered later, and then by describing what the
subsequent chapters intend to do.
Although this study may contribute to our knowledge of performance measurement systems
and intergovernmental relations, it should be remembered that the statute of interest—IDEA—
impacts over 6.5 million children and their families. Children with intellectual and physical disabilities
represent a historically underserved population, and there is considerable disagreement over the
appropriate type and level of services these children should receive.

At a practical level,

understanding what the statute intends to do, and whether its intentions are being carried out, can
reveal whether these children are experiencing the education and developmental outcomes
intended by Congress, as expressed in the statute and through decades of existing special education
policy. The need for such knowledge is especially urgent now that ESEA has been reauthorized, and
Congress and the new administration may well revisit IDEA in the coming years. Finally, this inquiry
can also provide evidence about the feasibility and limitations of intergovernmental performance
measurement in the twenty-first century, and possibly shed light on realistic policy avenues for the
future.
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CHAPTER 2: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT
This chapter explores the foundations of performance measurement, its growth in the public
sector, and identifies some of the controversies surrounding its assumptions. To do this, it will
review the literature and several key federal statutes and executive actions. This review is intended
to establish the theoretical and political context of the performance movement, especially at the
federal level where IDEA originated.

It also develops the study’s assertions that performance

measurement is a major tool for “rationalizing” of public policy.
Performance Measurement Defined
Performance measurement, a central concept in this research, might seem straightforward
at first glance, but its definition can be more complicated. Therefore, this chapter begins by carefully
defining this concept. Although performance could mean any action or activity, in this discussion I
use “performance,” to describe the actions undertaken by a program or policy that are intended to
fulfill an explicit or implied program function or purpose. This might seem obvious, but many
programs lack a clearly articulated definition of their core functions and intentions. Therefore, efforts
to elucidate these actions and activities are crucial steps in determining what constitutes
performance. By “measurement,” I mean the systematic collection of information that is connected
in some way to a program as it linked to a program’s goal(s) and objectives.
Measurement may focus on one or more stages of a program’s implementation. Typically,
there is a program theory that provides the underlying conceptual framework that links program
activities to the accomplishment of specific objectives and ultimately the program’s goal(s).One
might connect a program’s activities to its objectives and goals in a visual way, using an outcome line
(Mohr, 1995) or a logic model (Frechtling, 2007; Rossi, 2004). Thus, program theory may be
expressed as a set of causal assumptions (or “causal chains”) and linkages associated with the
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program’s implementation (Smith and Larimer, 2009). Measurement may proceed, of course, using
a variety of tools and standards.
In the public and nonprofit sectors, “performance” is often linked to accountability—that is,
the idea that the actions of a program, actor, or groups can be known, defined, recorded, and
studied for the purpose of making a judgment about those actions relative to a standard. In the field
of Public Administration, budgeting interests spurred the development of accountability and laid
some of the foundations for modern performance measurement. But the concept of accountability,
particularly in a democratic setting, is not entirely freed of its political component. In particular,
accountability in public administration requires one to conceptualize the entity or person that is
being held to account, as well as the entity or person to whom accountability is owed. This, in turn,
has tended to hinge on the paradigm to which the discipline or author of the concept has been
influenced. As it concerns performance measurement, the concept of accountability also carries the
necessity of expressing the subject matter to which the principal is holding the agent accountable.
One may also view performance measurement as a tool in a century-long effort by
administrators to use an increasingly systematic set of controls, systems, and procedures in order to
rationalize policy and thereby achieve goals and objectives, even in the absence of any clear direction
of policy by their principals, elected public officials. Deborah Stone (1988) has referred to this effort
as the “rationality project”—an endeavor that both accepts and strives to enhance a politicsadministration dichotomy. From this vantage point, the development of performance measurement
is part and parcel of administrative developments—closely guided by advancements in science and
technology—which have provided policymakers with ever-increasing information about policy
initiatives. However, the collection and use of this information rests on a number of assumptions
about human behavior, public policy, and accountability in general.
Underlying Assumptions of Performance Measurement
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Performance measurement rests upon several intellectual currents that are not always
articulated or explicit.

These currents buoy a number of assumptions about performance

measurement, including assumptions about human behavior that are not native to the fields of
Political Science or Public Administration.
One key assumption underlying performance measurement is goal theory. Goal theory holds
that the existence of goals motivates actors to behave differently. Such goals, if properly structured
and attainable—for example, using the SMART (specific, measureable, achievable, results-focused,
and time-bound) framework—are said to guide actors to develop and improve in ways that lead to
the achievement of goals. Development and improvement thus occur through, and are chiefly
defined by, the design of goals that are developed by a particular entity. In the field of educational
psychology, goals are said to enable teachers or other administrators to encourage and discourage
particular behaviors. Performance measurement tends to borrow similar logic with regard to the
efficacy of incentive arrangements. In particular, performance systems often rely on performance
targets to guide improvement efforts, and to set the criteria for compliance with statutory
requirements. The problem, however, is that goal theory argues that the worker rather than the
manager needs to set the goals. Indeed, workers are more productive if they set specific, difficult
goals and commit publicly to achieving them. Yet with public programs, it is often the policy makers
(similar to managers) who set goals, targets, and so one. The implementers (workers) are the ones
who need to set the goals in order for goal theory to predict improved performance.
Performance measurement, and in particular its justification in the public sector, is also seen
as a solution to the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem exists when a person or
group of people—the principal—empowers another person or group—the agent—to act on the
principal’s behalf. The principal and agent, however, have diverging interests, information, and
formative backgrounds that result in the agent’s inability or unwillingness to carry out the exact
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wishes of the principal. In highly complex policymaking environments such as those that emerged in
the twentieth century, the principal-agent problem is further exacerbated by information
asymmetries and the existence of massive legislative frameworks that tend to “package” many
competing components into one bill or resolution that is ultimately brought to a vote. Large
bureaucracies may also have interests such as maximizing their budgets, expanding existing
programs and acquiring new ones, insulating themselves from the oversight of elected officials,
favoring policies they regard as objectionable but that are favored by their principals, and building
support among clientele groups. All of these interests may be at odds with those of their principals,
elected public officials.
The principal-agent problem can become magnified whenever executive agencies implement
legislation by means of administrative law. Such law involves an often lengthy, complicated, and
opaque rule making process. Regulations or rules, once issued, are often subject to court challenge
and adjudication. The enforcement of rules can also be a complicated process. The net result is that
executive agencies acquire substantial discretionary legislative and executive powers. As problems
and their solutions become more complex, Congress has had to rely more heavily on the executive
departments to carry out its intentions. These intentions can be aspirational rather than realistic,
multiple and conflicting rather than single and clear cut, and vague rather than specific. This
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies or to departments as disbursers of grants-in-aid gives
these executive agencies substantial autonomy or discretionary authority in their role of agents. This
situation has also been repeated at the state level, especially as many legislatures and governorships
began to adopt term limits, and elected leadership came to rely heavily on the institutional and
technical knowledge of agency professionals.
One way for elected officials—as principals—to exercise control over the implementation of
complex and comprehensive statutes has been through the use of performance measurement.
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Performance measurement provisions—which might be included in the legislation itself—can allow
legislatures, interest groups, researchers, and the general public to gauge the degree to which the
enacted program is achieving its legislative aims. The principal-agent problem assumes that this type
of oversight is necessary to counter the implementing agencies’ incentive to shirk or otherwise tailor
the implementation process to fit the resource, technical, and personnel arrangements of the
agencies rather than the intended legislative requirements.
Hal Colebatch (1995) argues that the performance mindset (program evaluation in particular)
makes a number of assumptions about public policy and organizations. It assumes, for example, that
(1) policies exist to solve problems, (2) policies represent decision makers’ choices about how to
achieve desired outcomes, (3) organizations exist as instruments for this purpose, (4) organizational
activities are the components of programs, and that (5) one can assess programs by connecting
problems to outcomes. Colebatch argues that these “rationalist aspirations for policy” also assume
that organizations are coherent, instrumental, and hierarchical (150). These assumptions can, of
course, pose considerable problems for performance measurement, which will be considered later in
this chapter.
Performance measurement also assumes that actors within the policy cycle use information
to make decisions. One way to think about performance-based decision making is to consider the
human capacity and willingness to process information. For example, the pure rationality approach
to decision making assumes that policymakers can impartially collect information, assess
alternatives, and choose the most advantageous course of action given a particular standard.
Alternatively, scholars such as Herbert Simon (1957) have argued that “bounded rationality”, in
which information is disseminated and retained in a way that is limited by the constraints of
information symmetries and human cognitive limits, is a more appropriate way to think about
decision making.

Another interpretation of performance-based decision making is Charles
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Lindblom’s (1959) concept of incrementalism or “muddling through”, which emphasizes the fact of
conflicting interests in policymaking and the need for compromise as a tool for reconciling these
interests.

Aaron Wildavsky (1969) extended the incremental approach to public budgeting

processes, from which many contemporary performance measurement systems arose. Some of
these differing perspectives are evident in public sector performance measurement, which, as the
next section will discuss, has risen to prominence without a clear consensus about the utility of the
information it intends to provide.
The History of Performance Measurement
Budgetary Origins
Performance measurement in the public sector is traceable to the various accountability
movements that appeared with the Progressive Movement. Progressive reformers came to define
the idea of public sector accountability in quantifiable and numeric terms—especially with regard to
public budgeting systems. Early public administration theorists tended to frame accountability as
directional—that is, something that was owed by public administrators and their agencies to elected
officials and the public. Frederickson (1997) and others continue to recognize this framework as an
intellectual keystone of professional public service.
Many early efforts to hold public agencies financially accountable occurred at the local level.
For example, during the Progressive Era, citizens in a number of large U.S. cities—most famously New
York City—developed municipal research organizations to monitor and report on the expenses and
outputs of municipal services. These organizations tended to coincide with other municipal reforms
such as council-manager systems that placed administrative (and budgetary) powers into the hands
of appointed professionals. These reform efforts were also evident at the state level as the “short
ballot” concentrated gubernatorial powers, and at the federal level as Congress delegated increasing
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budgetary discretion to the president with the Budget and Accounting Act (1921) and the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act (1950).
These diverse reforms included planning-programming-budgeting (PPBS), a process that
collects data on unit costs and services, often expressed as work plans. Early PPB systems (PPBS)
faced problems associated with lag time—for example, data became obsolete before legislators
could approve complex PPB plans. Lee and Johnson (1978) identify other key reforms such as the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Uniform Project System and the Tennessee Valley Authority’s effort
to construct budgets that described specific program actions and objectives. They argue, however,
that early “performance budgeting” efforts like these fell short of their intentions due to their use of
inadequate, insufficient, or inappropriate data (70). Another budgetary reform, zero-base budgeting,
required organizations to justify their funding and even very existence, a process that often required
substantial performance data and analysis. This experiment was challenged by the often exhaustive
process required to collect these data (Lee and Johnson, 1978).
Despite the challenges that early budgeting reforms posed to planners, the reforms tended
to subject multiple dimensions of programs to regular review and cursory assessment during the
budget process. This enabled both legislators and administrators to identify and reward units or
“budget lines” that either consistently performed well according to some criterion or those which
decision-makers viewed to be relevant or otherwise essential to prevailing legislative agendas. More
importantly, these reform efforts encouraged public officials to view programs in terms of activities,
outputs, and outcomes.
Early observers such as Allen Schick (1966) have argued that twentieth century budgeting
reforms proceeded through several stages of accountability. The earliest stage involved a concern
for inputs and program resources; the second stage emphasized accountability through efficiency;
and the third stage concentrated on planning for objectives. Lee and Johnson (1978) built on Schick’s
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view by arguing that the progression of accountability augmented executive responsibilities for
program outcomes. This expansion of responsibility, they argue, not only extended accountability
systems beyond single-year budget cycles, but also enabled public officials to hold programs
accountable for a diverse set of outcomes that reflected increasingly complex policy problems.
Program Evaluation and Policy Disappointments
Military spending on field-level evaluations during World War II and the expansion of federal
programs during the New Deal and Great Society eras spurred the growth of program evaluation as
an empirically grounded method of inquiry. As these federal programs expanded, tools of evaluation
became better refined. Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) seminal guidance on research designs, for
example, helped to identify methods for conducting social science research that would yield valid
findings about causes and their effects. It was possible using the more powerful research designs,
including the experimental and quasi-experimental designs, to obtain estimates of program effects
that were not confounded by other factors. Evaluation theorists also began to articulate theories of
practice. For example, Joseph Wholey’s (1983) advocated for evaluability assessments, where
evaluators first discuss and reach agreement with the evaluation sponsor and other stakeholders on
the evaluation’s objectives. He argues for evaluations involving rapid-feedback and an ongoing
process of monitoring output and outcomes. These developments built on budgeting reforms to
broaden the ends for which programs would be held accountable. They encouraged elected officials
to establish legal requirements along with funding for governmental agencies to conduct program
evaluations. Program evaluation soon emerged as both a respectable discipline and field of practice,
as evidenced especially by Peter Rossi’s efforts to frame it as a highly systematic process (Rossi et al.,
2004).
Many of the New Deal and Great Society programs, however, sought to address problems
that were much different in scope from the budgeting and good-government concerns of the
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Progressives. The New Deal agenda was a response to a massive economic crisis. There were few
governmental programs in place to provide financial relief to unemployed and suffering individuals
and families, as well as struggling and failing businesses. The Great Society era programs responded
to public concerns about the declining economy and growing poverty. The programs, since they
involved a dramatic expansion of federal government involvement in the economy, raised
constitutional issues at a number level not seen since Reconstruction.
This reality contributed to the discontentment of elected public officials in at least two ways.
First, these officials were being asked to create agencies and programs to deal with problems about
which they lacked good information. For example, issues such as inequality, poverty, and
homelessness proved difficult to express in measureable terms, and the various metrics suggested
for measuring these broad problems proved to be controversial. The nature and scope of the
problems were also difficult to quantify. What elected public officials were familiar with were
agencies and their existing budgeting, staffing, and “infrastructural” charges. Even if public officials
could agree on a specific method for expressing and measuring these problems, executive authorities
often had difficulty implementing the program designed to rectify those problems (Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1973). The federal government experienced considerable difficulty, for example, in
“targeting” and defining the specific geographic areas eligible for the Model Cities program in the
1960s—a crucial factor required for the program’s planned implementation.
A second factor that contributed to discontentment over these mid-twentieth century
programs was the perceived persistence and even escalation of the very problems the programs
intended to solve. This perception, combined with the Vietnam/Watergate crises, national fiscal
crises, and tax revolts, contributed to public skepticism about the public sector’s ability to solve
complex social problems. These factors fostered a political climate in which charges of waste,
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ineffectiveness, and corruption became effective campaign slogans, and by 1980 a professed antigovernment candidate, Ronald Reagan, was elected president by a landslide.
As public programs came under increasing scrutiny, however, public officials began to
distinguish between program evaluation and performance measurement. Resource constraints and
shifting perceptions of accountability helped to clarify some distinctions between program
evaluation and performance measurement. For example, generally speaking, performance
measurement systems tended to be ongoing rather than episodic, broadly-focused rather than issuespecific, routinized rather than customized, and program funded (McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006).
These characteristics encouraged some programs to address accountability independently of formal
evaluations.
Performance measurement systems also became attractive to program managers since they
had a large role in developing and carrying them out. The same generally is not true of program
evaluations, which are often conducted by outside evaluators under contract. Plainly, managers
wanted some control over how their programs were assessed since they knew they would be held
accountable for their programs’ achievement of goals and specified objectives.

In addition,

performance measurement provided those making decisions on budgets, including elected
executives, legislators, and agency heads, with a mechanism for allocating scarce resources by
rewarding high-performing units and programs with larger budget increases relative to others
(McDavid and Hawthorn, 2006). Finally, elected public officials, agency heads, agency personnel, and
other stakeholders were able to make use of the information provided by performance
measurement for framing discussions about policies and programs. For example, at the local level,
managers implemented benchmarking as a way of assessing and comparing the performance of their
departments relative to similar communities. Mayors and council members were able to use
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objective measures of good performance, such as sharp drops in the crime rate or successes in
attracting new business development, as persuasive arguments in election campaigns.
Other voices argued against making this distinction. According to McDavid and Hawthorn
(2006), program evaluation and performance measurement are part of the same feedback loop that
assesses and connects outcomes to programs, and hence, as Wholey (2001) suggested, could be used
jointly. Yet, many government and nonprofit organizations saw value in adopting quality-based
performance standards, such as total quality management, first developed in the private sector. On
the other hand, there was political risk from formal and systematic program evaluations. In an era of
fiscal restraint, the program’s budget might be cut and, even worse, the program terminated. For
program managers and staff, there was far less risk to performance measurement; managers and
staff had greater control over it. This is a major reason that performance measurement experienced
a considerable upsurge of support in the public and nonprofit sectors. It supported New Public
Management’s emphasis on giving managers the responsibility and discretion necessary to improve
quality in the delivery of public services.
The Quality Paradigm
The Quality Paradigm is a relatively broad concept that characterizes the thinking of various
private-sector entities, especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The concept borrows
much from Total Quality Management (TQM) principles, which stemmed largely from the writing of
management specialists such as D.E. Deming, as well as many western corporations borrowing the
management practices of Asian firms—especially in Japan. Berman (2006) has framed the Quality
Paradigm as a customer-oriented approach to management that public managers have been
adopting in earnest since the early 1990s and especially in the 21st century. Like their private-sector
counterparts, many public organizations have engaged in process reengineering in order to address
the core principles of customer-centered service, “flatter” organizational hierarchies, employee
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empowerment, and innovation. This type of reengineering involves restructuring organizations to
focus upon outcomes, often defined as service goals, but also as statutory compliance. Managers,
knowing that outcomes are the focus of organizational effort, must develop performance measures
and data collection efforts for monitoring changes in those measures. A number of organizations
have responded to this need—often due to statutory pressures (e.g., a legal requirement to develop
and use performance measurement), the need to better allocate scarce resources, or because their
proactive managers believe that adopting and using performance measurement will improve both
their professional reputation and the performance of their organizations.
A number of “quality” dimensions have fostered the adoption of performance measurement
systems. Martin and Kettner (2010) have argued that the concept of “quality”—which includes
dimensions ranging from accessibility and competency to responsiveness and security—was fully
integrated into performance measurement by the twenty-first century, alongside the more
traditional concerns for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. For example, program managers have
adopted service standards, systematic assessments, integrated information systems, and process
mapping.

McDavid and Hawthorn (2006) assert that performance measurement systems have

adopted a number of managerial concerns that are legacies of the Quality paradigm. For example,
public managers may adopt performance measurement to improve employee morale by
disseminating client feedback and encouraging employee participation in improvement efforts.
Developments in American Federalism
The ascent of performance measurement coincided with a growing tendency to devolve
federal program implementation to the states. This approach, historically rooted in the states’ rights
philosophy and gradually enabled by Nixon-era fiscal federalism, has enjoyed political popularity in
recent decades. Advocates of this type of devolution argue that state and local governments are the
best judges of their own distinctive demographics, needs, and politics and, because of this, are best
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qualified to implement federal programs. In the context of performance measurement, devolution
exacerbates the principal-agent problem by designating state agencies—whose primary
accountability is owed to governors and state legislatures—as the primary agents responsible for
federal policy implementation (Walker, 2000).

This proliferation of agents (states) heightens

concerns of the principal (national government) about performance. As such, Congress and federal
grant-administering authorities (usually located in cabinet-level departments) frequently link
intergovernmental disbursements to some means of assessing—rigorously or otherwise—such
programs. These reporting requirements contribute to accusations at the state and local level of
burdening recipients with unfunded mandates. Indeed, as the next chapter shall explore, this
criticism often surface in the political debates over major federal policy initiatives and the
mechanisms by which they are assessed.
Information Technology
Performance measurement systems benefitted from advances in information technology,
such as personal computers, networks, survey and statistical software, email, and the internet, which
proliferated at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Without this technology, conducting routine
and ongoing performance measurement was labor intensive, difficult, and time-consuming. Newer
advances in information technology include data collection by electronic reporting systems and the
expanded use of data repositories (data centers and the “cloud”).

Over time, program staff

conducting performance measurement had access to easy-to-use statistical software for conducting
analyses. Evan Berman (2006) frames information technology (IT) as a group of management
strategies that may enable organizations to reduce transaction costs, increase human interaction,
and provide more timely and comprehensive information, among other things.

Although these

strategies are emergent and often costly, their adoption has not only affected individual
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organizations, but also the pace and scope of dissemination and use of performance information
(Holley, Dufner, and Reed, 2004).
Improvements in information technology have also resolved some of the major constraints
on planning associated with the often disappointing PPBS and performance budgeting experiments
of the twentieth century. For example, program managers could reassess problems without lag time
given the advent of instantaneous data transmission between agencies and governing bodies.
One could argue that data integration and other IT advancements represent a solution to a
long-existing obstacles—information deficiency, time constraints, and limits on cognition—that acted
as impediments to “rational” policymaking. Advances in information technology have broadened the
appeal of performance measurement as a tool for enhancing public policy. This appeal is, in fact,
evident in a number of federal actions in the last two decades.
The Triumph or Performance Measurement
Many of the factors discussed above enhanced the attractiveness of performance
measurement, especially at the federal level. Performance-based systems appealed to at least two
political agendas: for program advocates, they offered promise of enhancing program impact and
justifying program expansion; for program opponents and skeptics, they offered the promise of
increasing program accountability by subjecting programs to routine oversight and threats of budget
reductions. For program opponents and skeptics, Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government
(1992) reinforced their beliefs that government bureaus are less efficient than private businesses.
Based on their perspective, there was a need to hold government bureaus accountable for their
performance and a need for a national accountability strategy.
The federal effort to formally embrace the performance movement culminated in the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. The GPRA required all federal agencies to
develop performance plans and annual performance reports—a requirement that would be
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subordinated linked to annual budget cycles. In contrast to previous performance efforts, the GPRA
was an act of Congress rather than a decision of an executive agency. As a 1997 report from the
General Accounting Office (GAO) pointed out, Congress through the GRPA attempted to adopt the
“best features of its predecessors” and apply them on a larger scale (8). This larger stage included
federal agencies that administered federal grants to states, thus extending the reach of GPRA to
state and local agencies that received funding or otherwise participated in the delivery of these
federal programs.
The second Bush administration expanded performance measurement through its Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In contrast to the GPRA, PART was an executive effort spearheaded
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that focused on programs rather than agencies.
PART enabled OMB officials to assess (using questionnaires that varied by agency type) a number of
performance measures for particular agencies. These weighted measures included design (20%),
strategic planning (10%), program management (20%) and program results (50%); and agencies could
receive one of five ratings ranging from “effective” to “ineffective.”3 Portions of PART were codified
by Executive Order 13450 in 2007, which also established a Performance Improvement Council
within the OMB. Although PART received criticism for its perceived disconnection from the OMB’s
actual budget recommendation process (OMB Watch, 2005), it represented a further embrace of
performance measurement that, like the GPRA, impacted multiple levels of government via block
grant programs.
The Obama administration sustained the federal focus on performance measurement. One
of the president’s earliest actions was the creation of the non-statutory position of Chief
Performance Officer (CPO), to which he appointed the same person nominated for the statutory
3

Two of these components—design and strategic planning—may be more closely related to program
evaluation than performance measurement. This is an illustration of how performance measurement and
program evaluation can be and probably are used jointly despite efforts to separate the two as noted earlier.
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Deputy Director for Management (DDM) in the OMB—effectively consolidating the positions in one
individual. The administration also announced its intention to replace PART with the Performance
Improvement and Analysis Framework, which would, according to the OMB, “switch the focus from
grading programs as successful or unsuccessful to requiring agency leaders to set performance goals,
demonstrate progress in achieving goals, and explain performance trends” (Congressional Research
Service (CRS), 2011, 13). The OMB and CPO also announced “High Priority Performance Goals”
(HPPGs) for 24 agencies in 2009, most of which focused on inputs, activities, outputs, and proximal
outcomes (CRS, 2011). The president’s FFY2011 budget also outlined “performance management
strategies” that included “us(ing) performance to lead, learn, and improve outcomes;
communicat(ing) performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency; and
strengthen(ing) problem-solving networks” (CRS, 2011, 24).
Importantly, the Obama administration’s efforts to enhance performance measurement
were not done in isolation. In 2010, for example, Congress passed and the president signed the
GPRA Modernization Act. This legislation codified the existence of performance improvement
officers (PIOs—a legacy of PART and E.O. 13450), realigned timeframes for strategic planning,
required regular congressional consultations, quarterly rather than annual reviews, descriptions of
the resources and strategies agencies use to implement their performance plans, OMB action on
agencies’ unmet goals, and designation of cross-cutting federal priority goals.

In 2011, the

administration launched the website “performance.gov” to announce and report priority goals. By
2014, each agency reported its strategic and agency priority goals, each of which contained progress
updates, “next steps”, performance indicators, and “contributing programs and other factors” (U.S.
Government, 2016).
Criticism of Performance Measurement
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Beryl Radin (2006) argues that performance measurement has enjoyed widespread adoption
with only limited attention paid to its theoretical or demonstrated consequences.

These

consequences, she asserts, are often adverse due to outdated assumptions about and models of
public policy and administration. A number of other authors have questioned various aspects of
performance measurement, and given its widespread adoption in the public sector, these criticisms
should be carefully considered.
Fragmentation
The fragmentation of the American political system creates considerable problems for public
sector performance measurement. The problem of fragmentation arises from the constitutional
separation of powers—especially between the legislative and executive branch—and from
federalism. Radin has written extensively (2000, 2006, 2009) about difficulties associated with
implementing performance measurement within the American federal system. Chief among these is
the difficulty of federal officials to implement performance monitoring and improvement efforts in
policy areas in which state and local officials have historically exercised considerable discretionary
authority, as the next chapter explores in more detail. This is problematic, she argues, because the
management tool of performance measurement assumes that elected public officials, program
managers, program staff, and other stakeholders share common strategies and values, and thus
agree on the program’s goal(s) and specific objectives. This is seldom the case. In a large and diverse
country like the United States, and a federal system of government, these policy actors will hold
different values, occupy different positions, carry out different roles in the policy process, and be
responsive to different constituencies.
With a federal system there will be tension between those who advocate for devolution, and
greater state authority and autonomy, and those who advocate for greater federal authority and the
top-down managerial controls associated with performance monitoring regimes such as those
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expressed in GPRA and PART. Paul Posner (2002) also has noted the phenomenon of “third party
government.” This is the collaboration of public, nonprofit, and private actors at multiple levels that
occurs when implementing joint federal-state programs. Such collaboration, which often involves
large and complex service delivery networks, is seldom easy. For the federal agencies responsible for
such programs, there are clearly additional challenges in using performance measurement as a tool
for monitoring what these programs are accomplishing. Are the state agencies up to the task of
gathering accurate and thorough performance data from the members of these service delivery
networks, calculating performance statistics from the data, and reporting those statistics? When the
federal government is the primary funding source for programs with performance-monitoring
components, it is federal authorities who will have final authority to define both the performance
measures and the performance monitoring systems that are used. In a large federal system like the
United States, it is difficult for federal authorities to use performance monitoring to influence the
policy outcomes delivered by sub-national actors.
The Ambiguous Role of Organizations and Professionals
Performance measurement assumes that the managers and staff of organizations are
capable of acting rationally to achieve the organization's goal(s) and specific objectives. Real-world
organizations, however, have managers, staff, clients, and other stakeholders who may be only
vaguely aware of the organization's goal(s) and specific objectives. Indeed, these individuals have a
multiplicity of goals that are but loosely linked if at all to the organization's goal(s). Colebatch (1995)
asserts that, because organizational activity is characterized by interactions among participants, each
with his or her unique involvement, in the organization and “potentially contradictory”
understanding of its activities, performance-based efforts to assess organizations based on their
accomplishment of goals is problematic (154).
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These concerns conflict with a “one-size-fits-all” approach to performance measurement, in
which organizations and programs are assessed based on how well they are accomplishing their goals
as articulated in legislation, a mission statement, and list of specific objectives. Another concern is
when performance metrics disproportionately emphasize organizational processes.

Such an

emphasis may ignore the environment in which organizations exist, as well as the diverse roles and
perspectives of those who constitute organizations.
Performance measurement systems may also reduce the autonomy of professionals. Eliot
Freidson (2001) has identified two components of professionalism: “(T)hat certain work is so
specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required training and experience, and the belief
that it cannot be standardized or rationalized” (17). As we have seen, performance measurement
systems tend to proceed in a routinized manner that embraces standards, metrics, and indicators.
The professionals using these systems will be doing administrative work that does not correspond
with the specialized work for which they were educated, recruited, and trained. At the agency level
(assuming the absence of additional funding,) resources will be diverted from expenditures on
professionals performing activities directly related to the agency’s mission, to administrative
activities such as the construction of data collection systems, training existing staff to engage in the
necessary data management activities, or hiring third party contractors to collaborate in the
performance measurement effort. These realities may create confusion and adversely affect the
productivity of professionals who carry out the essential mission of the agencies. For example,
federal educational policy in the 2000s that mandated performance measurement in K-12 public
schools resulted in considerable confusion and anger among teachers about their professional
autonomy and role as educators.
Measurement and Assumptions about Values
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Performance measurement systems also face a number of problems with measurement.
Performance measurement systems often assume the existence of a connection between a program
and a particular outcome, and measure that relationship using a standard.

Performance

measurement systems are not usually implemented using research designs with a control group to
allow for a valid determination of program effects. As a result, there may be alternative explanations
for changes in performance, not related to the program. In short, there is often an “attribution”
problem. Since performance measurement systems often do not gather or look at factors that are
not part of the system, but that nevertheless impact performance, opportunities are lost to learn
more about the program and why it is succeeding or failing. While program evaluations using
powerful research designs and analytic methods can sometimes identify such factors, performance
measurement is rarely equipped or intended to do so.
D.T. Campbell (1976) articulated another concern about performance measurement systems:
“The more any quantitative social indicator (or even some qualitative indicator) is used for social
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to
distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (49). Some policymakers raised
this concern, for example, in the educational realm with the advent of high-stakes testing (Chapter
Three). The possibility of gamesmanship may indeed increase as agencies increase their technical
competencies to collect and report complex program data or as agencies become acquainted with
the priorities and interpretations of monitoring authorities.
Some performance measurement efforts also tend to ignore or downplay the reality of
multiple goals. For example, some performance indicators emphasize efficiency and on the surface
appear to be apolitical (Radin, 2006)—a legacy of their budgetary origins. This tendency may create
problems for agencies that deliver social services, especially at the federal level, because of statutory
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duty, program mission, and program implementation that historically emphasized the value of equity
more than efficiency.
Finally, a number of scholars have explored differences in the way people view the world in
general. Howard Gardner (1983), for example, has argued for the existence of six different types of
human intelligence, some of which may be better disposed to meet certain goals than others. Daniel
Goleman (1997) emphasizes the existence of emotional intelligence, which he argues is likely distinct
from traditional views of intelligence quotient (IQ) but likely equally decisive in one’s personal
destiny. In a similar vein, David Boyle (2001) has noted a paradox with regard to numbers, insofar as
“when numbers fail, we get more numbers….(i)f the targets fail, we get more targets…Because
counting and measuring are seen as the antidote to distrust, any auditing failure must need more
auditing” (38-39). Boyle’s paradox and the supposed existence of multiple intelligences stand in
contrast to performance measurement, which is dominated by linear thinkers and draws much of its
authority from data that may have only a transitory legitimacy (Radin, 2006).4
Conclusion
This chapter has considered some of the underlying assumptions of performance
measurement, its historical development, adoption in the public sector, and some of its intellectual
critiques. The exploration revealed that performance measurement has become a major tool for
“rationalizing” public policy, despite some of its criticisms. The review also laid the groundwork for
discussing American education policy, an arena in which many actors have chosen to adopt
performance measurement as part of the accountability strategy. The next two chapters will explore
the development of public education policy in the United States, and in particular the legislative
history of American special education.

4

These ideas about human intelligence and psychology are illustrative of a much larger body of research that is
beyond the scope of this discussion.
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CHAPTER 3: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF AMERICAN EDUCATION POLICY
This chapter explores the background and development of a major policy area—public
education—that has adopted performance measurement in a highly visible way. This chapter will do
this by reviewing interstate studies, legal documents, committee reports, and other scholarly
literature. The purpose of this review is to connect performance measurement to the policy area of
public education. This connection must be explored directly because IDEA’s complex performance
measurement system—the topic of the next chapter—is intertwined with the controversies and
politics of American public education. Moreover, this exploration is needed to understand how the
states—the historically dominant governments in this area—have handled education policy and, in
later chapters, whether and how the states have reacted to IDEA.
By public education, I mean those services provided, governed, and funded by public entities
for the purpose of instructing children and young adults—usually between the ages of five and
eighteen—according to a particular set of principles or standards.5Public education follows a model
that became increasingly formalized throughout American history. This model involves instruction
delivered by teachers during formal and structured meetings with students (pupils) at designated
locations and times. Although postsecondary (higher) education also fits this definition, this research
is principally concerned with the primary and secondary education levels in which the federal
government has shown relatively greater interest.
Public Education in the United States
The scope of public education in the United States has expanded greatly over the last half
century. This reflects the considerable changes that American society has encountered since the
founding era. In colonial times, educational provision, curricula, expectations, and attainment varied

5

It should be noted that special education services—the topic of the next chapter—extend well before and
beyond this age range.
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considerably across the colonies (Cremin, 1970). After independence, the federal government had
virtually no role in education. Among governments, it was only state and local governments that had
the ability to offer and deliver educational services to children, and over time they assumed
responsibility for public education. The federal government’s involvement in public education,
although longstanding, was for many years very modest.
The earliest federal policies with regard to public education worked to augment state and
local resources and prerogatives. The Land Ordinance of 1785, for example, directed resources from
the sale of certain sections of surveyed federal land in the Old Northwest Territory for public
education and its maintenance. Similarly, although intended for higher education, the Morrill Act of
1862 empowered the states by establishing land-grant colleges and universities while deferring to
the state legislatures on decisions regarding the curricula and administration of those institutions
(Hyman, 2008).
State Administration of Education
The states’ prominence in education policy has its roots, therefore, in the historical
circumstances of American federalism. The U.S. Constitution, furthermore, granted Congress only
specifically enumerated powers and reserved, through the Tenth Amendment, all other powers to
the states. This reservation of domestic power to the states ensured that public education, especially
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was shaped largely by the diverse political cultures,
statues, debates, and investments of state governments. Indeed, it was local governments that
taxed their residents, constructed schools, and hired teachers that held the most responsibility for
public education. Commenting on the situation he observed in New England, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed that “(T)he existence of a school is imposed (by the state), but the township builds it, pays
for it, and directs it” (2000, 63).
The Local-State Epoch
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Public education, then, was clearly a state and local affair, and its provision varied
throughout the United States for most of its history. Tax-funded schools at the primary level were
relatively scarce, and these schools tended to educate children of families unable for various reasons
to make educational arrangements with private or ecclesiastical entities. Some state and local
entities chose to restrict access of some families to these resources altogether; African Americans,
for example, faced considerable obstacles to public education in many states (Winslow, n.d.).
During the 1830s and the era of cultural change that followed, reformers such as Horace
Mann advocated for a number of changes—the “common-school” concept—that included access by
all children to education, a greater commitment of resources to education, teacher training, and nondenominational curricula (Winslow, n.d.). Although the drive for reform was no doubt motivated in
part by idealism, it likely also stemmed from the acknowledgement of the expanded electorate
during the Jacksonian era of “mass democracy.” The prospect of a large but poorly-educated voting
public was contrary to the vision of Thomas Jefferson and other revered national founders, who had
advocated educational attainment as a key requisite for a functional democracy.
Out of this reform era also emerged state boards of education, which grew to coordinate the
state-wide provision of public school facilities and other resources. As such, these boards, whose
members were variably elected or appointed depending on the state, wielded considerable influence
over the growth and evolution of education systems.6 In many cases, the boards’ powers expanded
as they assumed direction of executive-level departments of education, or state education
authorities (SEAs). The advent of these state level authorities accompanied the dissemination of
popular educational books, from Noah Webster’s English dictionary to the popular “McGuffey’s”
readers, which laid the foundation for widespread textbook adoption and the standardization of
certain approaches to teaching subjects across schools.
6

Horace Mann, for example, was secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Education.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, many states expanded educational provision to the
secondary level. States were also starting to approve compulsory attendance laws that typically
required children of certain age groups to attend school. Compulsory attendance, in addition to
increased immigration around the turn of the twentieth century, spurred increases in student
enrollment and popular literacy. As student populations grew, many schools were organized into
distinct local governments or local education authorities (LEAs) with geographically defined
boundaries, often governed by locally selected school boards that came to oversee the staffing and
physical demands of local buildings.
As the provision of public education became increasingly widespread and complex in the
twentieth century, local education authorities assumed considerable clout, much of which has
persisted into the twenty-first century. As Kenneth Wong (2004) has noted,
“In practice, once their legal status had been established, local governments enjoy substantial
control over critical resources that can be used to sustain their existence.

Localities can

select their own political representatives, decide on fiscal policies, and choose the scope of
their services.

Localities generally maintain more discretion over district organization,

guidance and counseling, pupil-teacher ratios, staff recruitment, and extracurricular
activities” (360).

Smaller local authorities, however, faced economic problems as populations shifted to urban
areas.

Consequently, throughout the twentieth century, states consolidated many of these

governments. By the dawn of the twenty-first century (2002), school boards accounted for about 15
percent of local governments in the United States, compared to about 70 percent in 1942 (Wong,
2004). In many states, the numerical decline was dramatic. Michigan, for example, counted no
fewer than 7,362 school districts in 1912, but no more than 552 traditional LEAs in 2008 (Michigan
Legislative Council, 2010). Despite their declining numbers, local school boards have enjoyed relative
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stability. Wong asserts that, throughout the United States, these board positions are often popularly
elected,7 seldom contested, usually nonpartisan, and their politics are usually of little interest to
everyday citizens (2004).
An Expanded State Role: Leadership
In recent decades, however, the states—not the local authorities—have played a
considerable role in school funding and accountability. Kenneth Wong’s research (2004) identifies at
least three components of this expanded state role: (1) the leadership and structural diversity of
state boards of education, (2) expanded state funding systems, and (3) the proliferation of statedriven accountability systems. State boards of education are of interest because they oversee
elementary and secondary public education. Because of this, a number of studies have examined
how these boards are selected and the scope of their authority relative to that of the governor and
state legislature. For example, in 2015, the National Association of State Boards of Education
(NASBE) discerned four primary models of state educational governance defined by the means of
selecting the board of education and the chief state school officer. For example, in the first model,
adopted by 13 states, the governor appoints the state board of education while the board
recommends or appoints the chief state school officer. In only three states—New York, South
Carolina, and Mississippi—is the legislature or legislative leaders involved in the selection of board
members; and in three states—Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wisconsin—there is a chief school
officer but no board of education (NASBE, 2015).
In his examination of 2002 data, Wong (2004) also observed that, in the 10 states in which
board members were elected, half conducted statewide partisan elections; and in the 14 states in
which chief school officers were elected, eight used statewide partisan elections. Interestingly, these
data reveal no instances in which a state’s board and chief state school officer are both elected by
7

Some board members may be appointed by the mayor or even the governor in larger cities.
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citizens, although Washington’s chief state school officer is elected by local school board members,
and Wisconsin’s elected chief school officer serves without a state school board. Largely due to their
diversity, these models do not correspond with any obvious geographic or regional clusters.
State Funding Issues
Irrespective of their school governance systems, state governments in the United States have
assumed considerable responsibility for education funding. Apart from constitutionally mandated
funding, it is elected officials, notably the governor and the state legislature, that have final authority
on funding decisions for public schools. In many states, debates on funding are about the details of
formulas that determine the amount of state money that will go to particular school districts.
Funding decisions thus involve politics, and political party control of the governor’s office and of the
state legislature can make a difference. So also can the programmatic and constituency interests of
individual legislators located on key committees dealing with public education, especially those
serving on an appropriations committee or relevant subcommittee. Funding decisions, from a
comparative standpoint, also depend on cultural/historical factors, as some states give a higher
priority to public education than do others (Lee, 1997; Rosenthal and Fuhrman, 1981). In addition,
geographic divisions often permeate state legislatures, as in the form of city-suburban-outstate
cleavages. State legislators must negotiate bargains to achieve state funding levels sufficient to meet
the needs of fiscally distressed and often racially heterogeneous districts (Wong, 2004).
This fragmentation has become more consequential in recent decades, as states have
assumed an increasing share of primary and secondary education funding, relative to local education
authorities. Wong’s (1999) longitudinal study of educational funding across the states found that the
states, on average, funded 38.3 percent of primary and secondary education costs in 1959, but have
hovered around the 50 percent level since the 1980s. Data from the National Center for Educational
Statistics (NCES) reveal that the state share, on average, fell to about 45 percent by FFY 2012 (2011-
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2012). Yet here, too, variation exists for levels of state funding. Some states, such as New Mexico
(73.0%) and Washington (67.8%), have assumed a high level of responsibility for education funding;
whereas others, such as Illinois (28.7%) and New Hampshire (17.8%) have assumed much lower
levels of responsibility (NCES, 2012; Wong, 2004).
There are a number of reasons for this variation in state funding responsibility. First, a
number of states have faced judicial challenges to their school finance structures, as many high-tax
but low-wealth school districts initiated lawsuits regarding funding inequities relative to wealthier
districts (McDermott, 1999). As a result, many states adopted redistributive formulas that allocate
state and local resources in a more equitable way.
A second reason for variation in state funding responsibility is the anti-property tax climate
that swept through many states starting in the 1970s, most visibly in the wake of California’s
Proposition 13 (1978). In the wake of this revolt, a number of studies found a positive relationship
between the organization of such taxpayer revolts and the state share of K-12 education funding
over time (American Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 1980; Urban Institute,
1983).
In Michigan, for example, the state legislature had resisted an expansive funding role for
public education prior to 1993—the state’s share of funding was only 28.7 percent in 1993-1994
(Wong, 2004). In a number of school districts in the state, the decline of manufacturing led to
serious fiscal problems; other school districts, however, mostly in wealthy suburbs, were unaffected.
Further, an adversarial relationship existed between public officials from Detroit and those from
outstate. These differences made it impossible for legislators to reach a compromise, despite the
fiscal problems of some districts and funding inequities becoming more serious over time. Facing
growing public and media discontent over the well-publicized March closure of a rural school district,
the governor and legislature eventually agreed to replace a substantial percentage of property tax
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revenue with state revenue while raising the state sales tax, fees, and certain excise taxes—an
arrangement that voters later approved as “Proposal A.” (Arsen et al., 2005; Vergari, 1995). In the
wake of the compromise, Michigan’s state share of educational funding rose to 66.8 percent by
1995-1996. Michigan’s experience thus provides an example of how a property tax revolt meshed
with fiscal crises in school districts, legislators intent on promoting narrow constituency interests,
foot dragging by the legislature, and finally a reluctant compromise. The compromise dramatically
increased the state’s share of educational funding responsibility.
State-Driven Accountability Systems
Another way in which the states have exercised control over education policy is through
educational accountability systems. One visible example of these accountability systems is testing.
At the time President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind act into law (2002), the states had
constructed highly variable test-based accountability systems. Using 2000 data from Education
Week, Wong (2004) calculated a “state score for testing and standards policies” based on (1) the
number of English and Mathematics tests administered to students in grades 1-8, (2) the number of
English and Mathematics tests administered to students in grades 9-12, (3) whether the state assigns
ratings to all schools, and (4) whether the state identifies low-performing schools. The final scores
ranged from a low of 0.25 (Nebraska) to a high of 2.75 (Alabama). The variation among the metrics
was more dramatic; test administrations for grades 1-8 ranged from two (Nebraska) to 16 (Utah);
test administrations for grades 9-12 ranged from one (Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) to eight
(Alabama and Arizona). Nearly half (23) of the states assigned or planned to assign ratings to
schools, while only 12 states identified or planned to identify low performing schools.
Another way in which state governments may address educational accountability at the local
level is through choice-based programs. Teachers’ unions and opponents of public funding for
sectarian institutions have strongly opposed school choice programs. On the other hand, political
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conservatives and “free-market” advocates support them. In practice, the states may enact choicebased programs in several ways. For example, according to the Center for Education Reform (CER),
as of 2015, 42 states have enacted laws enabling the creation of charter schools (2015). Charter
schools are educational institutions, sponsored by a third party, with renewable charters, that deliver
educational services that meet a set of state-determined standards. In its purest model, students
who attend these charter schools carry with them state funding, thus depriving the traditional school
districts that lose these students of valuable state funds. Furthermore, although bound by state
regulations, these institutions tend to enjoy discretion with regard to instruction and personnel.
According to the CER (2015), more than 2.9 million students were attending over 6,700 charter
schools across the United States in 2015.
Vouchers are another mechanism designed to foster choice. These usually take the form of
state subsidies for students to attend non-public schools. Like other school choice mechanisms,
advocates of traditional public schools tend to oppose vouchers. One argument against vouchers is
that schools accepted vouchers may give students religious instruction. This controversy reached the
U.S. Supreme Court in Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris (2002), in which the court ruled that the voucher
system in Cleveland, Ohio—through which a very high percentage of parents sent their children to
sectarian schools instead of traditional public schools—did not violate the establishment clause of
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Like state-driven testing systems, the states’ approaches to choice-based systems are
variable.

Jay Greene (2002) has calculated an “Education Freedom Index” comprised of four

components: (1) charter schools, (2) subsidized private schools, (3) home schooling, and (4) public
school choice.

Greene’s approach finds considerable variation across the states on all four

components, as well as the final scores, which range from 0.88 (Hawaii) to 2.94 (Arizona).
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This consideration of state control over education policy has revealed several things. First,
there has been variation among the states with respect to each of the mechanisms of state control
considered above—state boards of education, funding systems, and accountability systems. As a
result of this interstate variation, the national educational landscape is decentralized.

This

decentralization has been an important political obstacle to centralizing efforts at the national level
(intentional and otherwise) that this chapter will consider next.
Second, in exercising their authority in the education arena, the states have fostered a
performance-based relationship between state and local education authorities. Although some of
the accountability systems described above are not performance measurement systems of the type
the federal government would design at the start of the twenty-first century (and discussed below),
they are efforts by state authorities to address and measure real or imagined problems or standards
at the local level.
Third, by definition, these aspects of state control involve some interaction between state
and local education authorities. These interactions, in turn, involve some effort on the part of state
authorities to direct activities at the local level. For this reason, the centralization of state authority
may have special relevance for education systems.
Federal Involvement in Education Policy
It is clear that the states have enjoyed considerable discretion in how to develop their
education systems. It is through this lens that federal involvement in the educational policy arena
must be considered. A number of early 20th Century actions signaled Congress’s willingness to enter
the education arena, such as the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, Lanham Act of 1940, and the G.I. Bill of
Rights of 1944 (Lowi and Ginsberg, 1998). However, the embarrassment of the Soviet Union’s
successful Sputnik launch spurred Congress to pass the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of
1958. NDEA was aimed at improving science and mathematics education at all levels, primarily
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through preparation of instructors in these fields, and grants to states to facilitate such instruction at
the primary and secondary levels.
Prior to the Great Society era, however, Congress generally was gridlocked on the question
of federal involvement in education. There was deference to dual federalism, the notion that the
federal government and the state governments had distinct responsibilities. Importantly, the federal
government should not be getting involved in areas of state responsibility. With this notion still
holding currency, many representatives opposed allocating federal funds to segregated schools in
the southern United States, and other members of Congress were unwilling to provide funds that
could potentially be used for sectarian schools. The civil rights movement served to push Congress
toward a greater role in education policy. First, there was the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown vs. Board
of Education decision (1954), a landmark case in which the Warren Court ruled that segregated
public schools were inherently unequal, and violated the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.
Second was Congress’s eventual passage, a decade later, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These
federal actions, along with highly publicized southern intransigence, gave the federal government the
legal authority to act as a guarantor of civil rights and liberties, along with the rationale to use its
resources to compel school districts to implement racial integration and to conduct redistributive
fiscal policy in a variety of domestic policy areas.
ESEA and its Context
The federal government’s landmark entry into the education arena occurred with the
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965. Although the act requires
regular congressional reauthorization, its most consequential component—Title I—authorizes
Congress to appropriate funds to state education authorities to be dispersed to local authorities with
large numbers of children from low income families. Significantly, ESEA also heralded an era of what
political scientists call “marble cake federalism,” in which the federal government chose to disperse
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funds to state and local governments for particular purposes, resulting in a mixed system of
responsibility among various layers (i.e., levels) of government.
ESEA was not, however, a perfect culmination of national perspectives. For one thing, ESEA’s
implementation offered incentives for southern and poor local school districts to implement civil
rights policies, especially integration. Furthermore, ESEA was an antipoverty program. At the time of
its passage, President Johnson had been advocating anti-poverty legislation in various policy areas—
as part of his “War on Poverty”. At that time, the federal concern for social justice reflected the
renewed interest in civil rights spurred by the Warren Supreme Court, popular interest in Michael
Harrington’s expository book The Other America (1962), and a landslide election victory in 1964 that
gave the Democratic Party large majorities in both houses of Congress. From a policy standpoint,
then, the federal government’s first major thrust into the primary and secondary education arena
was largely a response to a broader anti-poverty agenda.
Furthermore, ESEA did not directly address some key debates that had occupied national
educational reformers since the Progressive Era. One of those debates, for example, concerned the
very purpose and content of public education.

David Stoesz (1996) asserts that, during the

Progressive Era, school curricula tended to move toward a “utilitarian paradigm” in which school
boards de-emphasized traditional academic courses such as science and language in favor of
citizenship and trade-related courses such as mechanics, civics, and home economics. (120). Stoesz
argues that this movement was a response to (1) the increasing presence of children of immigrants in
schools, (2) widespread acceptance of certain metrics such as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale
that reveals considerable differences in students’ academic abilities, and (3) the desire among
progressives to rationalize the delivery of education into a system that aligned with the demands of
jobs in the American economy. Though opposed by influential reformers such as John Dewey, this
movement was encouraged by the National Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary
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Education, as expressed in its 1918 report titled The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education. This
report was skeptical that all students could be expected to master traditional subjects, and as such,
provided some justification for the gradual adoption of non-academic subjects. By 1930, about twothirds of secondary-level courses involved what Thomas Toch has describes as “commercial, general,
or trade subjects” (Toch, 1991, 48-49; Stoesz, 1996).
One of the challenges raised by this paradigm was the difficulty in setting standards for
assessing students’ knowledge and performance. As Stoesz puts it, “Whereas standards had existed
for evaluating a student’s facility to comprehend Greek tragedy, use proofs in geometry, or
appreciate baroque architecture, how did one evaluate a student’s ability to tighten a lug nut, vote,
or bake a cupcake?” (1996, 120). This challenge was not fully resolved, and consequentially, many
educators in the first half of the twentieth century were unable to effectively connect students’
advancement in educational programs to the students’ academic performance.
With the crisis of Sputnik, Congress dedicated federal resources to the cultivation of
academic subjects such as science, mathematics, and foreign language through the NDEA; but the
broader debate over educational objectives and assessment remained a state and local matter. With
the passage and implementation of ESEA, federal policymakers hoped to alleviate discrepancies in
academic performance to the extent that those discrepancies were associated with the devastating
effects of poverty. Yet beginning in the 1970s, as with other the Great Society programs, many
policymakers and scholars were increasingly disillusioned with the perceived inability of ESEA to
solve the problems Congress had targeted.

For example, a series of studies by educational

sociologist James Coleman reported that the benefits gained by the provision of federal funds to
students of low income families were likely counterbalanced by problems that were well beyond the
scope of those funds to solve, such as adverse family and neighborhood conditions that afflicted the
students’ lives (Ravitch, 1993).
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ESEA and Standards-Based Education
With the ascent of political conservatives in the late 1970s and the election of President
Reagan in 1980, the federal role in public education appeared tenuous, especially with Reagan’s
pledge to dismantle the new U.S. Department of Education, among other federal institutions.
Conservatives’ advocacy of such a diminished role reflected their disenchantment with liberals.
Although liberals had dominated education policy making since the Great Society era, it appeared
that their policies has failed to give the country public schools that a good job educating students.
The liberal consensus, as reflected in education policy, had arguably failed. Critics such as Chester
Finn, Jr., for example, argued that this consensus was the product of interactions among multiple
actors, including schools of education at prestigious universities; teachers’ organizations such as the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and National Education Association (NEA); minority advocacy
groups, key philanthropists; and prominent policy institutes (Stoesz, 1996). Many conservatives
asserted that these groups had fostered a redefinition of traditional notions of academic
achievement, such as graduation and college admission, “Not as rewards to be earned through
achievement, but as compensation that all students were entitled to regardless of their
performance,” (Toch, 1991, 58).
President Reagan’s first Secretary of Education, Terrel Bell, refused to preside over the
disassembly of his department. Instead, he chose to put the problem of failed education policy onto
the government’s agenda. Bell created a blue ribbon panel called the National Commission on
Excellence in Education, which, after collecting data and testimony from various regions and
stakeholders throughout the country, compiled and disseminated an influential report in 1983, titled
A Nation at Risk. This report described in stark terms the decline of international competitiveness
and various types of competencies among recent graduates of American public schools. The clear
implication was that the United States faced an impending loss of economic competitiveness and
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prosperity due to these educational shortcomings. In the wake of this report, at a time when public
resources for education were declining, were calls for a number of educational reforms. At the state
and local level, these reforms included educational choice initiatives, local experiments with school
and district management reforms, and—importantly for federal education policy—a movement
toward standards-based education.
As noted above, standards for educational performance (to the extent they had been
implemented) had long been the prerogatives of state education authorities, but because of a
number of factors, states’ influence upon federal education policy declined in the late twentieth
century. These factors included Congress’s willingness to attach various conditions to its renewals of
Title I ESEA funds, the dissemination of pessimistic information about public education such as the
Coleman reports and A Nation at Risk, and the growing movement toward performance
measurement in the public sector (Chapter Two). Advocates of standards tended to reject broad
performance criteria—in which assessments gauged very general and long-term goals, viewing them
as being unworkable due to the decentralized nature of the U.S. education system.

Rather,

proponents of standards-based reform tended to push for specific and quantifiable standards, such
as criterion-referenced tests, for constructing accountability systems.
By the time of the first Bush Administration, the question of performance and standards had
taken center stage. At a national summit in Charlottesville, Virginia in September 1989, the president
and most state governors affirmed their belief that education standards were necessary to enable
state and local districts to address problems of low educational achievement among students.
Standards were thus a cornerstone of the president’s chief education policy initiative, America 2000.
This initiative responded to recommendations by the National Goals Panel for national tests for
grades four, eight, and twelve in five subject areas; federal grants for “New American Schools” (at
least one in each congressional district); and the use of report cards on school and district progress
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toward the achievement of educational goals (New York State Education Department (NYSED), 2016).
The proposal’s endorsement of national testing, however, had opponents in Congress.

Many

conservatives were alarmed by the prospect of expanding federal power in a way that seemed to deemphasize the role of states. Many political progressives worried that a national testing regime
would add yet another burden for school districts with many of their students from minority and
low-income families. These school districts were already threatened by declines in tax revenue and
school choice movements (NYSED, 2016).
Congress did not approve America 2000, and the initiative’s future was in doubt with the
election of President Clinton.

Yet the new president had enthusiastically attended the 1989

Charlottesville summit as Governor of Arkansas, and his administration was visibly endorsing both
“Reinventing Government” and the performance ethos of the new Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA). Given this, it is not surprising that the administration adopted a national
education proposal similar to that of its predecessor. In fact, the Clinton initiative was in many ways
a resurrection of America 2000, renamed Goals 2000, and maintained the former’s concern with
educational performance standards. More importantly, these proposals became legislation, such as
the 1994 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, which defined a number of general goals for American
education and elicited state-written school improvement plans for achieving those goals. Under this
system, the states could receive federal funds to assist in meeting these goals, with the assistance of
a National Education Standards and Improvement Council and other national entities. States could
use funds to make sub-grants to local education authorities. To a large extent, the legislation
enabled the states to decide on the content, purpose, and design of these improvement plans, even
though the law itself articulated the national goals. These aspirational goals, which included the
assertion that “United States students will be first in the world in mathematics and science
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achievement”, nodded to longstanding concerns of the Coleman Reports and A Nation at Risk, but
the ability of states to achieve the goals was dubious.
More significantly, Congress in 1994 incorporated standards-based requirements into an
ESEA reauthorization called the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA). IASA explicitly aligned ESEA
with state improvement efforts, “promot(ing) the alignment of all education components—
curriculum and instruction, professional development, school leadership, accountability, and school
improvement” (U.S. Department of Education (USDOE), 1995). To do this, the new law called for
states to determine if schools and local education authorities are making “adequate yearly progress”
(AYP) toward the states’ goals, allowing state education authorities to target underperforming
schools or districts for additional resources or corrective action (Goertz, 2001). Notably, IASA also
required states to hold disadvantaged students to the same standards as other students (USDOE,
1995.) With these statutes, the federal government paved the way for the more rigorous federal
involvement in standards that was to follow.
No Child Left Behind
On January 8th, 2002, President George W. Bush signed a reauthorization of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act called the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). Consistent with the
president’s campaign promises, NCLB drastically increased the federal role in the education arena
using a confluence of performance measurement, fiscal federalism, benchmarking, and improvement
activities. The hallmark of the new law was that states, as a condition for receiving Title I funds
through ESEA were required to develop expanded and federally-defined performance measurement
systems for assessing particular groups of students. Similar to the IASA, NCLB required the states to
measure Adequate Yearly Progress, but went much further in defining AYP. For example, reading
and mathematics testing was now required not just for three grade spans, but every grade from
three through eight, and once in high school. In addition, states were to measure the progress of all
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schools and school districts, establish target dates for improvement, and break out performance data
by subgroups of students (poverty, race, ethnicity, disability, etc.) (Goertz, 2001). Schools that failed
to make AYP for a certain amount of time were required to set aside a portion of their Title I grants
for efforts such as tutoring, restructuring efforts, and school choice.
Despite its bipartisan passage and widespread early support, NCLB suffered from a number
of problems. Most evident, perhaps, were the unrealistic proficiency requirements. For example,
states were critical of the law’s requirement that all students meet proficiency standards by the
2013-2014 school year. This requirement was so rigorous that even high-performing schools would
fail to achieve AYP. It created widespread fear of fiscal sanctions for noncompliance. States also
criticized the federal government for not providing sufficient funding for the various new services
NCLB required. By 2009, 38 states had considered legislation with language critical of NCLB, five
states passed legislation explicitly rejecting parts of the law, and the State of Connecticut sued the
federal government over inadequate funding (Shelly, 2012).
In the wake of NCLB’s passage, administration officials seemed to double down on the law’s
rigorous requirements. “I will not let deadlines slip or see requirements forgotten,” declared U.S.
Secretary of Education Rod Paige in 2002. “If anyone comes to me to appeal for a waiver from the
federal requirements, I hope to be very pleasant as I firmly say, not in this century. Not in this
country” (McDermott and Jensen, 2005, 41). Bryan Shelly (2012) notes, however, that regardless of
the rigidity of NCLB’s requirements, it could not be implemented without the states’ cooperation;
thus, the states were positioned to negotiate for flexibility. Under NCLB, federal waivers under the
Bush Administration tended to grant states flexibility in only limited ways; for example, allowing
states to show evidence of learning progress based on certain core principles, rather than the letter
of the law.
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NCLB was due for reauthorization in 2007, but the divided Congress was unable or unwilling
to take up the issue as President Obama took office. In the meantime, with states clearly failing to
meet NCLB requirements, the administration allowed states to apply for flexibility on various
provisions of the law. In a document released for state education authorities on June 7, 2012, the
U.S. Department of Education invited states to apply for flexibility on as many as ten components of
NCLB, including flexibility for determining AYP (USDOE, 2012). The administration attached several
conditions for these waivers; the SEA’s peer-reviewed applications were required, for example, to
demonstrate the state’s use of “college- and career-ready standards”, not dissimilar to what the
administration had required states to adopt in their applications for the president’s Race to the Top
program. The president’s clear encouragement of these standards is one reason for the eventual
widespread adoption of (and controversy over) the state-initiated Common Core State Standards
Initiative. No fewer than 34 states applied for and received NCLB waivers for the 2012-2013 school
year.
Another problem of NCLB was that it reduced the autonomy of teachers and other
instructional personnel. This was due to the law’s heavy focus on standardized tests, as well as its
requirements for states to identify and recruit only “highly qualified teachers.” As a result, critics
argued, teachers have faced a range of challenges including “problems of implementation, impacts
that appear to lessen the creativity of teachers, ‘gaming’ processes, and policies that require
teachers to teach to the test” (Radin, 2006, 70). Significantly, the reduction in teacher autonomy also
raised doubts about the ability of federal monitoring systems such as NCLB to effectively stimulate
improvements in programs implemented by state and local governments receiving federal funding.
This is because, in the classroom, teachers are “street level bureaucrats” that Lipsky (1980) argues
are the persons who really determine the quality of service delivery. Efforts to control the actions of
teachers in the classroom can interfere with teachers’ using their specialized skills gained from

54

professional education, apprenticeship, and experience. Teachers who are under pressure to “teach
to the test” may try to do so, and students may learn the “right” answers to factual questions and the
right way to solve simple analytic problems. Still, the performance metrics may be a poor gauge of
learning that reflects other kinds of abilities (e.g., writing a critical essay; skills in the performing arts;
contributing to a group project; or designing, setting up, conducting, and interpreting a scientific
experiment).
NCLB also had difficulty reconciling competing values. For example, part of the law’s initial
appeal was its stated intention to foster equity in educational achievement—to reduce what the
Citizen’s Commission on Civil Rights and others have called the achievement gap. The legislation
required states to break out data by historically disadvantaged groups of students and show
adequate yearly progress for these students. The complexity of the final statute, however, meshed
the law’s equity concerns with its overall emphasis upon accountability, adequate yearly progress,
and standards. “What emerged, ”noted Gary Orfield, “was an 1,100-page document calling for
impossible achievements that have never been accomplished anywhere” (2002, 2). Civil rights
advocates found less to like about NCLB as dropout rates among disadvantaged children increased,
struggling schools faced harsh sanctions, and disadvantaged children continued to lack access to the
rigorous curricula of their higher income peers (Perlstein, 2004).
The Every Student Succeeds Act
On December 10th, 2015, Congress reauthorized NCLB as the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA). While maintaining the performance emphasis that had existed in ESEA since 1994, the new
law removed the federal government’s ability to set performance standards, granting the bulk of that
authority, once again, to the states. As President Obama remarked at the signing ceremony:
“The goals of No Child Left Behind, the predecessor of this law, were the right ones: High
standards. Accountability. Closing the achievement gap. Making sure that every child was
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learning, not just some. But in practice, it often fell short. It didn’t always consider the
specific needs of each community. It led to too much testing during classroom time. It often
forced schools and school districts into cookie-cutter reforms that didn’t always produce the
kinds of results that we wanted to see” (White House, 2015).

While ESSA clearly intends for states to play a dominant role in developing their own
performance systems for receiving Title I funds, the U.S. Department of Education will play an
oversight role. State plans—another legacy of the 1994 reauthorization—are still required, and the
federal government will presumably have the power to reject parts of those plans, should they fail to
comply with the law’s intentions. The use of this authority by the U.S. DOE will invite oversight from
both sides of the political aisle. Ominously, members of both parties expressed concern with the
department’s proposed rules for ESSA implementation when those rules were released for public
comment in May 2016, and Congress voted to scale back the Department of Education’s
enforcement provisions almost a year later.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a definition of public education in the United States and briefly
summarized its local origins.

It then explored state-level developments that enhanced state

authority over public education policy in the United States, including state boards of education,
funding systems, and state-driven accountability systems—all of which existing studies have found to
vary across states. The chapter noted the decentralizing effect of this variation as it discussed the
growth of the federal role in education policy. In doing this, the discussion also built on an
observation made in Chapter One, namely that the relationship, if any, between particular state-level
factors (for example state-local centralization) and performance in federal performance systems is
surprisingly understudied, but important to our knowledge of multi-government performance
systems.
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The chapter then turned to federal involvement In education policy, arguing that Congress
chose to get involved in public education largely through the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, which, in its early years, was an expression of Congress’s and the administration’s civil rights and
antipoverty agenda. Yet much of Congress’s interest in education policy was also due to its gradual
recognition that American students lagged behind those in other developed countries in a number of
ways. Over time, the nature of and blame for this deficiency shifted to students and teachers, and a
political consensus emerged to try to address the problem with performance standards.
The chapter then explored how, as Congress reauthorized ESEA over the ensuing decades,
proponents of standards-based education were able to attach standards-based provisions to those
reauthorizations, culminating with No Child Left Behind. These statutes focused heavily on student
performance on assessments. The results of these assessments were an important means by which
students and teachers—and states themselves—were assessed. Yet these standards presented some
of the problems of performance measurement that the last chapter identified. One of these was the
risk of applying “one-size-fits-all” performance metrics to school districts and schools with vastly
different resources and student populations. Another was problems of implementation that are
inherent to the American federal system. The advocates of standards no doubt had the good
intention of improving student learning in the public schools, much like the advocates of
performance measurement had the good intention of improving governmental agencies’
effectiveness and efficiency. Other values, including those commonly used by both conservatives
and liberals, also shaped arguments by members of Congress about the merits of federally imposed
standards in elementary and secondary education.
Whatever the complex mix of motivations of Congress and the Bush Administration, many
NCLB requirements were poorly received by the states. By the time President Obama finished his
second term in office, persistent lobbying by state officials achieved success. Members of Congress
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showed their desire to “return” federal authority in setting educational standards back to the states.
The Congress replaced NCLB with the Every Student Succeeds Act. ESSA is an effort by Congress to
retreat from the education policy arena. This was due to the growing numbers and influence of
conservatives in Congress, who always opposed a large role for the federal government in education
policy. It was also a reaction to lobbying by the political opponents of standards, including especially
the teacher unions, whose members had to deal with the real failures of NCLB. The success of the
new law is hardly assured, and it is worth noting that the considerable fanfare with which ESSA was
signed was strikingly similar to the celebratory consensus that greeted the passage in 2002 of its
reviled predecessor. Yet the much heralded re-empowerment of the states under ESSA is much like
an existing performance system, also designed by the U.S. Department of Education, but
implemented in a more specific area: special education. This chapter has laid foundation for the
review of documents and other sources on the American special education performance system that
is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: AMERICAN SPECIAL EDUCATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEA
Special Education
The previous chapter reviewed the development of public education in the United States,
with particular attention to the gradual expansion of the federal role in that arena and its associated
embrace of performance measurement. The review was a broad one, however, because public
education is a complex set of services delivered to a very large and diverse group of people. For
example, providers can make decisions about curricula, programs, and educational environments
based on factors such as subject area, pupil age, and resource capacity. In recent decades, many
education authorities have also constructed specialized systems for educating students with
disabilities.

This subset of public education includes a diverse range of amenities, programs,

personnel, and other resources that extend beyond the scope of services used to educate the
general population of students.8 These services may be either comprehensive or very narrow,
depending on the circumstances of particular students. In this chapter, I attempt to identify the
foundations of and factors affecting the growth of these special education services, and to discuss
the major goals, design for implementation, and challenges of current federal legislation in this area.
At a statutory level, the U.S. Congress has defined “special education” to mean “specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,
including (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in
other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education” (P.L. 108-446, 2004). I use this definition in
this research. The term “special education”, therefore, includes this subset of education services but
not the broader scope of education services that various governments provide. To provide context,

8

Some practitioners use age-specific definitions for the terms “children” and “student”; in this chapter, I use
the words interchangeably.
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it is helpful to first review the background and development of these programs. I then consider
Congress’s characterization of special education and the nature of its involvement in this policy area.
American Special Education Prior to Federal Involvement
Special education policy—the actual education services delivered to disabled children—has
been based upon the dominant scientific understanding of those physical and intellectual disabilities
thought to affect an individual’s “educability”—that is, one’s supposed capacity for learning. In the
colonial era, and well into the nineteenth century, people with disabilities often faced additional
hardships brought about by prevailing notions of social and economic responsibility. Certain obvious
impairments, such as blindness, deafness, and severe cognitive disabilities, were known well before
the industrial era, and have been of considerable interest to educators since.
The Advent of Special Education Settings
In his study of the history of special education, Robert Osgood (2008) has observed that the
social and political forces that motivated the Progressive movement, occurring at the turn of the
twentieth century, also shaped the manner in which disabled children were treated. Prior to the era
of mass industrialization, children with disabilities might be cared for—often in isolation—according
to the customs and practices of their families and local communities. The outcome of this care—
though profound for the disabled child—had but a marginal impact on the national economy.
Industrialization, however, brought about large scale social changes including the factory system, the
growth of large cities, the association of diverse ethnic groups, and increasingly organized school
systems. This increasing integration of American society, especially in cities, increased the visibility of
the developmental and functional limitations suffered by people with disabilities. Yet, as Osgood
observes, “with heightened awareness came an increasingly cautious and pessimistic view of
disability. By the early 1900s, the state of being disabled generated considerable suspicion, even
outright contempt, among many” (2008, 8). As a result, efforts to accommodate people with
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disabilities centered on principles of containment and eradication rather than inclusion and
development. These principles were apparent in a number of ways. For example, a number of social
reformers in the early twentieth century interpreted the work of Charles Darwin and emerging
knowledge of genetics to advocate for the sterilization of people with particular disabilities they
thought were heritable. Although the biological aims of the eugenics movement fell out of favor,
especially in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities, the eugenics movement’s belief that disabled people
were an economic and social burden, and a population that was best dealt with separately, persisted
in the form of segregated educational settings.
Margret Winzer (2009) has noted that Progressive-era educators and social reformers
viewed segregation as the most favorable approach for addressing students with disabilities. By
implementing this view, they designated separate settings for students deemed unable to advance
through the complex educational systems. Officials argued that by providing separate
accommodations for disabled students, there would be fewer disturbances or strains on the teachers
and students in the regular classroom setting. This was a particular challenge for public school
officials in charge of urban schools, with their increasingly complex structures and curricula. Such
officials dealt with increasing enrollment numbers due to state compulsory education laws and
immigration. With larger enrollments, there was a larger number of students with disabilities. Thus,
officials perceived a growing need to identify and segregate students with disabilities from other
students.
Aside from expanding enrollment, there was a multitude of other factors that made
segregated special education settings attractive in the early twentieth century. All of these factors
spurred the growth of segregated settings, but such growth occurred in a piecemeal design, with
services varying from place to place. As Winzer writes,
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“Despite the critical nature of compulsory education laws, the mounting population of
immigrant children in the schools, and the pervasiveness of IQ testing, the growth of special
segregated classes was the outcome of a host of social, economic, medical, and educational
movements rather than the offspring of a single trend. The combination of new medical and
scientific knowledge, the influence of new theories of heredity and evolution, increasing
social fears, and a climate of interventionist social reform provided the historical context
within which steadily increasing numbers of children were being identified as recipients for
special education. The essential nature of special education—what it did and who it served—
remained relatively stable (…) However, with the burgeoning of segregated classes, special
education evolved into an area characterized by a bewildering, complex, and complicated
structure of disabilities, classes, and settings” (2009, 78-79)

Furthermore, “When special education classes truly emerged in the first decades of the 20th
century, the alleged purposes were highly variable: there was little consensus among the organizers
and most had modest immediate goals” (Winzer, 2009, 88). Although these programs offered
disabled students an environment that ostensibly promoted the possibility of their eventual
productive integration into society, the nature and circumstances of these special settings were the
source of continuous debate. For one thing, admission often involved some type of controversial
aptitude or intelligence testing, which had come under extensive criticism by the 1920s (Black, 2003).
The identification and labeling of students based on mental capacity would remain a profoundly
controversial problem in special education (Stainback and Stainback, 1992).
Even without the problem of identification, a consensus did not exist with regard to
expectations for disabled students upon leaving special education settings. In many cases, manual
work and training overshadowed academic instruction in these settings, offering an implied social
and economic message about the limited post-school expectations for these students.

Such

preparation for vocational work, however, was of interest to policymakers as resources were
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strained during the Great Depression era (Osgood, 2008). The idea that special education, albeit
segregated, could provide training for people who might otherwise require substantial social
assistance, also gained attention at the national level. For example, speakers at the 1930 White
House Conference on Child Health and Protection emphasized the economic rather than charitable
merits of special education, while acknowledging longstanding controversies over the extent and
funding of these services. The extent of those contributions became increasingly evident as the
United States entered World War II, and people with disabilities contributed in great numbers to the
workforce. As Winzer puts it, “The performance during the war of people with mental retardation
and other disabilities created a new level of confidence and expectancy and justified the notion that
special children could learn more than just fundamental skills” (2009, 100).
Federal Involvement in Special Education
Despite these advances, policy discussions about special education during the postwar era
tended to center around questions of resources rather than content, structure, or segregation.
Although some states had begun putting policies in place for funding and administering special
education programs, no state prior to 1970 had a comprehensive system available to serve all
children with disabilities (Martin et al., 1996). Real or imagined state and local constraints, a growing
advocacy movement, and the emerging federal interest in civil rights brought about major changes in
special education policy starting in the 1960s.
Early Federal Efforts
Public policy protections for disabled people originated at the federal level and followed in
the wake of protections earned by racial minorities in the second half of the twentieth century. The
legal rationale for such protections derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution that forbids states from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” The legal and legislative successes of the civil rights movement plainly
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encouraged advocates for other minority groups (e.g., those with mental disabilities, the mentally ill,
LGBQT, those suffering unbearable pain, and the terminally ill) and large but disadvantaged groups
(e.g., the aged, children, and women) to lobby for both legal protections and favorable public
policies.
In 1961, President Kennedy established the President’s Panel on Mental Retardation to
develop recommendations for addressing mental disabilities.

The panel’s report, A Proposed

Program for National Action to Combat Mental Retardation, called for federal action on research,
goal setting, and other efforts to improve the lives of people with intellectual impairments
(President’s Panel on Mental Retardation, 1962). The panel also conducted a series of studies and
observations abroad—particularly in Scandinavia, and noted the principle of normalization, which, in
the words of Bengt Nirje, one of its chief conceptual developers, means “making available to all
people patterns of life and conditions of everyday living which are as close as possible to the regular
circumstances and ways of life of society” (Nirje, 1976, 231).
The normalization principle accompanied the pragmatism of emerging interpretations of
mental disabilities. For example, the 1959 Manual of Terminology and Classification of Mental
Retardation no longer defined mental retardation as an invariably untreatable and permanent
condition, a development that Winzer has framed as a Kuhn-style paradigm shift that began to define
intellectual disabilities as social constructs (American Association of Mental Deficiency, 1959; Winzer,
2009). As a result, segregated settings were no longer obvious and logical approaches for educating
students with disabilities as long as less restrictive settings were available.
Early congressional actions in this area were gradual but cumulative. In the wake of the
National Defense Education Act of 1958 (see Chapter Three), President Eisenhower signed into law
P.L. 85-926 and the Training of Professional Personnel Act of 1959 (P.L. 86-158), which provided
federal support to educational institutions for training personnel to work with children with
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intellectual disabilities. Congress expanded the former act in 1963, broadening its scope to include
training for students with a broader array of disabilities. Other federal legislation was explicitly
aimed at accommodating and training people with physical disabilities, such as, for example, the
Captioned Films Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-905) and the Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-276).
Congress also signaled its willingness to provide direct financial support for public education
by passing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (P.L. 89-10 or ESEA) in 1965, which signaled
federal involvement in the educational realm through the mechanism of fiscal federalism. Although
ESEA did not disperse funds for the express purpose of students with disabilities, Congress soon
passed the State Schools Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-313), which allowed students in state-sponsored special
education programs to be included in entitlement calculations, and federal Title I funds under ESEA
to be used to benefit students in those programs (Martin et al., 1996).
This early federal legislation also created a new agency. In its 1966 amendments to ESEA,
Congress authorized the establishment of a Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped (BEH)
within the U.S. Office of Education (which did not become a cabinet level department until 1979.)
Under Title VI of ESEA, the BEH was to provide grants to assist states with designing and improving
special education programs, and Congress reaffirmed this policy with the more comprehensive
Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-230). However, the National Council on Disability
(NCD) has noted that “neither (the 1966 nor 1970) program included any specific mandates on the
use of the funds provided by the grants; nor could either program be shown to have significantly
improved the education of children with disabilities” (2003, 4).
Litigation
The special education policy landscape was further shaped by a series of U.S. District Court
decisions that built on the legacy of Brown vs. Board of Education. In the first of these cases, the
Pennsylvania Association of Retarded Children (PARC) challenged the Commonwealth of
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Pennsylvania’s restrictions for admission to special education programs. State officials had forbidden
the enrollment of students who had not “attained a mental age of 5 years”, ostensibly due to the
higher costs of educating these students (Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILC), n.d.).
Through a consent decree, the commonwealth agreed to provide a free public education to all
students regardless of the extent of their disability.

This case, PARC vs. Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania (1971), is also noteworthy in that the plaintiffs presented to the court extensive
research finding evidence for the educability of these children (Winzer, 2009).
The second key case was Mills vs. Board of Education of the District of Columbia (1972). The
plaintiffs in this case were the families of eight children who faced exclusion from the district’s
education programs due to their disabilities. The District argued that it had insufficient resources to
provide a free education to these children and many others with disabilities. The U.S. District Court
of the District of Columbia ruled that the District could not decide to exclude students with
disabilities based on financial resources, because that exclusion violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. This decision effectively removed fiscal justifications for
denying a public education for students with disabilities. As Martin and his coauthors have observed,
these court decisions had far reaching consequences, including a stream of subsequent litigation,
such that “By 1973, more than 30 federal court cases had upheld the principles of PARC and Mills”
(1996, 28).
Other court decisions helped shape the special education policy landscape in the early 1970s.
These cases included Wyatt vs. Stickney (1971), in which a federal district court ruled that disabled
children residing in state institutions were entitled to a particular protections and accommodations,
including placement in the “least restrictive” settings possible to achieve rehabilitation (Wyatt vs.
Stickney, 1971). In a related case, Lessard vs. Schmidt (1972), a federal district court ruled that
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disabled people could not be involuntarily committed to institutions without the same due process
procedures and protections afforded to defendants in the criminal justice system.
These landmark cases, along with the precursor legislation and involvement of the U.S. Office
of Education noted above, set the stage for more comprehensive and coordinated federal
involvement in special education policy. However, in the wake of key federal court decisions that
made clear the comprehensive responsibilities of states to provide a free and appropriate public
education to all students, many state and local policymakers pointed to a real or imagined dearth of
funds available to extend these necessary provisions.
Another impetus for enhanced federal involvement was Congress’ finding, after a 1972
investigation, that many children with disabilities throughout the United States were not served in
appropriate educational settings:
“1.75 million handicapped children are receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million
handicapped children are receiving an inappropriate education (…) The long-range
implications of these statistics are that public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of
dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in
a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to
become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain
burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing
their dependence on society” (Quoted in Wright, 2010).

P.L. 94-142
A number of studies of the development of special education policy argue that Congress
used a two-pronged approach to articulate special education policy (Turnbull, 1986; Martin et al.,
1996). The first prong involved explicit prohibitions against discrimination. The key example of this
approach was Congress’ 1973 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 93-112), specifically
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Section 504, which included language explicitly prohibiting entities receiving federal assistance from
denying equal protection to people with disabilities. Turnbull (1986) convincingly demonstrates that
Section 504 is a cornerstone of special education civil rights policy, and the legislation is also
significant in its role as a precursor for the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (P.L. 101-336). But,
as others have pointed out, Section 504 “included no funding and no monitoring, and so was virtually
ignored by local and state education authorities for 20 years” (1996, 29).
The second prong was Congress’ establishment of a formal educational grant program. The
vehicle for this approach was the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, passed by Congress
and signed by President Ford in 1975. This law, sometimes abbreviated as EHA but more commonly
called P.L. 94-142 in the literature, amended existing legislation (for example P.L. 91-230 of 1970).
For this reason, special education scholars have tended to use the term “Education for the
Handicapped Act” to refer to a collection of federal statutes, of which the 1975 act (P.L. 94-142) was
paramount (Turnbull, 1986).9 As a grant program, P.L. 94-142 provided federal support for states to
provide special education programs and related services to students with disabilities, which by 1975
was a clearly articulated public responsibility required under law. According to the U.S. Department
of Education, this law had four key purposes: (1) “to assure that all children with disabilities have
available to them (…) a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs, (2) to assure that the rights of children with
disabilities and their parents (…) are protected, (3) to assist States and localities to provide for the
education of all students with disabilities, and (4) to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate all children with disabilities” (2010, p. 5).

9

For clarity, this research will refer to the Education for the Handicapped Act by its statutory number (P.L. 94142), as such references usually allude to the 1975 legislation.
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Although P.L. 94-142 established a federal mechanism for assisting state and local education
agencies in fulfilling these constitutional obligations, Congress chose to assume a relatively small
proportion of this funding. The legislation authorized funding at 40% of the average per pupil
expenditure (APPE) for children who do not receive special education services. This funding method
brought about three key problems.

First, as special education services grew increasingly

professionalized in the decades following P.L. 94-142, more resources were required to provide
students with disabilities with a free and appropriate public education. The funding authorized by
the legislation was tied to the APPE for students without disabilities—a figure that was increasingly
dwarfed by the APPE for students who required special education services (Griffith, 2015).
Second, although the legislation authorized funding at a target of 40% of the APPE, in the
decades since the law went into effect, Congress has never actually appropriated that amount. The
appropriated amount reached only 12% during the Carter administration, dropped to 8% under
President Reagan, peaked at 25% due to stimulus funds from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, and declined to 16% in federal fiscal year 2015 (National School Boards
Association, 2015; Martin et al., 1996). Because of this chronic shortfall, advocacy for “full funding”
of IDEA—that is, funding at 40% of the APPE for students without disabilities—has long been a focus
of the politics of special education policy.
Third, the original federal formula dispersed funds to states according to the number of
students identified for special education services. Although the statute placed a ceiling on the
number of students with disabilities who could be counted for this purpose (e.g., no more than 12%
of a state’s total student population) the fiscal consequence of identifying more rather than fewer
students for special education was clear. Therefore, critics argued, the funding formula encouraged
state and local officials to over-identify students for these programs—a concern that would have
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both fiscal and political consequences for special education policy in the decades to follow (Martin et
al., 1996).
The fiscal structure of P.L. 94-142 thus required state and local education authorities to
assume much of the financial responsibility for special education, with the federal government
playing an oversight role. The nature and strength of this federal role, however, would be shaped by
policy developments as Congress amended P.L. 94-142 and the political landscape shifted. It should
be noted, also, that despite Congress’ failure to fully fund its 40% authorization level, states have
never been obliged to participate in this grant program. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this
reality in Smith vs. Robinson (1984). In this decision, the court identified the role of P.L. 94-142 as
Congress’ “exclusive remedy” for redressing educational discrimination against people with
disabilities; although this legislation was designed to help the states provide constitutionally required
services to people with disabilities, it was not a mandate to provide such services (Turnbull, 1986).
“Still,” writes Claire McCann, a policy analyst for the New America Education Policy Program,
“despite being a voluntary program, federal dollars for states’ special education are likely too
significant for states to decide they are unwelcome, particularly given that courts would still require
states to provide free and appropriate public education to all special education students” (2014, 15).
Although Congress has periodically revised P.L. 94-142 (including its 1990 introduction of the
title “Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” (IDEA) to the law, reflecting a lingual movement
away from emphasizing “handicaps”), much of the law has remained consistent since its 1975
passage.

Its four key purposes, for example, have remained central themes in subsequent

reauthorizations. Equally significant is the fact that P.L. 94-142 and its amendments have helped to
define a critical legal concept that has become the cornerstone of American special education law:
Free Appropriate Public Education.
Free and Appropriate Public Education
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Since the mid-twentieth century, a key theme in special education research, federal court
decisions, and the language of P.L. 94-142 have been the need to secure the legal rights (equal
protection) of disabled children to a free and appropriate public education, following fair procedures
for doing so (due process) and the many benefits (for disabled children, for families, and for society)
of doing so. In his legal study of special education policy, H.R. Turnbull has framed Free Appropriate
Public Education (FAPE) as a fundamental and multifaceted legal concept woven through a number
of statutes (chiefly P.L. 94-142 and Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act) and court decisions
(Turnbull, 1986; Turnbull et al., 2006). The concept of FAPE has at least six components: (1) zero
reject; (2) testing, classification, and placement; (3) individualized and appropriate education; (4)
least restrictive environment; (5) procedural due process; and (6) parent participation and shared
decision making.10
The first of these principles, zero reject, prohibits agencies from “explicitly or functionally
excluding” students with disabilities from education programs (NCD, 2003, 4). This prohibition is
rooted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown vs. Board of Education decision, in which the court
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits differences in the
manner and quality by which two different groups of people are publicly educated. In the case of
special education, the federal PARC and Mills decisions made clear that children with disabilities
were also entitled to equal protection as far as public educational access is concerned. In the case of
entities receiving federal funds for special education, Congress has required state and local education
agencies to set “full service goals”, conduct annual counts or censuses to “identify, locate, and
evaluate” all children with disabilities, and prevent functional exclusion by offering children with
disabilities an appropriate education according to his or her needs (Turnbull, 1986, 43).

10

Depending on the source and timeframe in question, scholars have tended to use different labels for these
six components; however, the principles are fundamentally similar.
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The zero reject principle has also prohibited the expulsion of students when those expulsions
are due to behaviors associated with their disabilities, although local education agencies may place
these students in more restrictive educational settings, provided that the appropriate due process
procedures are fulfilled. Later iterations of IDEA have required local officials to seek remedies for
behavioral problems that might result in such disciplinary actions. In the event that discipline does
occur, education services may not cease during periods of suspension of expulsion (NCD, 2003).
The second principle of FAPE requires appropriate evaluations of students who are suspected
of having disabilities. The logic of special education provision requires the use of some method for
identifying children who stand to benefit from those services. The method, by definition, requires
the use of testing—that is, the application of criteria to produce evidence of an impairment that is
thought to warrant an alternative approach to the child’s education. Historical criticisms of testing
from the scientific community and special education advocates led to a number of federal actions.
For example, in Larry P. vs. Riles (1979), a federal court ruled that non-validated intelligence tests
could not be used to assign African American students to segregated educational settings. The court
found the tests in question to be racially and culturally biased, resulting in a disparate impact on
African American students.11
With similar concerns, Congress under P.L. 94-142 has required state and local education
authorities to engage in “nondiscriminatory evaluation”, which requires the use of testing and
evaluation materials that (1) are validated for the purpose for which they are applied, (2) are
provided in the child’s native language, (3) are administered by trained professionals in the manner
intended by the producer of the test, (4) address educational needs beyond general intelligence, (5)
can be conducted given physical or intellectual impairments from which the child suffers (assuming

11

Another federal decision, PASE vs. Hannon (1980), did not find fundamental biases in the testing processes
considered.
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those impairments are not the subject of the test) (Turnbull, 1986).

Furthermore, no single

procedure may be used to determine the child’s educational placement, and the child must be
evaluated in a comprehensive way that includes an assessment of physical, social, and intellectual
dimensions of disability. Finally—and consistent with other FAPE principles—the test or evaluation
must be administered using a team approach, involving the input of educators and specialists in the
areas of disability under consideration.
The results of these evaluations guide the development of students’ Individualized Education
Programs, or IEPs. As a principle of FAPE, IEPs are written documents that describe key components
of a student’s annual education program. Winzer (2009) argues that the IEP requirement in P.L. 94142 is a political compromise. While it gives the federal government the authority to use coercion to
compel compliance with the law, it leaves key decisions about educational provision to local
authorities through the IEP process. Regardless of IEP’s political origins, the federal government
requires IEPs to contain certain key components such as a statement of current academic
performance, annual goals, special education and related services to be provided, the extent to
which the child will not participate in the general education classroom, participation in state and
district wide tests, and objective criteria by which evaluations will occur and their results reported
(U.S. Department of Education (DOE), 2007a). In addition, the IEP must be developed using input
from an IEP team. The IEP team must include, among others, at least one of the student’s parents or
guardians, teachers (general and special education), a school official, an individual qualified to
interpret the child’s evaluation results, and the student for whom the IEP is intended.
Another principle of FAPE is education in the Least Restrictive Environment, or LRE. While
the principle of zero reject seeks to assure all students with disabilities are able to participate in
educational programs, the LRE principle requires this participation, to the extent possible, be in the
same setting as that enjoyed by students without disabilities. The roots of this stem from the
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emerging legal preference expressed in court decisions such as Wyatt vs. Stickney (see above). As
Turnbull notes, the LRE preference (1) is thought to reduce stigma associated with special education,
(2) allows students’ IEPs to incorporate the least restrictive possible setting before a decision is made
to place the child in a more restrictive setting, and (3) provides a remedy for the reality of separate
but unequal education settings found to exist for students with disabilities and declared
unconstitutional in Brown and subsequent court decisions (1986).
LRE is a rebuttable presumption, meaning that integration into general education settings is
required, unless such integration is found to have an adverse effect on the child with a disability
(Turnbull, 1986). The concept of LRE has been criticized on a number of grounds, especially when
viewed as a continuum of restrictiveness. For example, Steven Taylor (1988) notes that LRE, among
other things, implicitly legitimizes the concept of restrictive environments, improperly associates
segregation with service intensity, and sanctions infringements on the rights of disabled students.
Nevertheless, LRE has emerged as a central concept in (and arguably an articulation of) FAPE, to the
extent that federal policymakers have begun using the terms alongside one another, that is, “FAPE in
the LRE”.
A fifth principle of FAPE is procedural due process, which provides parents and guardians
with various avenues for recourse if they contest school officials’ decisions with regard to their
children’s experiences with special education. Parents and guardians are therefore afforded the right
to consent to placement evaluations and access their children’s records. P.L. 94-142 also built on the
Lessard ruling to provide parents and guardians the right to request an independent educational
evaluation, due process hearings, mediations, appeal mediation decisions, and to be given prior
notice before school officials make changes to their children’s IEPs (NCD, 2003).
The final component of FAPE is parental involvement in decision making. Turnbull locates
the legal foundations of parental involvement within the tradition of participatory democracy,
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writing that “At the core of the constitutional principles (for parent participation) is the common law
doctrine that parents have a duty to support their children and a corollary right to their children’s
services and earnings for as long as the children have the legal status of minors” (1986, 108). In
addition to due process rights, parents and guardians serve as members of the IEP team, giving them
the right to advance notice of IEP meetings, mutually convenient meeting scheduling, assistance
from an interpreter if needed, and “To have their thoughts, preferences, and opinions considered
and generally be involved in the decision making process” (NCD, 2003, 5).
By the twenty-first century, these components of Free and Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE) have become so central to special education policy that it has become common for policy
documents and special education organizations to refer to them as the principles of IDEA.
Importantly, the federal government also came to view these components as cardinal responsibilities
of state and local educational authorities.
Disproportionality
While FAPE constituted a major concern of P.L. 94-142 and its subsequent amendments,
policymakers and civil rights advocates have pointed out an especially problematic dimension of
special education policy that has become known as disproportionality. Historically, scholars and
practitioners have been concerned with the disproportionate overrepresentation of minority
students in special education programs, relative to children in other racial and ethnic groups.
Especially distressing has been the reality that special education and related services could be used
as a method for excluding minority students from the general education classroom, even if the
conditions of FAPE are fulfilled.
A number of federal court decisions also signaled increasing federal interest in this problem,
leading to changes in the process of identifying and evaluating students under FAPE. Hobson vs.
Hanson (1967) ruled against culturally biased tests as a component of evaluations for placement of
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children into special education settings. Two decisions in California, Diana vs. State Board of
Education (1970) and Lau vs. Nichols (1974) determined that students with limited English proficiency
were disproportionately represented in programs for the educable mentally retarded (EMR) because
state authorities had failed to provide multi-lingual students with linguistically appropriate
accommodations, thus signaling judicial attention to what would become defined as “inappropriate
identification” (Elliott, 1987; Coutinho and Oswald, 2000). The Larry P. vs. Riles decision cast further
aspersion on the cultural biases of identification methods (IQ tests in this case) for particular
racial/ethnic groups.
Federal authorities sought to address disproportionality upon ESEA’s early involvement in
special education programs in the late 1960s. Beginning in 1968, for example, the U.S. Office of Civil
Rights (OCR - later a part of the Department of Education) biannually sampled selected school
districts to obtain data on student enrollment and special education placement. The OCR required
state and local education authorities to submit and implement corrective action plans if their
enrollment patterns exhibited disproportionality (Coutinho and Oswald, 2000)
One of the problems with disproportionality measurement has been the lack of consensus on
what methods, cut points, and sample size limits are appropriate to signal the need for intervention.
Early investigations used composition measures, which compared differences of proportions, while
later approaches explored risk-based methods that were more commonplace in epidemiology
research. Other methods were adopted in response to particular state court rulings.12 Congress did
not offer guidance on measuring disproportionality in P.L. 94-142, and subsequent amendments did
not directly address the issue until the 1990s.
IDEA 1997

12

For example, the Mattie T. Consent Decree in Mississippi.
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In the realm of special education policy, the two-decade period after the 1975 passage of P.L.
94-142 was characterized by two movements. The first movement involved what Winzer has called
the “era of inclusion”, which prompted a struggle between advocates of dismantling distinct special
education systems in favor of maximum inclusion, and defenders of the individual-centered approach
to serving students with disabilities.

This controversy arose in response to real or perceived

problems brought to light by court rulings, national implementation of FAPE principles, and political
discussions in the general education realm, such as the Regular Education Initiative (REI), proposed in
1986 by assistant secretary of Education Madeline Will. The REI was of interest to the special
education community for its push to align components of general and special education systems,
mainly for cost reduction purposes. This initiative and the full inclusion agenda faded by the mid1990s, as the principle of selective inclusion based on children’s individual development prevailed
(Winzer, 2009).
The second movement during this era focused on increasing accountability, performance,
and outcomes. This performance focus characterized many public sector programs during this era as
Congress approved the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) (Chapter Two), and had a
notable effect on the direction of education policy in the wake of the Nation at Risk report (Chapter
Three). It was in this climate that Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 1997. Although the tenets of
P.L. 94-142 remained intact, the IDEA 1997 amendments steered federal special education policy
toward the performance measurement regime that would emerge in the subsequent decade.
President Clinton signed P.L. 105-17, reauthorizing IDEA, on June 4, 1997.

This

reauthorization made several changes. For one thing, the law now had four parts: Part A (general
provisions), Part B (Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities (children ages 3-21), Part
C (Provisions for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities—replacing Part H), and Part D (support
programs) (P.L. 105-17). The law designated the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special
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Education and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS) as the agency responsible for implementing IDEA and
the program’s de facto grant administrator. OSERS, headed by the assistant secretary of education,
resulted from the combining of the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP—itself the successor
of the Bureau for the Education of the Handicapped), the Rehabilitation Services Administration
(RSA), and the National Institute for Disability and Rehabilitation Research (Martin et al., 1996).
Responsibility for IDEA oversight and grant administration was given to OSEP, the agency liaison for
state education authorities.
Passed in the wake of GPRA, IDEA 1997 featured performance components. Although P.L.
94-142 had required participating state education authorities to submit Annual Program Plans
specifying how they would comply with the provisions of the act, this system invited criticism. As a
performance tool, the original legislation was lenient and federal enforcement of its provisions was
criticized as inadequate, given the absence of a systematic monitoring system whereby the federal
government could regularly review and sanction applicants (NCD, 1996). IDEA 1997 required states
to establish goals and standards for student knowledge and performance and to publicize the
aggregated results of their monitoring programs.
IDEA 1997 also addressed funding concerns. Rising costs of per pupil special education
funding no doubt exacerbated Congress’ reluctance to fully fund IDEA, but another reason for
Congress’ unease with full funding was its increasing attention to the problem of overrepresentation.
As this problem garnered the attention of academics and advocates alike, legislators became
increasingly reluctant to support the program’s statutory targets. The reauthorization responded to
this concern in two ways. First, it reorganized the program’s funding structure to allocate funding on
the basis of a total school-age population and poverty formula, regardless of school districts’
respective proportions of students in disability categories (Parrish, 2002). Second, the 1997 renewal
required state education authorities to collect data on the representation of racial and ethnic groups
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in special education in a manner distinct from the Office of Civil Rights’ efforts (Coutinho and Oswald,
2000; Hehir, 2002).13 However, disproportionality was not yet a monitoring priority through which
OSEP could sanction states, and, related or not, the funding shortfall persisted.
Although its funding and performance mechanisms would have noteworthy long-term
impacts on special education policy, IDEA 1997 also introduced components directly aimed at
improving services for children with disabilities and their parents. For example, as part of its
performance-based focus, the new law required states to include students with disabilities in stateand district-wide assessments, and establish performance goals for these students. The legislation
also expanded some procedural safeguards for parents, such as broader access to student records,
use of non-technical language in communications regarding children’s rights, expansion of mediating
services, and efforts to ensure that parents are members of any group making placement decisions
(Taylor, 2000).

IDEA 1997 also required the IEP to address “positive behavioral intervention

strategies, if appropriate”, and clarified a number of provisions concerning student discipline (Taylor,
2000, 155). The law also acknowledged the increasing professionalization of special education by
creating a system of grants for teacher and personnel training.
Reauthorization: IDEA 2004
Shortly after the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in early 2002, Congress
began considering another reauthorization of IDEA. For the next two years, Congress invited
advocacy groups, scholars, and parents to present their viewpoints regarding IDEA’s strengths,
effects, limitations, and implementation.

The responses and testimony revealed the broad

popularity of the law among stakeholders, concerns about federal funding and state implementation,
and a desire to enhance state and local accountability.

13

The OCR retained the ability to enforce antidiscrimination laws and refer problematic districts to the
Department of Justice, if appropriate.
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The law also had support from a politically conservative administration. Unlike his most
recent Republican predecessors, President G.W. Bush signaled his interest in enhancing the federal
government’s role in the education realm, especially through the use of performance and
assessments, as indicated by executive level actions such as the Performance Assessment Rating Tool
(PART - Chapter Two). Fatefully, for special education policy, the administration clearly intended to
align elements of IDEA with NCLB. Indeed, the Department of Education was already making clear in
its communications to state and local officials that education authorities would be held accountable
through NCLB for the achievement of individual subgroups, including students with disabilities (OSEP,
2002).
In July of 2002, the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education (PCESE)
published a report with a number of findings and recommendations for improving the delivery of
special education services. Among other things, the Commission found that the existing IDEA system
emphasized process over results, stressed a bureaucratic model of “compliance”, and failed to
address problems such as the dubious validity of some evaluation methods (OSERS, 2002). The
Commission recommended (1) a “focus on results, not process”, (2) embracing a “prevention”
model, not a “failure” model, and (3) “consider(ing) children with disabilities as general education
students first” (OSERS, 2002, 8-9).
In a working document released in February 2002, the National Council on Disability (NCD)
noted that, in its extensive interviews with stakeholders, “A large number of comments addressed
the need for change to a less bulky, timelier system focused on solid outcomes for students and
more classroom time for teachers” (3).

Furthermore, “[m]ore emphasis should be placed on

meaningful monitoring activities leading to improvements in student outcomes” (NCD, 2002, 3). In
addition to concerns about program funding and confusion surrounding the law’s discipline
provisions, the NCD paper also raised concerns about disproportionality, advising that “appropriate
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data collection and manipulation is important, with the issue of disaggregation for race and gender
appearing several times” (2002, 4). The NCD concluded with recommendations, including (among
others) enhanced enforcement of FAPE provisions, the development and use of national standards
for compliance, greater efforts to address the problem of disproportionality, and simplification of the
law’s student discipline requirements.
A year later, as Congress continued to consider amendments to IDEA, Secretary of Education
Rod Paige released a set of principles for reauthorizing the law. These included (1) “stronger
accountability for results”, (2) “simplify paperwork for states and communities and increase
flexibility”, (3) “doing what works”, and (4) “increase choice and meaningful involvement for
parents” (DOE, 2003). The secretary argued that “IDEA must incorporate the NCLB principles of
assessment for children receiving special education and align with NCLB accordingly to enhance state
efforts to improve student achievement” (DOE, 2003).
That April, OSEP released a memorandum to all chief state education officers that outlined
the agency’s Continuous Improvement and Focused Monitoring System (CIFMS). According to the
memorandum,
“OSEP will implement an integrated, four-part strategy: (1) verifying the effectiveness and
accuracy of States’ monitoring, assessment, and data collection systems; (2) attending to
States at high risk for compliance, financial, and/or management failure; (3) supporting States
in assessing their performance and compliance, and in planning, implementing, and
evaluating improvement strategies; and (4) focusing OSEP’s intervention on States with low
ranking performance on critical performance indicators.

This four-part accountability

strategy (…) will enable OSEP to: (1) focus on a small set of critical indicators that are based
on improving results for children with disabilities and their families; (2) support improvement
in the validity and reliability of data that OSEP and States use to focus on performance; (3)
through improvement planning, and the Annual and Biennial Performance Report process,
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help ensure that accountability for improvement rests primarily with States; (4) provide
States with needed technical assistance; and (5) focus the attention of OSEP’s Monitoring and
State Improvement Planning (MSIP) Division on the States that need the most support to
improve their performance” (p. 2).

In addition to its endorsement of performance indicators, OSEP’s memorandum signaled a
determinations process that would assess the states’ performance on selected indicators, and that
some of these indicators would be particularly critical to those determinations. It also suggested that
federal assistance would be made available to states with sub-optimal determinations. The 2003
memorandum thus laid the foundation for the monitoring system that OSEP would use to implement
the expected reauthorization of IDEA, which came the following year.
The November 22, 2004 Congress reauthorized IDEA by overwhelming margins.

The

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA 2004) passed the House of
Representatives by a 397-3 margin and by a unanimous consent agreement in the Senate.14 During
the December 3rd signing ceremony, President Bush remarked that “In this bill, we’re raising
expectations for students. We’re giving schools and parents the tools they need. We’re applying the
reforms of the No Child Left Behind Act to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act so schools are accountable for teaching every child” (White House, 2004). However, it remained
the task of the Department of Education—specifically OSEP—to decide how to implement these new
requirements.
IDEA 2004 Performance Measurement
The new law retained much of the language of its predecessors; for example, it maintained
the key tenets of free and appropriate public education, as well as the (non-compulsory) 40%
average per pupil expenditure (APPE) authorization of its predecessors. Section 616 of Part B,

14

This study refers to the law as IDEA 2004, although some sources abbreviate the law as IDEiA 2004.
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however, explicitly empowered the Department of Education to construct a system for monitoring
state performance in implementing the law. Section 616 defines three monitoring priorities: “(A)
Provision of a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, (B) State
exercise of general supervisory authority, including child find, effective monitoring, the use of
resolution sessions, mediation, voluntary binding arbitration, and a system of transition services (…)
(C) Disproportionate representation of racial and ethnic groups in special education and related
services, to the extent the representation is the result of inappropriate identification” (P.L. 108-446,
2004).15
Section 616 also stipulates that the Department of Education should monitor these priorities
by reviewing participating plans designed by participating state education authorities. OSEP has
implemented this requirement by requiring the states to submit “State Performance Plans (SPPs),
subject to revision at least every six years, and “Annual Performance Reports (APRs) with annually
updated data subject to OSEP review. IDEA 2004 requires all of these documents to be publically
available and sets forth provisions by which the Department of Education can review them, but it is
less clear about how they should be organized. OSEP has therefore developed a standardized
template with 20 performance indicators (later reduced to 16), for which the states were required to
measure their progress in meeting IDEA requirements. These performance indicators for Part B—the
bulk of the law’s scope—are summarized in Table 4.1.

15

“Child find” refers to the requirement that officials identify all children who may be in need of special
education and related services.
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Table 4.1: Summary of OSEP’s IDEA 2004 Part B Performance Indicators as of 2016
Indicator

Theme

Monitoring
Priority

Type of
Indicator

1

Graduation

FAPE in the LRE

Results

2

Dropout

FAPE in the LRE

Results

3 (A-C)

Participation
and
Performance
on Assessments

FAPE in the LRE

Results

Source used to
report under
ESEA

4 (A-B)

Discipline

FAPE in the LRE

Results (A)
Compliance
(B)

Data collected
under IDEA §618

5 (A-C)

Least
Restrictive
Environment

FAPE in the LRE

Results

Data collected
under IDEA §618

6 (A-B)

Pre-School LRE

FAPE in the LRE

Results

Data collected
under IDEA §618

7 (A-C)

Pre-School
Children with
Improved
Outcomes

FAPE in the LRE

Results

State-selected

8

Parental
Involvement

FAPE in the LRE

Results

State-selected

Data Source
Source used to
report Title I
under ESEA
Data collected
under IDEA §618

Calculation
Percent of youth with IEPs graduating
from high school with a regular diploma
Percent of youth with IEPs dropping out
of high school
Participation and performance of
children with IEPs on statewide
assessments: (A) percent of the districts
with a disability subgroup that meets
the minimum ‘n’ size that meet the
state’s AYP/AMO targets for the
disability subgroup, (B) Participation rate
for children with IEPs, (C) Proficiency
rate for children with IEPs against grade
level, modified and alternate academic
achievement standards
Rates of suspension and expulsion: (A)
Percent of districts that have a
significant discrepancy in the rate of
suspensions and expulsions of greater
than 10 days in a school year for
children with IEPs, (B) percent of
districts that have: (1) a significant
discrepancy, by race or ethnicity, in the
rate of suspensions and expulsions of
greater than 10 days in a school year for
children with IEPs, and (2) policies,
procedures, or practices that contribute
to the significant discrepancy and do not
comply with requirements relating to
the development and implementation of
IEPs, the use of positive behavioral
interventions and supports, and
procedural safeguards
Percent of children with IEPs aged 6
through 21 served: (A) Inside the regular
class 80% or more of the day, (B) inside
the regular class 40% or less of the day,
and (C) in separate schools, residential
facilities,
or
homebound/hospital
placements
Percent of children aged 3 through 5
with IEPs attending a: (A) Regular early
childhood program and receiving the
majority of special education and
related services in the regular early
childhood program, and (B) separate
special education class, separate school,
or residential facility
Percent of preschool children aged 3
through 5 with IEPs who demonstrate
improved: (A) Positive social-emotional
skills, (B) Acquisition and use of
knowledge and skills, and (C) Use of
appropriate behaviors to meet their
needs*
Percent of parents with a child receiving
special education services who report
that
schools
facilitated
parent
involvement as a means of improving
services and results for children with
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Indicator

9

10

Theme
Disproportionate
Representation
by
Race/
Ethnicity
Disproportionate
Representation
in
Specific
Disability
Categories

Monitoring
Priority

Disproportionality

Disproportionality

Type of
Indicator

Data Source

Compliance

Data collected
under IDEA §618

Compliance

Data collected
under IDEA §618

Calculation
disabilities*
Percent
of
districts
with
disproportionate representation of racial
and ethnic groups in special education
and related services that is the result of
inappropriate identification
Percent
of
districts
with
disproportionate representation of racial
and ethnic groups in specific disability
categories that is the result of
inappropriate identification
Percent of children who were evaluated
within 60 days of receiving parental
consent for initial evaluation or, if the
state establishes a timeframe within
which the evaluation must be
conducted, within that timeframe
Percent of children referred by Part C
prior to age 3, who are found eligible for
Part B, and who have an IEP developed
and implemented by their third
birthdays
Percent of youth with IEPs aged 16 and
above with an IEP that includes
appropriate measureable postsecondary
goals that are annually updated and
based upon an age appropriate
transition
assessment,
transition
services, including courses of study, that
will reasonably enable the student to
meet those postsecondary goals, and
annual IEP goals related to the student’s
transition service needs.
Percent of youth who are no longer in
secondary school who are (A) enrolled in
higher education within one year of
leaving high school, (B) enrolled in
higher education or competitively
employed within one year of leaving
high school, (C) enrolled in higher
education or some other post-secondary
education or training program, or
competitively employed, within one year
of leaving high school*

11

Child Find

Effective General
Supervision / Child
Find

Compliance

State monitoring
and data system

12

Timely
Transition
between Part B
and Part C

Effective General
Supervision
/
Effective
Transition

Compliance

State monitoring
or data system

13

Post-School
Transition
Goals in IEP

Effective General
Supervision
/
Effective
Transition

Compliance

State monitoring
or data system

14 (A-C)

Post-School
Outcomes

Effective General
Supervision
/
Effective
Transition

Results

State-selected

15

Resolution
Session
Agreements

Results

Data collected
under IDEA §618

Percent of hearing requests that went to
resolution sessions that were resolved
through resolution session agreements

16

Mediation
Agreements

Results

Data collected
under IDEA §618

Percent of mediations held that resulted
in mediation agreements

Effective General
Supervision
/
General
Supervision
Effective General
Supervision
/
General
Supervision

Source: Author’s adaption of OSEP (2014a) “Part B Indicator Measurement Table”
*Sampling allowed
FAPE in the LRE = Free and Appropriate Public Education in the Least Restrictive Environment
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The selection and definition of these indicators suggest a number of things. First, the
indicators concerning FAPE loosely correspond with its six core principles. Two of the FAPE indicators
correspond with ESEA priorities (1—graduation and 2—dropout), while another (participation and
performance on state assessments—3) reflects both NCLB and IDEA 1997 monitoring efforts. Two
FAPE principles—LRE (5 and 6) and parent involvement (8)—are clearly represented, while the IEP
principle is addressed in terms of outcomes (7) and effective transition (12 and 13). Zero reject is
addressed through discipline indicators (4a and 4b), which are likely also intended to clarify some of
the ambiguities stakeholders raised about discipline under IDEA 1997.

Effective evaluation is

partially covered by child find (11), and procedural due process is addressed through resolution
session and mediation agreements (15 and 16).
Disproportionality is addressed on the SPP/APR in three ways: through “discrepancies” in
discipline (4), in special education and related services as a whole (9), and in specific disability
categories (10). OSEP’s decision to monitor Indicators 9 and 10 separately may be based on
academic studies that have found discrepancies by both race/ethnicity and disability category—
especially disability categories that are more subjectively defined (Council for Children with
Behavioral Disorders, 2012). However, OSEP did not provide a measure, cut point, or sample size
criterion for monitoring the disproportionality indicators; this key decision was left to the states.
The design of the indicators also reveals that states must collect some data through periodic
communications with students or parents. Use of these indicators, especially parent involvement (8)
and post-school outcomes (14), also grants the states considerable discretion over sampling and data
sources. If states elect to use a statistically rigorous approach to these and the disproportionality
indicators, then the need for technical assistance may require involvement of third party contractors
or consultants.
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Using these indicators, however, provides the states with limited discretion on data sources
and sampling options. Furthermore, education authorities may have more control over performance
on some indicators than others. For example, time between evaluation and identification (11),
parent involvement (8), least restrictive environment (5 and 6), and discipline (4) are program
activities; whereas graduation (1), dropout (2) and performance on assessments (3) can be construed
as outputs. Post-school outcomes (14) are likely the prime outcome of the IDEA 2004 framework,
and the indicator over which state authorities exert the least direct control.
OSEP also made an important distinction between compliance and results. The agency
designated the majority of the IDEA indicators as “results” indicators, meaning that states were
asked to set annual “measureable and rigorous targets” in their SPPs, based on the states’ baseline
data for those indicators. In contrast, six of the IDEA indicators are “compliance” indicators, meaning
that OSEP requires all states to exhibit data showing 0% (disproportionality) or 100% (child find and
effective transition) performance levels. This distinction was particularly important for OSEP’s annual
determinations process required under IDEA 2004.

Section 616 requires the Department of

Education to make annual determinations for each of the states, based on their performance on the
APR.

These determinations, in ascending order of severity, are “meets requirements”, “needs

assistance”, “needs intervention” and “needs substantial intervention”. Section 616 attaches various
consequences for states that need assistance, intervention, or substantial intervention; including
referrals to technical assistance resources, preparation of a corrective action plan, and redirection of
Part B funds for remedial actions, among other things. OSEP has based these determinations on
states’ progress in meeting the compliance indicators.
During the Obama Administration, and as NCLB came under criticism for its perceived federal
overreach, OSEP reevaluated its nearly exclusive focus on compliance indicators as a basis for the
important annual determinations. After consultations with state education personnel and requests
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for comment, OSEP in 2014 began to implement a process called “Results Driven Accountability”
(RDA). In his explanation of the agency’s movement toward RDA, Secretary Arne Duncan used
language strikingly similar to that of the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education a
decade prior: IDEA performance measurement was focusing too much on “process” rather than
“results”. As Secretary Duncan put it, “For too long we’ve been a compliance-driven bureaucracy
when it comes to educating students with disabilities. We have to expect the very best from our
students—and tell the truth about student performance—so that we can give all students the
supports and services they need. The best way to do that is by focusing on results” (DOE, 2012b.)
OSEP’s stated vision for RDA was straightforward: “All components of an accountability
system will be aligned in a manner that best supports States in improving results for infants, toddlers,
children and youth with disabilities, and their families” (DOE, 2014b). The program’s theory of action
emphasized the use of leadership, collaboration, technical assistance, and accountability to achieve
these results. From the states’ perspective, RDA meant had two immediate effects. The first effect
was OSEP’s clear intention to include states’ performance on IDEA results indicators in their annual
determinations, although the nature of this change was unclear (and will be explored in Chapter
Five). The second effect of RDA on state monitoring efforts was its requirement that each state
develop a State Systemic Improvement Plan (SSIP). As with other components of RDA, OSEP required
these multi-year plans to describe how the state would focus data, infrastructure, research, and
evaluation on state-selected targets for improving results for children with disabilities.
The IDEA 2004 monitoring system, including RDA implementation, will be explored further in
the next chapter. It is worth concluding this discussion by observing that the system overseen by
OSEP, despite the powers wielded by the Department of Education, involves devolution, since it gives
additional discretion to the states. The actual scope of states’ discretion depends on OSEP’s choices
about the processes, outputs, and outcomes to monitor and the measures used to do this. These
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matters are a consideration of the next chapter. The view that states should have some discretion
with respect to performance measurement received further Congressional support with the recent
passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in December 2015, which embraces devolution in
implementing ESEA. IDEA 2004 may have many parallels with—and lessons for—the performance
system that the Department of Education ultimately uses to implement ESSA, and this is another
reason to explore what OSEP has done, and how the states have responded.
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND VARIABLES
Overview
The previous chapter considered the development and context of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and its performance measurement system. That review built on two
previous chapters that discussed the background and some controversies associated with education
policy and performance measurement. The review uncovered a policy framework in which services
for students with disabilities are authorized by federal legislation, the content of which depends on
administrative education policy, the decisions of federal courts, and activity by advocacy groups. The
programs delivering such services are funded by both the federal and state and local governments.
They are delivered mostly by local public school districts. They are monitored by the federal
government, which relies upon systems of performance measurement that are implemented by the
states.
In this chapter, I will describe the data and analyses used to answer the key research questions
outlined in Chapter One. Namely:
1. Does feedback matter?

That is, do the states make substantive changes as a result of

federal feedback pertaining to performance oversight under the IDEA framework? If so,
when, why, and how?
2. What types of performance indicators, if any, produce the most change? What are the
characteristics of these indicators?
3. What states, if any, exhibited evidence of improvement under this federal monitoring
system? What are the common characteristics, if any, of those states?
Specifically, I will describe a large set of data that I collected, coded, and organized to permit
the desired analyses. I will then describe the variables in that dataset. These descriptions will lay the
groundwork for the next two chapters, in which I use these data to address each of the research
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questions and their associated hypotheses. In the final chapter, I will discuss the implications of
these findings, with special attention to a broader question posed in Chapter One: Can an effort to
systematically assess programs improve performance?
Data Sources and Variables: Performance and Indicator Definitions
For this research, I created an original dataset in which I recorded a series of observations
about each of the 50 American states over nine consecutive years (2007-2015).

The first

observations were taken from each state’s Annual Performance Report (APR) and/or State
Performance Plan (SPP), for each of the years in question. In these reports, the states provided, for
each IDEA performance indicator, a target and a performance score. For each indicator, the target—
typically expressed as a percentage—represents the state’s “measureable and rigorous target” above
or below which the state will seek to perform for the particular year in question. Likewise, the
performance score for each indicator is the numeric representation of the state’s performance in
attaining the target. Therefore, if the performance score equals or outperforms the target for a
given year, for a given performance indicator, then the state has “met” its target for that year. The
movement of the performance score across multiple years is the basis for determining “progress” or
slippage.” For each year except for the baseline year (2007—in which no targets were set), and for
each indicator, I recorded this by creating a separate dichotomous variable to denote progress or no
progress.
There are two characteristics of target variables that are important to note. First, the
meaning of the direction of change in performance measures differs.

Some targets, such as

graduation and participation in statewide assessments, encourage higher performance score
percentages; whereas other targets, such as dropout and disproportionality, promote lower
performance score percentages. I account for this distinction by assigning, for each indicator, a
separate dichotomous variable to denote whether the state has met or not met its target. Second, a
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distinction exists between compliance and results indicators with respect to targets. Given their
statutory basis within IDEA, OSEP has interpreted targets for compliance indicators to be absolute—
that is, either “0%” (e.g., disproportionality due to inappropriate identification) or “100%” (e.g., child
find). For results indicators, OSEP has permitted the states, in consultation with stakeholders such as
special education advisory committees, to set targets for subsequent years, typically based on one
year of “baseline” data collected for the indicator in question. The increasing rigor of the targets is
intended to encourage state and local officials to design and implement improvement activities or
otherwise deploy resources for the purpose of improving the state’s performance over time. OSEP
has permitted the states to adjust their targets, provided that stakeholders are involved in the
adjustment decision and that OSEP approves the state’s justification for the modification. For this
reason, states’ targets for the results indicators may not necessarily increase or decrease in uniform
or predictable increments each year.
Thus, the use of dichotomous variables for denoting progress/slippage and meeting/not
meeting targets is desirable for at least three reasons. First, the dichotomies most closely reflect
OSEP’s reaction to state performance. For example, states that achieved results far in excess of their
targets did not receive any more feedback from OSEP than states that simply met their targets.
Likewise, states that achieved substantial improvements from one year to the next received feedback
or acknowledgements similar to those whose performance held steady. Second, the states were able
to set their own targets for most of the performance indicators based on their baseline data. Due to
interstate variation, some states had baseline performance data closer to indicator “ceilings” than
others.16 This inherent variation would distort interstate comparisons on the basis of things like
magnitude of improvement, for example. Third, the use of these dichotomous variables allows the

16

By “ceiling”, I mean the point at which a state can achieve no further improvement in performance. For
example, a 100% graduation rate.
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analysis to consider OSEP’s compliance indicators—which have absolute and federally-set targets—
alongside the results indicators—for which the targets vary across the states.
The target and performance data are, of course, in the dataset as well. These percentages
represent different proportions depending on the performance indicator.

For example, some

indicators, such as graduation and dropout, use the entire student population of interest as their
denominators. Other indicators, such as disproportionality, use LEAs as their denominators. These
data are necessary for assessing the second and third research questions.
Although I collected target and performance data for sixteen performance indicators, OSEP
divided many of these indicators into multiple parts. In addition, for a number of indicators, states
were asked to set performance baselines after the 2007 reporting year. For this reason, for certain
indicators in the dataset, I could not assign target and performance data for years pre-dating the
common baseline years. The delays in baseline data collection were due to factors such as federal
methodological clarifications or state and federal confusion surrounding what exactly the particular
indicators were intended to measure. These delays were generally about the same across the states
due to the relative centralization of the IDEA reporting system. However, to address the possibility
that some states have reset their targets and baselines with OSEP approval (thus resulting in multiple
baselines over time), I identified baselines as they were reported in the most recent APR series
(reporting year 2015, or FFY 2013) used in the dataset.17 Due to the alignment of target and
performance data during baseline years, I did not assign any state a value for the variable indicating
whether or not the target was met for the indicator(s) in question during a baseline year. Table 5.1
summarizes the subdivisions within indicators, as well as the common baseline year in which data
were reported to OSEP. This table reveals that 31 target and performance indicators were recorded
in 16 domains and— for most of the indicators—for nine consecutive years.
17

The FFY 2013 APR series contained historical data in which baseline years were identified.
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Table 5.1: Summary of OSEP Performance Indicator Subdivisions and Baseline Years
Indicator

Theme

Subdivision

1

Graduation

N/A

2

Dropout

N/A

A
3

Participation and
Performance on
Assessments

B (Reading)
B (Mathematics)
C (Reading)
C (Mathematics)

A

4

Rates of
Suspension and
Expulsion
B

5

6

7

Percent of
children with IEPs
aged 6 through 21
served…

Percent of
children aged 3
through 5 with
IEPs attending a…

Percent of
preschool children
aged 3 through 5
with IEPs who
demonstrate
improved…

A
B
C

A

B
A1
(increased
rate of growth)
A2 (within age
expectations)
B1
(increased
rate of growth)
B2 (within age
expectations)
C1
(increased
rate of growth)
C2 (within age
expectations)

8

Parental
Involvement

N/A

9

Disproportionate
Representation by
Race/ Ethnicity

N/A

Calculation
Percent of youth with IEPs graduating from
high school with a regular diploma.
Percent of youth with IEPs dropping out of
high school.
Percent of the districts with a disability
subgroup that meets the minimum ‘n’ size
that meet the state’s AYP/AMO targets for the
disability subgroup.
Participation rate for children with IEPs.
Proficiency rate for children with IEPs against
grade level, modified and alternate academic
achievement standards.
Percent of districts that have a significant
discrepancy in the rate of suspensions and
expulsions of greater than 10 days in a school
year for children with IEPs.
Percent of districts that have: (1) a significant
discrepancy, by race or ethnicity, in the rate of
suspensions and expulsions of greater than 10
days in a school year for children with IEPs,
and (2) policies, procedures, or practices that
contribute to the significant discrepancy and
do not comply with requirements relating to
the development and implementation of IEPs,
the use of positive behavioral interventions
and supports, and procedural safeguards.
…inside the regular class 80% or more of the
day.
…inside the regular class 40% or less of the
day.
…in separate schools, residential facilities, or
homebound/hospital placements.
…regular early childhood program and
receiving the majority of special education
and related services in the regular early
childhood program.
…separate special education class, separate
school, or residential facility.

Type of
Indicator

Common
Baseline
Year

Results

2007

Results

2007

Results

2007

Results
Results
Results

2007
2007
2007

Results

2007

Results

2007

Compliance

2011

Results

2007

Results

2007

Results

2007

Results

2013

Results

2013

Results

2010

Results

2010

Results

2010

Results

2010

Results

2010

Results

2010

Results

2007

Compliance

2007

…positive social-emotional skills.

…acquisition and use of knowledge and skills.

…use of appropriate behaviors to meet their
needs.
Percent of parents with a child receiving
special education services who report that
schools facilitated parent involvement as a
means of improving services and results for
children with disabilities
Percent of districts with disproportionate
representation of racial and ethnic groups in
special education and related services that is
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Indicator

Theme

Subdivision

10

Disproportionate
Representation in
Specific Disability
Categories

N/A

11

Child Find

N/A

12

Timely Transition
between Part B
and Part C

N/A

13

Post-School
Transition Goals in
IEP

N/A

A

14

Percent of youth
who are no longer
in secondary
school who are…

B

C

15*

Resolution Session
Agreements

N/A

16*

Mediation
Agreements

N/A

Calculation
the result of inappropriate identification
Percent of districts with disproportionate
representation of racial and ethnic groups in
specific disability categories that is the result
of inappropriate identification
Percent of children who were evaluated
within 60 days of receiving parental consent
for initial evaluation or, if the state establishes
a timeframe within which the evaluation must
be conducted, within that timeframe
Percent of children referred by Part C prior to
age 3, who are found eligible for Part B, and
who have an IEP developed and implemented
by their third birthdays
Percent of youth with IEPs aged 16 and above
with an IEP that includes appropriate
measureable postsecondary goals that are
annually updated and based upon an age
appropriate transition assessment, transition
services, including courses of study, that will
reasonably enable the student to meet those
postsecondary goals, and annual IEP goals
related to the student’s transition service
needs.
…enrolled in higher education within one
year of leaving high school.
…enrolled
in
higher
education
or
competitively employed within one year of
leaving high school.
…enrolled in higher education or some other
post-secondary
education
or
training
program, or competitively employed, within
one year of leaving high school.
Percent of hearing requests that went to
resolution sessions that were resolved
through resolution session agreements
Percent of mediations held that resulted in
mediation agreements

Type of
Indicator

Common
Baseline
Year

Compliance

2007

Compliance

2007

Compliance

2007

Compliance

2011

Results

2011

Results

2011

Results

2011

Results

2007

Results

2007

*Note: This study considers the 31 indicators that existed during the nine-year time frame. OSEP restructured the indicator
numbers as part of its Results Driven Accountability (RDA) framework in 2014 and beyond. Three of the formerly 20
indicators were eliminated, one (SSIP-indicator 17) was added but not considered in this study, and two indicators (18 and
19) were renumbered (i.e., to 15 and 16) due to the deletions.

Some states chose to disaggregate targets and performance data for two indicators—3 and
8. For example, some states reported students’ participation in statewide assessments (Indicator 3)
by grade level or education level (e.g., middle school or high school), and other states divided their
parental involvement results (Indicator 8) according to the pre-school or school age status of
respondents’ children. To maintain consistency among these states, I randomly selected a reporting
category for each of these indicators, and used the target and performance score for that category,
for each state that chose to disaggregate its performance data on these two indicators. The
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randomly selected categories were Grade 8 English or middle school for Indicator 3 (participation and
performance on assessments), and school age status for Indicator 8 (parental involvement).
Data Sources and Variables: OSEP Feedback
A second set of variables captures OSEP feedback to each state education authority, for each
indicator, and for each year feedback was given. I collected this information from OSEP’s annual
response tables for each state. OSEP provided these tables to state officials each reporting year,
beginning with 2007. The tables were arranged by performance indicator, each containing a column
for “OSEP Analysis/Next Steps”, in which OSEP provided written feedback in response to the state’s
APR submission. To begin the coding process, I examined feedback for selected years and indicators,
noting patterns and similarities over the nine years of OSEP responses. These patterns became the
basis of approximately eleven different numeric codes that I assigned for each state, indicator, and
year. Given the reflexive nature of the coding process, I created and utilized a coding memo to which
I referred and updated regularly. This memo recorded any unusual circumstances and key decisions
made with respect to the codes (hereafter referred to as themes), often requiring recoding of
previous years to ensure consistency. Table 5.2 summarizes the key themes I identified during this
process, relevant to the quality of the data measurement and reporting process.
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Table 5.2: Summary of Key Themes Identified among OSEP Responses, 2007-2014
I.
Explicit statement of satisfaction and/or appreciation of the state’s efforts to improve
performance.
II. The state did not submit necessary data, submitted incomplete data, and/or provided
an incomplete description of its methodology.
III. The state did not report data as required, and/or did not make data available to the
public.
IV. The state did not use valid data, used an invalid methodology, did not adequately
justify its methodology, and/or reported incorrect data.
V. Explicit acknowledgement of the state’s failure to meet the target or achieve
compliance, and/or a statement anticipating the state’s future data demonstrating
improvement.
VI.
The state must address its improvement strategies.
VII.

Explicit statement about the targets, usually regarding increasing or decreasing rigor.

VIII. Explicit request that the state perform some action for the next APR, not including
requests for corrections of non-compliance.
IX.
Explicit request that the state correct non-compliance.
X.
XI.

Acknowledgement that the state performed an action that OSEP requested the
previous year.
The state did not perform an action that OSEP requested the previous year, or did not
perform the action in a satisfactory manner.

OSEP provided response tables, containing written feedback, through the 2012 reporting
year.

During reporting years 2013 and 2014, a different format was used to convey federal

responses to the APRs. This new format presented OSEP feedback in separate sections titled
“Results Data Summary Notes” and “Compliance Data Summary Notes”. In reporting year 2015,
OSEP replaced these tables with a response rubric, in which specific comments virtually ceased.
Therefore, response codes exist only for the first eight years of observation (2007-2014).
Data Sources and Variables: Additional State Data
The third set of data attempted to capture several state-level characteristics that may be
relevant to the IDEA monitoring system. The first of these variables records the states’ overall
determinations from OSEP, for each of the nine years of observation (2007-2015). Each year, OSEP
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made these overall determinations based on a rubric described in a document titled “How the
Department Made Determinations under Section 616(d) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act in 20xx: Part B”. These memoranda, in addition to OSEP’s annual determination letters to each
state’s director of special education, were the source of information for recording and interpreting
this variable. I express this as an ordinal variable representing the four determinations under IDEA:
(1) meets requirements, (2) needs assistance, (3) needs intervention, and (4) needs substantial
intervention. I also created dummy variables for each determination type, to permit flexibility if
needed for the purposes of multivariate analysis.
The dataset also contained a categorical variable denoting the governor’s party for each
state, for each year in question. These data were collected from multiple sources including the
National Governors Association (2016) and New York Times election outcome data (2008). The
variable may provide insight into whether gubernatorial leadership may have any measureable
impact on states’ accountability systems under IDEA, and if so, where that influence is evident.
Another variable to be considered in this analysis is per pupil expenditures. These data,
obtained through the U.S Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics (2016)
and the U.S. Census Bureau (2016) for the school years 2006-07 through 2013-14 inclusive, were
chosen as one indicator of states’ interest in directing finite resources toward education. Although it
is not a perfect expression of each state’s investment into IDEA performance systems, per pupil
spending also has the advantage of facilitating comparisons among states.
I also consider each state’s non-white enrollment, expressed as the percentage of American
Indian/Alaska

Native,

Asian,

Black/African

American,

Native

Hawaiian/Pacific

Islander,

Hispanic/Latino, and multiethnic students over nine years. These data, from the U.S Department of
Education National Center for Educational Statistics (2016), are an indicator of student diversity
among the states, and may provide insight into challenges that some states and local districts may
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have in providing IDEA services to students of diverse backgrounds. By considering diversity in these
models, it may be possible to suggest whether certain performance indicators are affected by
student heterogeneity.
Finally, I include Bowman and Kearney’s (2011) centralization scores for each state. These
scores, expressed as proportions, are numeric representations of state and local bonding using three
metrics first developed by H. Ross Stephens (1974): financial responsibility, service delivery, and
public personnel allocations. A centralized state, according to Stephens, was one that “controls basic
public policy, allocated resources, and delivers public goods and services” (1974, 52). Unlike the
other state-level variables, this is a fixed variable that will have only limited applicability in time
series analysis. Nevertheless, I include it because it is a widely accepted measure of state and local
capacity frequently used in the federalism literature. Its use in this analysis may provide insight into
what Bowman and Kearney call “second order devolution” and its association with the IDEA
performance system (2011, 564).
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CHAPTER 6: OSEP ACTIONS AND STATE RESPONSES UNDER IDEA
Addressing the Research Question
This chapter will describe the analyses used to address one of my research questions, and
the results of those analyses.

It will describe the analytic approach and key variables used,

accompanied by several tables and charts to summarize the results. The chapter will then discuss the
results and assess the hypothesis associated with the research question.
Does feedback matter? That is, do the states make substantive changes as a result of federal
feedback pertaining to performance oversight under the IDEA framework? If so, when, why, and
how?
The first task in addressing this question is to determine the extent to which OSEP has
provided feedback to the states under the IDEA performance system. Table 6.1 presents, for each
reporting year between 2007 and 2014 inclusive, and for each indicator, the frequency of OSEP’s
explicit requests for states to perform some action for the subsequent annual performance report.
The data reveal the extent to which OSEP requested actions during each of the eight years
considered. Looking across those eight years, for 14 indicators, the largest proportion of states
received requests from OSEP during the first reporting year (2007).18 In contrast, reporting years
2014 and 2013 were associated with the fewest requests for state actions; these two years were
associated with the lowest percentage of requests for 14 and 12 indicators, respectively.19

18

I include sub-indicators—for example 3a, 3b reading, and 3b math—in these indicator counts.
Excluding Indicators 6a and 6b (Preschool Settings), for which states reported data for only two of these eight
reporting years.
19

100

Table 6.1: Frequency of Explicit OSEP Requests for Specific State Actions, 2007 - 2014
Indicator
Graduation
Dropout
AYP
Participation Reading
Participation Math
Proficiency Reading
Proficiency -Math
Discipline
Discipline - Race
Settings >=80%
Settings <=40%
Settings –
Separate Facilities
Preschool Settings
– Early Childhood
Preschool Settings
– Separate
Facilities
Preschool
Outcomes (a1-c2)
Parental
Involvement
Disproportionality
Disproportionality
- Disability
Child Find
Timely Transition
Transition Goals
Post-Secondary
Outcomes (a-c)
Resolution
Agreements
Mediation
Agreements

Percentage of States
2010
2011
4.0%
4.0%
4.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2007
38.0%
42.0%
20.0%

2008
4.0%
2.0%
4.0%

2009
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2012
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2013
2.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2014
0.0%
2.0%
2.0%

24.0%

6.0%

2.0%

2.0%

24.0%

18.0%

4.0%

0.0%

24.0%

6.0%

2.0%

2.0%

24.0%

18.0%

4.0%

0.0%

26.0%

6.0%

0.0%

4.0%

18.0%

8.0%

4.0%

0.0%

24.0%
92.0%
N/A
10.0%
10.0%

6.0%
90.0%
N/A
2.0%
2.0%

0.0%
94.0%
N/A
0.0%
0.0%

4.0%
0.0%
N/A
4.0%
4.0%

18.0%
8.0%
12.0%
0.0%
0.0%

8.0%
10.0%
22.0%
0.0%
0.0%

4.0%
2.0%
4.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
2.0%
2.0%
0.0%
0.0%

10.0%

2.0%

0.0%

2.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.0%

2.0%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.0%

0.0%

100%*

100%*

100%*

100%*

100%*

96.0%

100.0%

92.0%

48.0%

18.0%

22.0%

4.0%

14.0%

10.0%

14.0%

20.0%

88.0%

24.0%

4.0%

2.0%

2.0%

4.0%

0.0%

0.0%

92.0%

40.0%

6.0%

4.0%

8.0%

6.0%

2.0%

0.0%

50.0%
88.0%
44.0%

74.0%
64.0%
82.0%

2.0%
6.0%
0.0%

0.0%
2.0%
90.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
2.0%

98.0%*

8.0%

N/A

100%*

98.0%*

12.0%

6.0%

14.0%

12.0%

2.0%

2.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

6.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

2.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
The denominator includes states that reported no data, to account for feedback that was assigned independently of data.
Blue shading = Year with the greatest proportion of OSEP feedback (including ties).
Red shading – Year with the smallest proportion of OSEP feedback (including ties).
*These requests were not state-specific; most were general reminders of APR requirements (see Table 5.5 below.)

Table 6.2 presents, as a separate tabulation, OSEP’s explicit requests for corrections of noncompliance, for each of the compliance indicators. The table is restricted to these indicators because
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only compliance indicators were associated with OSEP’s requests for corrections of non-compliance.
The data suggest that OSEP’s requests for corrections of non-compliance were frequent across the
eight-year time frame. The percentage of states that received explicit requests for non-compliance
ranged from 12% (Disproportionality in 2014) to 100% (Timely Identification in 2010 and Transition
Goals in 2009 and 2013).20
Table 6.2: Frequency of Explicit OSEP Requests for Corrections of Non-Compliance, 2007 - 2014
Compliance
Indicator
Discipline
Discipline - Race
Disproportionality
Disproportionality Disability
Child Find
Timely Transition
Transition Goals

2007
14.0%
N/A
38.0%

2008
20.0%
N/A
24.0%

2009
16.0%
N/A
20.0%

Percentage of States
2010
2011
14.0%
32.0%
N/A
42.0%
16.0%
16.0%

2012
32.0%
46.0%
16.0%

2013
38.0%
44.0%
18.0%

2014
32.0%
34.0%
12.0%

36.0%

40.0%

30.0%

36.0%

30.0%

30.0%

22.0%

24.0%

88.0%
84.0%
94.0%

98.0%
88.0%
98.0%

98.0%
90.0%
100%

100%
90.0%
28.0%

98.0%
92.0%
98.0%

94.0%
86.0%
98.0%

94.0%
84.0%
100%

100%
84.0%
84.0%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
The denominator includes states that reported no data, to account for feedback that was assigned independently of data.
Blue shading = Year with the greatest proportion of OSEP feedback (including ties).
Red shading – Year with the smallest proportion of OSEP feedback (including ties).

Given that OSEP appears to have used its authority under IDEA to provide feedback, it is
appropriate to explore what type of feedback OSEP provided to the state education authorities
(SEAs). Chart 6.1 illustrates the extent to which key issues were associated with the office’s explicit
requests for state actions.

The chart reveals that technical problems (n=30) and information

deficiencies (n=29) were the issues that prompted requests for specific state actions for the most
indicators. For all except one indicator (preschool settings in separate facilities, for which states
were only required to report data for the last two years in the dataset), OSEP requested that at least
one state address a problem related to methodology and validity. In these cases, the office noted
problems with the soundness or accuracy of the states’ measurements or data, or requested that

20

Differences among the compliance indicators will be explored in more detail below.
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states justify their methodologies. The proportion of these types of requests was relatively high
(33.9% and 31.6%) for the two disproportionality indicators (9 and 10).21
Chart 6.1: Issues Addressed in OSEP’s Requests for Specific State Actions, 2007 – 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

Information requests occurred when states submitted insufficient data or did not adequately
explain the relevant calculation methodologies in their APRs. With the exception of Indicators 6a and
6b, which tracked preschool settings data for only the final two years in the dataset, OSEP requested
additional information for every indicator at least one time during the timeframe of interest. For 15
indicators, these requests for additional information constituted the highest proportion of federal
requests.

21

Proportions were also high for Indicators 5a (settings >=80%), 5b (settings <=40%) and 6a (preschool settings
– early childhood), but the total number of requests regarding these indicators, during the timeframe
considered, was less than ten.
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Although the great majority of OSEP requests were associated with data, information
availability, validity, and methodological issues, some additional observations can be made about the
results in Chart 6.1. For example, for the four reading and math assessment participation and
proficiency indicators, OSEP’s requests were often accompanied by requests to report certain data,
or to make certain data publically available. OSEP also commented on states’ changes to their
indicator targets, and these comments often coincided with some of the office’s data-related
requests discussed above, especially for the participation and proficiency indicators and the
preschool outcome indicators. Although these comments usually expressed approval of the target
changes, OSEP requested that at least one state change its targets for Indicator 3c (proficiency on
statewide assessments) because the existing targets did not improve over the baseline measure. In
other cases, particularly with Indicators 7 (preschool outcomes), 13 (transition goals), and 14a-c
(post-secondary outcomes), OSEP requested actions that applied to a large number of states. Most
of these requests reminded states of their federal obligations for the subsequent year’s APR, for
example, “In reporting on this indicator in the (next) APR….the State must describe the results of the
State’s examination of data…” (OSEP, 2008, 3). For five of the six compliance indicators (i.e., all of
the compliance indicators except discipline), OSEP instructed many states to “…review its
improvement strategies and revise them, if appropriate, to ensure that they will enable the State to
include data in the (next) APR…that demonstrate[s] compliance…” (OSEP, 2007, 3). Due to its
specificity, I classified this advice as a unique theme in my coding scheme. The full summary of these
data is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Although I distinguish between OSEP’s requests for specific actions and the office’s explicit
requests for corrections of non-compliance, it should be noted that, as illustrated in Chart 6.2, large
proportions of compliance-related requests were not raised simultaneously with the particular issues
noted above. To the extent that the non-compliant states experienced additional problems with the
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compliance indicators, those other problems appear to be of the technical or methodological variety
in the case of Indicators 9 and 10 (disproportionality) and concerning improvement strategies in the
case of Indicators 11 (timely identification) through 13 (transition goals).

These findings are

consistent with some of the patterns detected above. It is important to note that the issues
illustrated in Chart 6.2 are not necessarily connected to the request for non-compliance; they simply
reveal what issues OSEP noted simultaneously to the non-compliance, for the compliance indicators
in question. The full summary of these data is provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Chart 6.2: Issues Addressed Simultaneously to OSEP Requests for Correction of Non-Compliance,
2007 - 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

Having discussed the nature of SEP’s requests for particular actions, it is now appropriate to
ask how the states have responded to these requests. Chart 6.3.1 illustrates the nature of these
state responses to requests OSEP made during the initial seven years of IDEA 2004 implementation
(2007-2013). The chart suggests, first, that a large majority of states performed the particular actions
or steps requested by the federal office. Across the indicators, the percentage of OSEP requests that
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were followed by satisfactory actions ranged from 71.4% to 100%. Notable exceptions include
Indicator 7 (preschool outcomes) and its subparts, for which OSEP’s requests tended to be non-statespecific reminders about federal obligations. With regard to two other exceptions—Indicators 15
(resolution session agreements) and 16 (mediation agreements)—OSEP appears to have followed up
its requests with either no further comments or a focus on the states’ failure to meet their
performance targets. Also noteworthy about Chart 6.3.1 is the low proportion of states that did not
perform the requested actions, ranging from 0.0% for 15 indicators with OSEP requests to 12.5%
(n=1) in the case of Indicator 15 (resolution session agreements). By and large, however, the data
suggest that OSEP has been largely satisfied with the states’ execution of its specific requests under
IDEA. The full summary of these data is provided in Table A.3.1 in the Appendix.
Chart 6.3.1: Percentage of Particular State Responses Noted by OSEP in the Reporting Year
Following Explicit OSEP Requests for Specific Actions, 2008 – 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
* As noted in Table 6.1, Indicator 7 requests tended to be systemic rather than state-specific.
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The patterns revealed in Chart 6.3.1 are also present when considering only the first year of
state responses to OSEP feedback. OSEP acknowledged these first-year state actions in its 2007
response tables, but the precise wording of those requests pre-dates the response tables
themselves. In an effort to explore how the states responded to OSEP’s authority during the first
year of implementation, Chart 6.3.2 displays data extracted from these 2007 response tables. Here,
again, it appears that a greater proportion of states performed the required action, compared to the
proportion of states that did not. Nevertheless, the proportions are close for certain indicators such
as 4a (discipline) and 14a-14c (post-secondary outcomes). For this reason, an additional chart—
Chart 6.3.3—is provided. This additional chart explores the key issue(s) associated with failure(s) to
perform the requested actions during the first year of implementation. Together, the tables show
that, in most cases, the problematic issues were about information deficiencies. The full summary of
the data in these two charts is provided in Table A.3.2 in the Appendix.
Chart 6.3.2: Percentage of states that OSEP noted addressed or did not address problems during
the first year of response tables (2007 only)

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*In this chart, the proportions for each indicator use all 50 states as a denominator.
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Chart 6.3.3: Percentage of states that OSEP noted did not address problems during the first year of
response tables, and the nature of problems that were not addressed (2007 only)

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

Information deficiency challenges—that is, problems that arose when states provided an
incomplete explanation of their methodologies, did not submit necessary data, or submitted
incomplete data—are also evident when the data are once again considered beyond the first year of
implementation. Charts 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 explore the nature of problems that were either not
addressed, or only partially addressed. In both tables, despite the small numbers of states that did
not adequately address the issues OSEP raised, information deficiencies appear to have been the key
challenges for those states with regard to meeting OSEP’s requests. The full summary of the data in
these two charts is provided, respectively, in Tables A.3.3 and A.3.4 in the Appendix.
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Chart 6.3.4: Percentage of instances in which OSEP noted states did not address problems, and the
nature of problems that were not addressed, 2008 – 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
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Chart 6.3.5: Percentage of instances in which OSEP noted states only partially addressed problems,
and the nature of problems that were only partially addressed, 2008 – 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*The previous year had no feedback except for the OSEP request, so the current year’s code is used.

In addition to OSEP’s specific requests for particular actions, it is also appropriate to explore
the nature of states’ responses to OSEP’s specific requests for correction of non-compliance. Chart
6.4 illustrates that, for the seven compliance indicators, OSEP’s specific requests for correction of
non-compliance were typically followed, in the subsequent year, by OSEP’s acknowledgement that
the states performed the requested actions—with proportions ranging from 89.4% to 97.1% of noncompliance requests. The full summary of these data is provided in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
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Chart 6.4: Percentage of Particular State Responses Noted by OSEP in the Reporting Year Following
Explicit OSEP Requests for Correction of Non-Compliance, 2008 – 2014

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

Now that the nature of OSEP’s feedback and the extent to which states have responded to it
have been explored, it is appropriate to ask whether the states have exhibited improvements after
receiving this feedback. To explore this question, I present data in Charts 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 that look at
changes—that is, the progress of annually reported performance data—for states that received OSEP
feedback during the baseline year of data (Chart 6.5.1), and those that did not receive OSEP feedback
during that year (Chart 6.5.2). Using the baseline year in this exploration is advantageous for two
reasons. First, the baseline year represents the point at which the indicator in question was likely to
be under development by SEAs and their stakeholders—a time during which SEAs may have been
relatively more receptive to making systemic or methodological changes that could improve results
in subsequent years.

Second, the baseline year allows one to consider multiple subsequent

timeframes consistently across the indicators considered. For example, I consider three types of
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“subsequent timeframes” in these charts: (1) the year immediately following the OSEP request, (2)
two years immediately following the OSEP request, and (3) all years following the OSEP request, up
to reporting year 2015. The baseline year approach also permits a comparison of the number and
proportion of subsequent OSEP requests, across the indicators with similar baseline years.
Chart 6.5.1: Percentage of States Whose Results Exhibited Improvement Following OSEP Requests
for Particular Actions, 2008 – 2015

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*OSEP requests were ubiquitous across states; there is no basis for constructing a comparison group.
**The sum of the treatment and comparison groups may not always equal 50; some states reported no data during the baseline
year.
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Chart 6.5.2: Percentage of States That Did Not Receive OSEP requests for Particular Actions, Whose
Results Exhibited Improvement after the Baseline Year, 2008 – 2015

Several observations can be made about these data. First, Chart 6.5.1 shows that, for most
of the indicators, states that received OSEP requests improved their performance in the subsequent
timeframes considered. After receiving OSEP requests during the baseline year, more than half of
these states exhibited improvement during all of the subsequent timeframes for graduation (n=17),
proficiency on math assessments(n=9), discipline (n=46), placement in general education settings
greater than 79% of the time (five states), increased growth on all three preschool outcome
indicators (all states), parental involvement (n=16), enrollment in post-secondary education or
training (all states), and mediation agreements (two states). In contrast, smaller proportions of these
states improved their performance on the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) indicator (n=7), resolution
session agreements (three states), and preschool outcomes within expectations (all states).
Chart 6.5.2 shows that, across all three time frames, states that did not receive indicatorspecific OSEP requests during the baseline year also exhibited improvement under the IDEA
performance measurement system. More than half of these comparison group states improved their
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performance for all subsequent timeframes for proficiency on math assessments (n=25), all three
educational settings indicators (n=45), and parental involvement (n=21). Like their counterparts that
did receive OSEP feedback during the baseline year, the comparison group states also had more
trouble improving on the AYP indicator (n=23) and resolution session agreements (n=39).
In general, for the majority of the indicators, and across all three time frames, the
comparison group states exhibited improvement more frequently than states that received OSEP
requests. This is not surprising given the selection bias inherent in this comparison. However, it
should be noted that for most indicators, more than half of the states that received OSEP requests
exhibited improvement for each of the three time frames, regardless of their performance relative to
the comparison group. Furthermore, the charts reveal important differences in improvement across
the three timeframes considered. For example, on average, a greater proportion of the comparison
group states exhibited improvement after the baseline year compared to the states that received
OSEP feedback during the baseline year, although that difference is statistically significant only for
the third timeframe—that is, all post-baseline years up to and including 2015.22Second, the table
reveals that, for the group of states receiving OSEP requests, the largest proportion (56.7%) exhibited
improvement during the two years immediately following the requests. For the comparison group,
however, improvement was most evident when considering all of the years following the baseline
year—that is, up to and including 2015.
The analyses also reveal that many states, including those in the comparison groups,
received OSEP requests during the years following the baseline year. However, these proportions
tended to be much smaller for the comparison group (11.5%, compared to 67.3% for the states
receiving OSEP requests.)

In addition, few states—mainly those in the comparison groups—

approached the indicator ceilings. Both of these effects—additional OSEP requests and the ceiling
22

(Z = -2.9391; (p=0.00328))
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effect—are most pronounced for Indicator 4a (discipline).These data and the source data for Charts
6.5.1 and 6.5.2 are summarized in Table A.5.1 in the Appendix.
Charts 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 explore the relationship between OSEP’s specific requests for
correction of non-compliance and subsequent compliance. Given the existence of far less room for
progress and slippage, and the higher likelihood of ceiling-effect distortion due to the absolute
nature of compliance targets (i.e., 0.0% or 100%), this table considers whether states achieved
compliance during either none or all of the post-baseline years.

Chart 6.5.3: Percentage of States That Met Compliance Targets during Either None or All of the
Years Following OSEP Requests for Corrections of Non-Compliance, 2008 – 2015

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*one state was exempt from Indicator 10 reporting.
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Chart 6.5.4: Percentage of Comparison Group States That Met Compliance Targets during Either
None or All of the Post-Baseline Years, 2008 – 2015

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*one state was exempt from Indicator 10 reporting.

For example, of the 19 states that received an OSEP request for correction of noncompliance for disproportionality, more than half (52.6%) met OSEP’s compliance target for this
indicator, for all of the subsequent reporting years. This contrasts with the 21 states that were
flagged for discipline by race, of which only 14.3% met OSEP’s compliance target for all subsequent
reporting years. Similarly to Charts 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, these charts suggests that, for all six of the
compliance indicators, comparison group states met their compliance targets more regularly after
the baseline year, compared to states that received the request for correction of non-compliance.
This, again, is likely the result of a selection effect. However, Charts 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 also reveal
differences among the compliance indicators themselves. For example, states clearly had greater
difficulty with timely identification, transition costs, and transition goals; only one state achieved
compliance on one of these indicators (transition costs) during every post-baseline year, and in fact
the majority of states in both groups were unable to achieve compliance with these indicators during
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any of the post-baseline years. In contrast, states in both groups enjoyed more success with the
discipline and disproportionality indicators.
These analyses also revealed that multiple OSEP requests for correction of non-compliance—
that is, requests beyond the baseline year—were more common than subsequent requests
considered in the previous set of tables (6.5.1 and 6.5.2), particularly for the comparison group.
However, the proportion of subsequent requests for corrections of non-compliance was still greater
for states that received such requests during the baseline year (88.6%) compared to the comparison
group (50.9%). These data and the source data for Charts 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 are summarized in Table
A.5.2 in the Appendix.
The above tables provide evidence that state education authorities have reacted to federal
feedback under IDEA 2004. The federal feedback appears to have related to requests for corrections
of non-compliance and issues pertaining to data, validity, and methodology. Although improvement
was not ubiquitous in this performance system, for many performance indicators, the majority of
states that received OSEP requests for specific actions early under IDEA 2004 implementation
improved their results in subsequent years. This was also true for certain compliance indicators. It
should also be noted that many states which did not receive OSEP requests also improved their
performance on certain indicators—often more so than those that did receive feedback—under the
IDEA performance system. I discuss these results below.
Discussion: OSEP Feedback and State Responsiveness
The first key research question asked if feedback matters; and if so, when, why, and how?
Specifically, this question explores whether states react to federal (OSEP) feedback from
performance oversight under the IDEA framework. This study set out the hypothesis that states will
address the problems that OSEP identifies and will show evidence of improvement for those
performance indicators after OSEP noted problems.
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First, for this hypothesis to be meaningful, there is a necessary assumption that OSEP actually
provided “feedback” to state education authorities after IDEA implementation. Data provided by the
office during the first nine years of that statute’s implementation reveal that OSEP did indeed
provide feedback to the states, and this feedback had several characteristics.

OSEP clearly

emphasized the need for states to correct “noncompliance”—that is, instances in which the states
did not meet the statutory requirements of IDEA—over time. Six performance indicators were
specifically concerned with statutory compliance, and OSEP appeared to adopt a “zero-tolerance”
interpretation of compliance for these indicators. These six are discipline by race/ethnicity,
disproportionality, disproportionality by race/ethnicity, and “general effective supervision” indicators
(timely identification, transition costs, and transition goals). States were not permitted to set
compliance targets. Rather, OSEP required states to attain performance of 100% for the effective
general supervision compliance indicators and 0% for the discipline and disproportionality
compliance indicators.
Second, OSEP’s construction and treatment of the six compliance indicators contrast with the
25 “results” indicators, for which the office permitted states to set their own targets based on
baseline data. OSEP provided annual feedback on these results indicators as well, but to the extent
that feedback concerned performance, OSEP adopted more of a referee’s role. For example,
although the federal office regularly acknowledged states’ successes and failures to meet their stateestablished targets, its specific directives and “next steps” tended to focus on improvement activities
and assessments of progress or slippage.
Third, for the results indicators, it was more common for states to receive feedback
pertaining to data, methodological, or information deficiencies as they pertained to annual
performance reporting. Here, again, OSEP appears to have been chiefly interested in compliance in
the sense that timely, accurate, and reliable data were required to assess performance. This type of
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feedback—concerning data, methods, and validity requirements—was evident for both results and
compliance indicators, especially during the first two years of OSEP’s State Performance Plan /
Annual Performance Report system.
There were also differences among the performance indicators in the frequency and type of
federal requests. For example, during the first year of IDEA implementation, over 80% of the states
received some type of feedback or request for future action for Indicator 4a (discipline), 9 and 10
(disproportionality), and 12 (transition costs).23 Across the first eight years of IDEA implementation,
problems with information deficiency (i.e., failure to submit necessary or correct data or a
description of methodology) cut across most of the indicators, although the problem was especially
pronounced (i.e., greater than 85% of requests) for Indicators 1 (graduation), 2 (dropout), 8 (parental
involvement), and 9 (disproportionality). This may be related to OSEP’s allowance of state-selected
data sources for some indicators (such as statewide surveys in the case of parental involvement, for
which OSEP regularly requested information about the representativeness of the survey sample) and
confusion over the relatively complicated calculation requirements in the case of disproportionality
(see Table 4.1 for a summary of permitted data sources across the indicators).
Technical problems—that is, failure to use valid data or insufficient methodological
justification—were most evident for Indicators 4b (discipline), 5 (educational settings), 9, and 10
(disproportionality).

Technical problems may have arisen with these indicators—especially

disproportionality—because they tend to measure complex ideas and require more statistical
assumptions (for example, state-selected “minimum n-sizes” and “performance thresholds”) than
other indicators. Over time, however, OSEP requested fewer state actions for these four indicators.
One explanation for this is that OSEP may have relaxed its diligence over time. Yet there is little

23

This does not include instances in which OSEP provided general indictor-specific requests or advice to all
states, as was the case for indicator 7 and 14.
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evidence for this.

The department’s annual “How the Department Made Determinations”

memoranda reveal few changes that would have benefited low-performing states during the annual
determinations process. The latter years of this analysis also coincided with the formation of OSEP’s
Results-Driven Accountability vision—hardly an effort to abandon state accountability and
performance measurement. Most tellingly, though, was the office’s own acknowledgement, in
subsequent years, that states fulfilled these requests to its satisfaction. It is indeed possible, then,
that state agencies were eventually able to resolve many of these technical issues to the office’s
satisfaction.
Problems with data availability (i.e., failure to report data as required or to make data
available to the public) were most pronounced for Indicators 3b and 3c (participation and
performance in statewide assessments). This may suggest that some states had problems with their
data delivery or reporting systems for these assessments, especially during the first year of IDEA
implementation. Yet, there was a noticeable decline in federal feedback for these indicators during
the second reporting year. Again, there is little evidence of relaxed diligence from OSEP. The office
continued to make these data publication requests well into the fifth and sixth reporting years. The
office also reiterated the public reporting requirements for statewide assessments in its SPP/APR
Related Requirements and in a December 3, 2009 memorandum to state education officials (DOE,
2009). And once again, OSEP frequently acknowledged that state agencies fulfilled these requests to
its satisfaction. It is possible, again, that state education resolved these problems data publication
issues relatively quickly.
The results also show that, in general, relatively fewer states received such feedback on their
results indicators as time went on. In contrast, for the compliance indicators, the frequency of
OSEP’s explicit requests for corrections of noncompliance over the timeframe considered remained
relatively stable. For example, in reporting year 2014—the eighth year of IDEA implementation—
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about one third of the states received such requests for Indicators 4a and 4b (discipline), over 80%
did so for Indicators 12 and 13 (transition goals and costs), and all states received such feedback for
Indicator 11 (timely identification). Chapter Seven will explore differences in state performance
among the indicators, including some key differences between the results and compliance indicators,
in further detail.
Strongly supporting the hypothesis, OSEP’s annual data tables show that states were
responsive to federal feedback under this system.

For the eight years following the office’s

responses to the state’s initial Annual Performance Reports, OSEP expressed satisfaction with states’
responses and this responsiveness was evident across all of the performance indicators. This finding
suggests that, in general, the states have chosen to follow the recommendations and guidance of the
federal monitoring authority.

Furthermore, to the extent that states did not address OSEP’s

requests, the cause appears to be persistent problems with data and information deficiencies.
This finding furnishes evidence to reject the null hypothesis that states did not address the
problems that OSEP identifies. Chapter One suggested that, consistent with the principles of
categorical grants-in-aid and with what Radin (2006) might call the “classical assumptions” of
performance measurement, states would decide to follow the requirements articulated by the
federal funding authority. Given the evidence from this study, it appears that this is the case despite
some of the criticisms in the performance measurement literature (Chapter Two) and the persisting
controversies of American federalism and education policy (Chapters Three and Four). For example,
despite Congress’s longstanding refusal to fully fund IDEA (Chapter Four), the state education
agencies seem to have accepted the IDEA performance system and its associated costs in exchange
for the inducement of federal IDEA funding. Furthermore, despite notable state protests and
eventual federal waivers over the compliance costs and performance expectations of No Child Left
Behind (Chapter Three), these results do not suggest similar vocal and strong resistance to the IDEA
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performance system. As I will argue in more detail in Chapter Eight, this may be due in part to
OSEP’s decision to devolve considerable monitoring authority to state education agencies.
The data also provide evidence of improvement for those performance indicators where
OSEP has pointed out problems—particularly problems the office identified during the baseline
year(s).24 More than half of the states that received an OSEP request during the baseline year
exhibited improvement on the performance indicators in question, especially during the two years
immediately following the OSEP request. This is evidence to reject the null hypothesis—that states
did not show evidence of improvement for those performance indicators after OSEP has pointed out
problems. These states clearly did show evidence of improvement, but there is uncertainty whether
OSEP review itself led to improvement. The uncertainty exists because those states that did not
receive OSEP requests (i.e., the comparison group) also exhibited improvement on many
performance indicators. Indeed, the proportion of comparison group states that attained this
improvement was slightly greater than the proportion of states that improved their results after
receiving OSEP feedback. However, the difference of proportions was statistically significant only for
the time period extending through reporting year 2015, suggesting that the effect of OSEP feedback
on performance, if any, may have been restricted to the reporting years immediately following the
feedback.25
There are several ways to consider this finding.

Since treatment group states and

comparison group states differ in innumerable ways related to performance and performance
improvement, It is impossible to know the actual effects of OSEP feedback on performance. Still,
speculation is possible. It is possible that states that did not receive feedback during the baseline
year were those most likely to achieve greater improvement in performance measures. Possibly, the
24

The baseline year was typically reporting year 2007, but recall that the baseline year came later for certain
performance indicators.
25
Z = -2.9391; (p= 0.00328)
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officials in such states have greater resources, more staff, and are more skilled at complying with
federal regulations. If so, it is likely that officials in those states who deliver education services to
children with disabilities are more able to do so. States that received feedback due to data,
methodological, or other compliance deficiencies, however, are challenged. Possibly, the officials in
such states have fewer resources, less staff, and are less skilled at complying with federal regulations.
If so, it is likely that officials in those states who deliver educational services to children with
disabilities are less able to do so.
An alternate interpretation is that, given OSEP’s tendency to focus on the technical aspects
of the results indicators, states that received OSEP requests may have directed resources toward
achieving compliance with IDEA’s reporting requirements. In situations where these resources are
scarce, these decisions may have required a shift away from improvement activities or other
performance-specific actions on which the comparison group states may have focused more heavily
over time.

If so, this would justify the concerns that Secretary Duncan expressed when he

announced the Department of Education’s adoption of the Results Driven Accountability (RDA)
system in 2014. This was intended to move the agency away from what he called “a compliancedriven bureaucracy” and toward helping the states achieve functional outcomes for children served
under IDEA. This shift will be considered, among other things, in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND EXPLORING STATE
CHARACTERISTICS UNDER IDEA
This chapter will describe the analyses used to address my two other research questions, and
the results of those analyses. Similar to the previous chapter, it will describe the analytic approach
and key variables used, accompanied by several tables and charts to summarize the results. The
chapter will then discuss the results and assess the hypothesis associated with the research
questions. Each research question will be considered separately.
What types of performance indicators, if any, produce the most change? What are the characteristics
of those indicators?
I will begin addressing this question by presenting the descriptive statistics for the targets
that states have chosen for each IDEA results indicator between the reporting years 2008 and 2015
inclusive. Recall that OSEP asked the states to set “measureable and rigorous targets” for each of the
29 results indicators, based on the states’ first year (baseline) of data.26 There are a number of ways
to consider these targets across the results indicators. One informative way to analyze these targets
is to gauge the states’ ambition for each indicator. One way to measure this is to subtract the states’
average target for each indicator from the respective indicator ceilings—that is, the results that
would indicate perfect achievement for the indicator in question. This approach is illustrated in
Chart 7.1.1. This chart reveals obvious variation in the average proximity of state targets from their
ceilings. Across the eight years, on average, state targets were within ten percentage points of the
indicator ceiling for Indicators 2 (dropout), 3b (participation in state assessments), 4a (discipline), and
5c (placement of students with IEPs in separate facilities.) In contrast, the average state target was
furthest (about 68.5 percentage points) from the indicator ceiling for Indicator 14a (percent of youth

26

Recall also that, in contrast, OSEP set the targets for the six compliance indicators (0% or 100%), so those
indicators are not included in the upcoming chart (7.1.1).
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who are no longer in secondary school who are enrolled in higher education within one year of
leaving high school.) Given that the targets were subject to OSEP approval, the variation in targets
represents a level of interstate and cross-indicator variation that the federal authority permitted
under the IDEA performance system. Descriptive statistics for each of the indicator targets are
presented in Table A.6.1 in the Appendix.

Chart 7.1.1: Distance of Average State Targets from their Respective Target Ceilings, Expressed in
Percentage Points, 2008 – 2015

Source: State Annual Performance Reports to OSEP.

In a similar way, Chart 7.1.2 displays, for each indicator, the difference between the states’
actual average performance, as reported to OSEP during the 2007-2015 timeframe, and the
indicators’ respective ceilings. The chart reveals that the average state scores were within ten
percentage points of the indicator ceiling for Indicators 2 (dropout), 3b (participation in statewide
assessments), 4a (discipline), and 5c (placement of students with IEPs in separate facilities.) Recall
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that these are the same indicators for which states set the most ambitious targets (Chart 7.1.1).
Chart 7.1.2 also shows that states’ average performance was within ten percentage points of the
ceiling (which is also the target) for five of the six compliance indicators (discipline, timely
identification, transition costs, and both disproportionality indicators). Descriptive statistics for each
of the indicator results are presented in Table A.6.2 in the Appendix.
Chart 7.1.2: Distance between Average State Performance on OSEP Performance Indicators and
Indicator Ceilings, 2007 – 2015

Given that the states were permitted to change their baselines and targets after the first year
of IDEA implementation, it is useful to consider each performance indicator with regard to states’
progress in meeting or exceeding their targets, as well as those that improved their results over time.
Charts 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 permit this type of comparison across the indicators for the nine years
spanning 2007 through 2015 (inclusive) in the case of meeting or exceeding targets, and the eight
years spanning 2008 through 2015 (inclusive) in the case of assessing improvement.
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Chart 7.2.1: Percentage of States that Met or Exceeded Targets, 2007 – 2015

Chart 7.2.2: Percentage of States that Improved or Maintained* their Results, 2008 – 2015

*Maintenance is considered in order to account for the ceiling effect, particularly of compliance indicators.

These charts show considerable variation among the indicators, regarding the difficulty
states encountered in meeting targets and improving results. For eight indicators, states met their
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targets more than three-fifths of the time, with the highest percentage of target attainment for
Indicators 3b (participation in statewide assessments) and disproportionality (9 and 10). States met
their targets more than half of the time for 17 (55%) of the indicators. States met their targets less
than one-third of the time for seven indicators, three of which were the compliance indicators for
effective general supervision (timely identification, transition costs, and transition goals).
With regard to their improvement/maintenance of results or compliance, states improved or
maintained their performance more than three-fifths of the time for 15 indicators, and more than
half of the time for 26 (84%) of the indicators. States had difficulty with improvement for three of
the six subparts of Indicator 7 (preschool outcomes), as well as Indicator 14a (percent of youth who
are no longer in secondary school who are enrolled in higher education within one year of leaving
high school). In the case of Indicator 3a (Adequate Yearly Progress), the tables suggest that states,
on average, had relative difficulty meeting their targets and improving results over the course of
IDEA implementation. In contrast, the states on average exhibited improvement or maintenance of
results on three of the six compliance indicators—discipline (4b) and disproportionality (9 and 10).
These tables also permit a comparison between states’ performance on compliance and
results indicators. For example, Chart 7.2.1 suggests that a smaller proportion of states, on average,
met the OSEP targets for the compliance indicators over the nine years considered. However, for
half of the compliance indicators (discipline and both disproportionality indicators), states met
compliance targets more than three-fifths of the time, while this was the case for only five (20%) of
the results indicator targets. Furthermore, Chart 7.2.2 suggests that states improved or maintained
their performance on all but one of the six compliance indicators at least 70% of the time across the
eight years considered, while this was the case for only three (12%) of the results indicators. The
constituent data for Charts 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 are presented in Tables A.7.1 and A.7.2 in the Appendix.
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Another way to think about the difference between compliance and results indicators is to
consider how OSEP made its overall determinations over time. As discussed in Chapter Four, under
the IDEA 2004 statute, OSEP provides annual state-level determinations for each state based on
information in the states’ annual performance reports. Between reporting years 2007 and 2013
inclusive, OSEP based each state’s overall determination on its compliance indicator performance,
and on the validity of the data the state provided when considering the results indicators (U.S.
Department of Education, 2007b; OSEP, 2013). Also as discussed in the previous chapter, these
determinations, especially if earned for multiple consecutive years, had fiscal repercussions such as
targeted assistance requirements and participation in federal guidance efforts (for example,
technical assistance programs.) The percentage of states that earned particular determinations is
shown in Chart 7.3.
Chart 7.3: Percentage of States Receiving Particular OSEP Determinations under IDEA 2004, 20072015

Source: OSEP annual determinations letters

This chart reveals several things. First, during the nine reporting years considered, OSEP
determined that states met one of three conditions specified in IDEA: “meets requirements”, “needs
assistance”, and “needs intervention”. None of the 50 states were determined to need “substantial
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intervention” during this timeframe.

Second, the percentage of states with the “meets

requirements” determination gradually increased from a low of 18.0% during the first year of
implementation to 76.0% during reporting year 2013. This was associated with a gradual decline in
the percentage of states with the “needs assistance” determination during that same timeframe,
with the exception of a small rise during reporting year 2010, due to two states’ improvement from
“needs intervention” status.
Finally, the chart illustrates a clear decline in the proportion of states earning the “meets
requirements” determination, and a corresponding increase in the percentage of states earning the
“needs assistance” determinations, beginning in 2014.

This change is relevant because OSEP

implemented its Results Driven Accountability (RDA) effort toward the end of calendar year 2013. To
explore how OSEP modified its methodology for making overall determinations under RDA, I
reviewed the office’s “How the Department Made Determinations under Section 616(d) of the
Individuals with Disabilities Act in 2015: Part B” documents for 2014 and 2015, and assembled
performance and scoring data that the office provided to the states during those two years (OSEP,
2014c; OSEP, 2015). I assembled these data into a series of tables (A.9.1 through A.9.4), which are
displayed in the Appendix, and I summarize these data in Chart 7.4 below.
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Chart 7.4: Average State Performance under the Results-Driven Accountability (RDA) System, 20142015

Source: author’s compilation of OSEP responses to States
*For the 2014 'Proficiency Gap' and 'Number of Students Excluded from Assessments' sub-elements, a smaller
percentage was more desirable than a larger percentage. Therefore, the percentages for these two sub-elements
were subtracted from 1.00 in order to align the 2014 score with the logic of the 2015 score, for which higher
percentages for all sub-elements indicated more desirable performance).

This analysis reveals several things about the RDA framework. First, OSEP clearly focused on
students’ participation and performance on statewide reading and mathematics assessments (and
the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP)) as the key results-based elements of RDA. In
2015, two additional “exiting data” elements were included in the RDA score calculation: graduation
and dropout rates. In short, OSEP focused on some, but not all, of the 25 results indicators during
the initial years of RDA. Chart 7.4 reveals that states’ average performance on the reading and
mathematics elements rose from 2014 to 2015. Likewise, the states’ average “results performance”
under RDA increased from 2014 to 2015, with the average score rising from 55.7% to 62.6%.
A second observation about Chart 7.4 and the more complex tables in the Appendix is that,
during the first two years of RDA, OSEP continued to factor compliance indicators into its overall
determinations (“meets requirements”, “needs assistance”, etc.), and the states maintained high
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overall average performance on these compliance indicators (92.6% each year.) Finally, states’
overall RDA scores, which OSEP has defined as the average of the states’ results and compliance
elements, rose slightly from 74.1% to 77.6% from 2014 to 2015, a finding that is reflected in the slight
increase of states that OSEP determined “met requirements” in Chart 7.3.
The above charts provide evidence that states have reacted somewhat differently to the
compliance indicators when compared to the results indicators. Moreover, states varied in their
targets (among the results indicators), performance, and improvement across the 31 indicators. The
tables also suggest that the RDA framework might have impacted overall state determinations, at
least for the first two years. There are several ways to interpret these findings, especially when
considering the ceiling effects and methodological construction of some of these indicators. These
interpretations will be discussed, in the context of this study’s hypotheses, in the next section.
Discussion: The Performance Indicators and Improvement
This study’s second key research question asked what types of performance indicators, if
any, produce the most change; and what the characteristics of those indicators might be. There
were several hypotheses associated with this question, and these hypotheses will organize this
subsection.
Question 2 - Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis suggested that states would meet compliance
indicator targets more consistently than results indicator targets, and that states would exhibit
improvement on the compliance indicators more consistently than the results indicators, primarily
because the OSEP monitoring system placed more emphasis on those compliance indicators.
This hypothesis was investigated using four approaches. The first approach compared the 25
results indicators and the six compliance indicators by looking at the frequency by which the states
improved or maintained their performance over the timeframe covering reporting years 2008
through 2015, inclusive. This comparison revealed that states improved or maintained performance
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on the six compliance indicators at a statistically significantly higher rate (78.02%) when compared to
the frequency of improvement on the 25 results indicators (57.39%).27
The second approach looked at states’ performance on the results indicators and compliance
indicators with respect to their “measureable and rigorous targets”.

This required, first, an

examination of the targets and results themselves—particularly for the 25 results indicators, because
OSEP permitted the states to set their own targets for the results indicators. When considering
states’ Annual Performance Report numbers for the 25 results indicators, the data revealed
considerable variation among the indicators with respect to the average targets the states
established (and OSEP approved), as well as considerable variation across the indicators with respect
to the results the states reported in their APRs. This is not an unexpected finding, but it lends further
evidence to what happened to the IDEA performance system as a result of devolution—where states
were allowed to set their own targets based on their own circumstances. Recall that OSEP set the
targets for the compliance indicators—all of which were set at either 100% or 0%.
These target data permitted a comparison with the performance data for each indicator,
thus revealing the frequency at which states met their targets for the results and compliance
indicators, across reporting years 2007 through 2015 inclusive. The results show that, during this
timeframe, states met their targets on the six compliance indicators at a statistically significantly
lower rate (39.39%) when compared to the frequency at which they met their targets for the 25
results indicators (50.73%).28

27

Z = -16.8834; (p = 0.000). Put another way, of the 7,483 observations of results indicator performance over
the nine-year time span and across the 50 states, states improved or maintained the previous year’s
performance 57.39% of the time. Likewise, of the 2,006 observations of compliance indicator performance
over the nine years and across the 50 states, states improved or maintained the previous year’s performance
57.39% of the time.
28
Z = 9.18; (p = 0.000). Put another way, of the 7,238 observations of results indicator performance over the
nine-year time span and across the 50 states, states met their targets 50.73% of the time. Likewise, of the
2,114 observations of compliance indicator performance over the nine years and across the 50 states, states
met their targets 39.39% of the time (recall that the compliance targets were, in fact, OSEP’s targets).

133

The third approach used to explore this hypothesis looked at how the states performed
relative to the indicator “ceilings”. This exploration revealed a number of things. First, looking across
the results indicators, it is apparent that states, on average, approached the indicator ceilings far
more closely for some indicators than for others. For example, on average, the states set ambitious
targets (i.e., targets within 10 percentage points of the indicator ceiling) for Indicator 2 (dropout), 3b
(participation on state assessments), 4a (discipline), and 5c (placement of children with IEPs in
separate facilities). These ambitious targets likely reflect the baseline data for these indicators. This
pattern is also evident when considering states’ results. On average, the states achieved the highest
performance (i.e., results within 10 percentage points of the indicator ceiling) on the same indicators
for which they set the most ambitious targets: dropout, participation on statewide assessments,
discipline, and placement in separate facilities. States that set a high target for an indicator appear
to focus greater effort there, likely reflecting the higher priority that states give to that indicator of
performance.
For five of the six compliance indicators, the states on average performed within ten
percentage points of the indicator ceiling—and for three of these indicators (discipline and both
disproportionality indicators), the average result was within one percentage point of the ceiling. This
is noteworthy because the performance “ceiling” for all six compliance indicators represents OSEP’s
target for all states, regardless of each state’s baseline year performance. The absolute nature of the
compliance targets and OSEP’s stated criteria for making annual determinations were likely
incentives for high performance on these compliance indicators.
The fourth and final approach for assessing this hypothesis compared states’ overall
performance on the results indicators for which they set the most “ambitious” targets or achieved
the “best” performance, to their overall performance on the compliance indicators. On average,
states met or exceeded their targets more than 60% of the time for five results indicators: 3b
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[participation in statewide assessments (math and reading)], 4a, (discipline), 7b1 (preschool
children’s acquisition and use of knowledge and skills), and 8 (parental involvement). Four of these
indicators—dropout, participation in statewide assessments (math and reading), and discipline—
were associated with the most ambitious targets and highest performance levels among the results
indicators. Similarly, on average, states improved or maintained their performance more than 60% of
the time for nine results indicators. Of these nine indicators, three—dropout, discipline, and
placement in separate facilities—were associated with the most ambitious targets and high
performance among the results indicators.
In comparison, all six compliance indicators saw, on average, improvement or maintenance
of performance more than 60% of the time—and more than 80% of the time for three of those
compliance indicators. Furthermore, unlike the pattern of progress on the “ambitious” results
indicators such as 3b (participation in statewide assessments) and 5c (placement in separate
facilities)—which appear to have been stifled by ceiling effects—all six compliance indicators saw
improvement or maintenance of performance over time, despite the absolute nature of the
compliance targets.
These findings furnish ambiguous support for my hypothesis. Three of the four tests—
improving performance over time, ceilings, and ambitious targets—do not support the null
hypothesis that states will not improve performance on compliance indicators more consistently
than results indicators. The fourth test found that the average proportion of results targets met over
time was greater than the average proportion of compliance targets met. However, there is an
alternate way to look at this test.

If one considers the proportion of compliance indicator

observations in which the states came within five percentage points of the compliance targets, then
the proportion of instances in which states meet their compliance targets over the nine-year
timeframe changes dramatically from 39.39% to 78.82%. This proportion is significantly greater than
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the corresponding proportion for results indicators (50.73%).29This five percentage point alternative
is relevant because OSEP’s annual “How the Department Made Determinations...” memoranda
repeatedly noted that the office would, for the purposes of making annual statewide determinations,
consider states in compliance with the six compliance indicators if the states achieved results within
five percentage points from the compliance indicator ceilings. Although it is only part of a bigger
picture, this may have encouraged states officials to concentrate on meeting OSEP’s definition of
compliance (<=5% or >=95%), rather than the office’s more rigorous (0% or 100%) compliance
targets—especially for the three most difficult compliance indicators (timely identification, transition
costs, and transition goals).
The results with respect to the ceiling test merit further comment.

To the extent a

comparison was possible, states tended to perform close to (i.e., within 10 percentage points from)
the indicator “ceilings” on the results indicators less frequently than the compliance indicators.
Similarly, to the extent that states set results targets close to (i.e., within 10 percentage points from)
the indicator ceilings, their performance on those results indicators tended to improve or remain
steady less frequently than the compliance indicators. What this suggests is that it was more difficult
for states to improve performance on results targets that were set close to ceiling levels than on
compliance targets set close to ceilings. The reason for this is unclear, although some states may
have greater control, through administrative actions, over performance on compliance indicators.
Question 2 – Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis associated with this research question
asserted that states will improve their performance on the results indicators in 2014 and 2015, when
OSEP adopted a greater focus on results. However, the data revealed that, during the first two years
of RDA implementation, OSEP chose to use only some of the results indicators in its statewide
determinations process, and the indicators that were used in that process did not correspond exactly
29

Z = -22.9556; (p = 0.000).

136

with those on the APR. Therefore, this hypothesis was explored by looking at the states’ overall
determinations before and after RDA, and assessing the states’ performance on the results
component of their overall RDA scores in the two initial years of RDA implementation.
During the first seven IDEA reporting years, OSEP’s overall determinations reveal a gradual
increase in the proportion of states that “meet requirements” (from under one fifth in 2007 to over
three quarters in 2013).

This corresponds with the timeframe during which OSEP’s annual

determinations were based primarily on compliance indicator performance, as well as certain aspects
of data reporting. Although the timeframe of this study only includes the first two years of OSEP’s
RDA implementation, the data show that (1) the proportion of states that achieved the best possible
determination (“meet requirements”) dropped by over half during the first year of RDA, and that (2)
the states’ average performance on the results indicators for which OSEP based part of the overall
“RDA score”, rose during the first two years of RDA.30
These findings suggest that states have taken seriously the performance indicators by which
the OSEP holds them accountable each year. The data suggest that states put effort into results
indicators, and that effort improved insofar as the RDA score was concerned. The findings do not
support the null hypothesis—that states will not invest greater effort into performance on results
indicators after RDA implementation. These and the findings above show that, overall, state officials
have chosen to participate in OSEP’s measurement system, even with the knowledge that they will
be held accountable for their performance under that system.
Question 2 – Hypothesis 3. It was also hypothesized that states would exhibit higher levels of
performance on indicators that measure proximate outputs rather than long-term outcomes. The
30

From 55.7% to 62.6%; see above. It is not possible to calculate an average score for the results indicators
prior to RDA implementation, because OSEP’s RDA results metrics do not correspond with all of the results
indicators. However, for the results indicators that are closest to the metrics used under both initial years of
RDA—3b, and 3c—states met or exceeded their targets at an average rate of 39.28% before RDA and 40.75%
after RDA. A stronger comparison would be possible if more years of post-RDA data were available.
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evidence for this is mixed. Chapter Four suggested that certain indicators (e.g., discipline, parental
involvement, least restrictive environments) are “activities” with outputs over which the states and
school districts exert more control than, say, the more distal outcomes such as graduation, dropout,
performance on statewide assessments, and post-school outcomes. This may be true, but state
performance on these indicators does not, on average, seem to follow such a pattern. For example,
while states on average found that only 30 percent of youth who were no longer enrolled in
secondary school were “now” enrolled in higher education (Indicator 14a), this proportion jumps to
almost 74% when considering “some other postsecondary training program” or competitive
employment (Indicator 14c). Likewise, although average state performance on some indicators over
which state and local authorities presumably have considerable control—such as discipline and
placement in separate facilities—remained favorable (i.e., within 10 percentage points of the
indicator ceilings), their average performance on other such indicators—such as parental
involvement and delivery of special education services in regular early childhood programs—were
much less favorable. In short, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. A more indepth study of these indicators, including perhaps an articulation of a full IDEA logic model, might
provide additional data for assessing this hypothesis.
Additional indicator-level findings. The exploration of the hypotheses revealed additional
findings with regard to the performance indicators.

For example, among the six compliance

indicators, states appear to have had considerable difficulty meeting the compliance targets for the
three general supervision indicators (11-13: child find, timely transition, and post-school transition
goals in the IEP). For all three of these indicators, OSEP required 100% of children or youth in each
state to meet the respective indicator standards, and their indicator definitions did not seem to allow
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as much state discretion as the other three compliance indicators.31

Across the nine years

considered, states met the compliance target for Indicator 12 only 12% of the time, and met the
targets for Indicators 11 and 13 less than five percent of the time—by far the lowest frequencies
among all 31 performance indicators.32 Nevertheless, this ceiling effect did not appear to limit states’
improvement or maintenance of progress on these compliance indicators. For example, although
the data show that states met the Indicator 11 target only 2.04% of the time, states improved or
maintained their performance on this indicator nearly three quarters (73.86%) of the time. Over the
same eight-year timeframe, the frequency of improvement for Indicators 12 and 13 (71.79% and
62.56%) remained far greater than the frequency at which states’ met the indicators’ targets.
Although this observation is not repeated for other indicators, it does suggest that these challenging
indicators encouraged the states to move closer to the “ceiling”.
Some of these compliance indicators, such as the two disproportionality indicators, posed
fewer problems for state education authorities. In the case of disproportionality, this may be
explained by the indicator definition, which asks states to report the percentage of school districts
with “disproportionate representation due to inappropriate identification.” As noted in Chapter
Four, there is no standard definition of disproportionality, and even if such a definition existed, the
concept of inappropriate identification is relatively subjective. These indicators thus allow the states
considerable discretion in designing their disproportionality methodologies—a reality that has been
criticized by a number of scholars (Albrecht et al., 2012).
What states, if any, exhibited evidence of improvement under this federal monitoring system? What
are the common characteristics, if any, of those states?

31

The other compliance indicators, for example, permitted the use of cell size restrictions.
The baseline year for Indicator 13 (transition goals) was 2011.

32
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As noted earlier, I collected a number of state-level variables to explore whether these
variables have any relationship with states’ performance on the IDEA Part B performance indicators
considered in this study. My dataset for this and much of the preceding analyses consisted of panel
data—that is, various repeated observations of the 50 states over nine years. Therefore, to address
this research question, I chose a repeated-subjects regression method called the generalized
estimating equation (GEE). The GEE is appropriate here for a number of reasons. First, the GEE
method accounts for variation within subjects—in this case, within states—for the dependent
variable being studied. This is preferable over a pooled regression method because it reduces bias
caused by differences across the states—for example, the diverse baselines and performance data
for the results indicators (recall Tables 5.10.1 and 5.10.2 above.) Second, the GEE is able to consider
multiple types of independent and dependent variables.

This was necessary because my

independent variables include both continuous (e.g., per pupil expenditure) and categorical (e.g.,
governor’s party) variables. Third, the GEE has precedent in peer-reviewed literature as a social
research method applicable to repeated measures analysis (Ballinger, 2004; Gardiner et al., 2009;
Hubbard et al., 2010; Nijrolder et al., 2010).
I designed and performed the GEE for this analysis in SPSS—the software with which I
managed my dataset. I treated the performance on each of OSEP’s 31 Part B performance indicators
as the dependent variable in 31 separate analyses. To enhance confidence in the model specification
for this investigation, I executed two separate analyses for each of the 31 indicators: one analysis
assumed what is called an “autoregression structure” while the other analysis assumed an
“independent structure.” I chose to use both structures because there is no definitive or agreedupon standard in the literature as to which of these structures is the most preferable when using
generalized estimating equations.
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For each analysis, I treated the governor’s party, non-white enrollment, centralization, and
per pupil expenditure as independent variables.33 I also included the reporting year as a predictor
variable to assess whether the states exhibited statistically significant improvements over time while
controlling for the other independent variables. The results of these analyses are presented in Table
7.1.

33

Please see Chapter Five for further explanation of these variables, and Chapter Three for their theoretical
context.
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Table 7.1: Relationship among Indicator Performance and State-level Factors, 2007 – 2015

(Intercept)
Governor
(Democrat)
Reporting
Year
NonWhite
Enrollment
Centralization
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

Graduation
AR
INDP
2.175
-2.534
(7.845)
(8.497)
.009
.051
(.0093)
(.0287)
-.001
.002
(.0039)
(.0042)
-.290
-.349
(.1117)**
(.1034)**
.003
.002
(.0022)
(.0022)
.000001
-.000002
(.0000)
(.0000)

Dropout
AR
INDP
11.538
14.825
(7.103)
(8.076)
-.002
-.016
(.0076)
(.0169)
-.006
-.007
(.0035)
(.0040)
.131
.116
(.0829)
(.0763)
-.002
-.002
(.0015)
(.0013)
.000005
.000004
(.0000)*
(.0000)

Participation - Math
AR
INDP

Proficiency - Reading
AR
INDP

AYP
AR
87.211
(14.930)***
-.004 (.0366)
-.043
(.0074)***
-.269 (.2026)
-.011
(.0051)*
.000005
(.0000)**

INDP
83.454
(16.913)***
-.128
(.0522)*
-.041
(.0084)***
-.407
(.1962)*
-.015
(.0049)**
.000003
(.0000)**

Proficiency - Math
AR
INDP

(Intercept)

-1.345
(1.1005)

-1.250
(.9540)

-5.210
(7.7038)

-3.882
(9.9956)

.951 (7.3780)

-2.398
(8.5037)

Governor
(Democrat)

.002
(.0021)

.001 (.0023)

.006
(.0295)

-.027
(.0303)

.013 (.0224)

-.034 (.0274)

Reporting
Year

.001
(.0005)*

.001 (.0005)*

.003
(.0038)

.002
(.0050)

.000 (.0037)

.002 (.0042)

NonWhite
Enrollment

-.006
(.0073)
.000
(.0001)
-.000001
(.0000)

-.141
(1069)
-.003
(.0020)
-.000008
(.0000)

-.121
(.1091)
-.004
(.0021)
-.000003
(.0000)

-.109 (.0917)

-.117 (.0940)

-.005
(.0017)**
-.000007
(.0000)

-.006
(.0018)**
-.000005
(.0000)

Centralization
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

-.006 (.0075)
.000 (.0001)
-.000001
(.0000)

Discipline – Race
AR

INDP

(Intercept)

2.908
(2.3190)

3.252
(2.4489)

Governor
(Democrat)

.006
(.0043)

.009 (.0054)

Reporting
Year

-.001
(.0012)

-.002 (.0012)

NonWhite
Enrollment

.010
(.0206)
.000
(.0005)

Centralization
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

.000008
(.0000)

.000 (.0217)
.000 (.0005)
.00000008
(.0000)

Settings >=80%
AR
-20.969
(2.6370)
***
-.005
(.0029)
.011
(.0013)
***
-.186
(.0661)**
-.002
(.0017)

INDP
-19.930
(3.0295)
***
-.035
(.0174)
.010
(.0015)
***
-.203
(.0687)**
-.002
(.0018)

-.000002
(.0000)

-.0000009
(.0000)

Settings <=40%
AR

INDP

9.885
(1.6978)***

9.866
(1.9159)***

.003 (.0024)

.012 (.0074)

-.005
(.0008)***

-.005
(.0010)***

.202
(.0220)***

.197
(.0264)***

.001 (.0005)

.001 (.0007)

.000002
(.0000)

.000001
(.0000)

Participation - Reading
AR
INDP
-.744
-.683
(1.0778)
(.9852)
.001
.000
(.0021)
(.0022)
.001
.001
(.0005)
(.0005)
-.006
-.006
(.0076)
(.0077)
.000
.000
(.0001)
(.0001)
-.00000
-.000000
(.0000)
(.0000)
Discipline
AR
INDP
16.204
15.952
(4.0084)**
(4.9949)
*
**
-.001
.024
(.0054)
(.0172)
-.008
-.008
(.0025)
(.0020)***
**
.044
.036
(.0837)
(.0801)
.001
.001
(.0017)
(.0016)
.000007
-.000001
(.0000)
(.0000)
Settings – Separate
Facilities
AR
INDP
1.755
2.692
(.4503)
(.6673)
***
***
.001
.005
(.0010)
(.0033)
-.001
-.001
(.0002)
(.0003)*
***
**
.000
.008
(.0100)
(.0103)
-.00009
.000
(.0002)
(.0002)
.000004
.000001
(.0000)*
(.000)**
**

Standard errors in parentheses AR = Autoregression Structure INDP = Independent Structure
^Reference category *Statistically significant <.05 ** statistically significant <.01 ***statistically significant <.001
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Table 7.1 (cont.) Relationship among Indicator Performance and State-level Factors, 2007 – 2015

(Intercept)
Governor
(Democrat)
Reporting
Year
NonWhite
Enrollment
Centralizatio
n
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

(Intercept)
Governor
(Democrat)
Reporting
Year
NonWhite
Enrollment
Centralizatio
n
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

Preschool Settings – Early
Childhood
AR
INDP
5.114
-4.292
(15.250)
(13.0932)
-.022
.034 (.0515)
(.0438)
-.002
.002 (.0065)
(.0076)
-.089
-.070 (.0935)
(.0963)
.001
.000 (.0023)
(.0023)
.000007
.000008
(.0000)
(.0000)

Preschool Settings –
Separate Facilities
AR
INDP
18.677
25.389
(15.683)
(14.7483)
.001
-.055
(.0250)
(.0329)
-.009
-.012
(.0078)
(.0073)
.176
.150
(.0910)
(.0816)
-.003
-.002
(.0017)
(.0016)
-.0000009
-.0000006
(.0000)
(.0000)

Preschool Outcomes (b1)

Preschool Outcomes (b2)

AR
-27.356
(7.0031)**
*
.006
(.0130)
.014
(.0035)***
-.060
(.0734)
.002
(.0015)
-.000004
(.0000)

INDP

INDP

AR
-23.654
(8.7499)**
.001
(.0135)
.012
(.0044)**
-.031
(.0830)
.003
(.0016)
-.000006
(.0000)

AR

11.909
(8.7401)

12.271
(8.2263)

-22.830
(8.2807)**

.027
(.0269)
.015
(.0034)***
-.038
(.0718)
.002
(.0016)
-.000007
(.0000)

.001
(.0232)
-.006
(.0044)
.109
(.0846)
-.001
(.0015)
-.0000001
(.0000)

.002
(.0308)
-.006
(.0041)
.125
(.0799)
-.001
(.0014)
.0000001
(.0000)

-.006
(.0132)
.012
(.0041)**
-.033
(.0864)
.002
(.0018)
-.000003
(.0000)

INDP

Disproportionality
AR

INDP

INDP
-24.321
(8.0718)**
.038 (.0242)
.012
(.0040)**
-.022 (.0790)
.002 (.0016)
-.00001
(.0000)

Preschool Outcomes
(a2)
AR
INDP
12.903
-16.212
(6.9648)
(6.4912)*
-.013
-.028
(.0106)
(.0030)
-.006
-.008
(.0035)
(.0032)*
.086
.087
(.0888)
(.0919)
-.002
-.002
(.0016)
(.0016)
.000002
.0000003
(.0000)
(.0000)
Preschool Outcomes
(c2)
AR
INDP

Preschool Outcomes (c1)

-28.639
(6.754)***

Parental Involvement
AR

AR

Preschool Outcomes (a1)

INDP
-25.205
(7.6020)**
.022 (.0322)
.013
(.0038)**
-.036 (.0819)
.002 (.0018)
-.000009
(.0000)

Disproportionality Disability
AR
INDP

(Intercept)

-20.534
(6.6314)**

-7.737
(8.5760)

1.949
(1.2430)

1.702
(1.5003)

4.401
(1.2739)**

4.089
(1.3173)**

Governor
(Democrat)

-.009
(.0179)

-.039
(.0534)

-.004
(.0036)

-.005
(.0036)

-.003
(.0026)

-.004 (.0036)

Reporting
Year

.011
(.0033)**

.004
(.0043)

-.001
(.0006)

-.001
(.0008)

-.002
(.0006)**

-.002
(.0007)**

7.136
(10.200)

9.559
(9.1286)

-.020
(.0115)
-.003
(.0051)
.076
(.0723)
-.001
(.0013)
-.000005
(.0000)

-.027
(.0306)
-.004
(.0046)
.067
(.0701)
.000
(.0012)
-.000008
(.0000)

Timely Identification
AR
-34.695
(4.1260)
***
.010
(.0102)
.018
(.0021)
***
-.032
(.0315)
.001
(.0007)
-.000007
(.0000)**

NonWhite
-.010
.048
-.007
-.006
.009
.011 (.0112)
Enrollment
(.1606)
(.1550)
(.0107)
(.0110)
(.0119)
Centralizatio
-.004
-.004
-.00005
-.00005
.000
.000 (.0003)
n
(.0034)
(.0035)
(.0001)
(.0001)
(.0003)
Per
Pupil .000007
.000005
-.0000004
.0000005
-.0000001
.0000001
Expenditure
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
Standard errors in parentheses AR = Autoregression Structure INDP = Independent Structure
^Reference category *Statistically significant <.05 ** statistically significant <.01 ***statistically significant <.001

INDP
-34.351
(4.1957)
***
.001
(.0094)
.018
(.0021)
***
-.035
(.0311)
.001
(.0007)
-.000007
(.0000)*
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Table 7.1 (cont.) Relationship among Indicator Performance and State-level Factors, 2007 – 2015
INDP

AR

INDP

-46.582
(5.6875)***

-37.174
(17.3145)*

-55.687
(19.3630)**

17.633
(7.5788)*

19.885
(8.0658)*

-.007 (.0142)

-.043
(.0348)

-.019 (.0341)

.002
(.0225)

.002
(.0291)

Post-School Outcomes
(b)
AR
INDP
4.249
3.437
(10.4530
(10.7788)
)
-.013
-.018
(.0209)
(.0255)

.024
(.0028)***

.019
(.0086)*

.028
(.0096)**

-.009
(.0038)*

-.010
(.0040)*

-.002
(.0053)

-.002
(.0052)

-.074
(.0334)*

.276
(.0973)**
-.001
(.0021)
.000007
(.0000)

.258
(.0970)**

.086
(.0738)
-.003
(.0016)
.00001
(.0000)**

.062
(.0880)
-.003
(.0018)
.000014
(.0000)**

.023
(.0053)
.001
(.0015)
.000009
(.0000)*

.017
(.0751)
.001
(.0016)
.00010
(.0000)*

Transition Costs

(Intercept)
Governor
(Democrat)
Reporting
Year
NonWhite
Enrollment
Centralizatio
n
Per
Pupil
Expenditure

AR
-47.205
(5.8321)*
**
-.007
(.0125)
.024
(.0029)**
*
-.090
(.0355)*
.001
(.0009)
-.000003
(.0000)

.001 (.0008)
-.000005
(.0000)

Transition Goals

.000 (.0021)
.000007
(.0000)

Post-School Outcomes
(a)
AR
INDP

Resolution Session
Mediation Agreements
Agreements
AR
INDP
AR
INDP
AR
INDP
-.281
2.151
18.496
10.569
-17.833
-15.841
(Intercept)
(8.0134)
(7.9508)
(15.0153)
(14.8804)
(7.4460)*
(7.6428)*
Governor
-.017
-.027
.030
.037
.061
.085 (.0421)*
(Democrat)
(.0211)
(.0253)
(.0380)
(.0576)
(.0312)
.000
-.001
-.009
-.005
.009
Reporting Year
.008 (.0038)*
(.0040)
(.0039)
(.0075)
(.0074)
(.0037)*
NonWhite
-.016
-.028
-.120
-.150
-.086
-.075 (1252)
Enrollment
(.0655)
(.0674)
(.1783)
(1851)
(.1205)
.001
.001
.003
.004
-.004
Centralization
-.004 (.0027)
(.0013)
(.0013)
(.0040)
(.0041)
(.0026)
Per
Pupil .000006
.000007
-.00001
-.000021
-.000005
-.000006
Expenditure
(.0000)
(.0000)*
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
(.0000)
Standard errors in parentheses AR = Autoregression Structure INDP = Independent Structure
^Reference category *Statistically significant <.05 ** statistically significant <.01 ***statistically significant <.001
Post-School Outcomes (c)

Several observations are evident from Table 7.1. First, the data suggest no major differences
between the autoregression and independent GEEs, especially with regard to statistical significance.
This gives some assurance with respect to model specification, given that the model includes all
relevant independent variables. Second, the table shows that no one variable was consistently
associated with performance across all 31 indicators. However, and when considering only the
statistically significant results found using both GEE structures, all of the state-level variables except
for governor’s party were statistically significant predictors of performance on at least one indicator.
For example, greater per pupil expenditures were associated with improved performance on
Indicators 3a (AYP), and 14a (students with IEPs enrolled in higher education within one year of
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leaving high school) and 14b (students with IEPs enrolled in higher education or competitively
employed within one year of leaving high school), but lower performance on Indicators 5c (students
with IEPs enrolled in separate facilities) and 11 (child find). Greater non-white enrollment was
associated with lower performance on Indicator 1 (graduation), 5a (students with IEPs in the general
education setting more than 79% of the time), 5b (students with IEPs in the general education setting
less than 41% of the time), and 12 (timely transition), but higher performance on Indicator 13
(transition goals). Bowman and Kearney’s centralization scores ware negatively associated with
performance on Indicator 3a (AYP) and Indicator 3c (proficiency on mathematics assessments).
Reporting year was positively associated with 13 indicators and negatively associated with
two. This suggests that, controlling for the other variables in these equations, states improved their
performance over time on 13 performance measures (four of which were compliance indicators) but
fell behind on two indicators (none of which were compliance indicators). There appear to be no
patterns among the results indicators in terms of which state factors were associated with
performance.
Overall, these results offer only limited evidence that the state-level data considered are
associated with state performance on the various IDEA indicators.

Nevertheless, the analysis

reinforces an earlier finding—that states exhibited significant improvement in their performance on
OSEP’s compliance indicators over time.
Discussion: The Role of other State-Level Factors
This study’s third key research question asked what states, if any, exhibited evidence of
improvement, and what are the common characteristics of those states? Higher levels of state-local
centralization, per-pupil expenditures, and racial/ethnic homogeneity were expected to produce
more indicator-level improvement. Although some evidence for these associations was found, the
overall results do not consistently support this hypothesis.
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The study found that state per-pupil expenditures were positively associated with
performance on indicator 3a (school districts with a disability subgroup that meet the state’s
Adequate Yearly Progress / Annual Measureable Objectives (AYP/AMO) targets) and two of the postschool outcomes indicators (14a and 14b). However, per-pupil expenditures were associated with a
greater degree of placement of children with IEPs in separate facilities (Indicator 5c) and child find
(Indicator 11).34 These results do not reflect improvement. Although a logical connection can be
made between these indicators and educational expenditures, the absence of statistically significant
relationships between per pupil expenditures and other key performance indicators such as parental
involvement, transition costs, and participation in statewide assessments is insufficient evidence to
reject the null hypothesis.
Similarly, statistically significant relationships were found between student racial and ethnic
diversity and performance on some of the IDEA indicators. Specifically, greater racial/ethnic diversity
was associated with higher performance on post-school transition goals in IEPs (Indicator 13) but
with lower performance on graduation, two of the educational settings indicators (5a and 5b), and
timely transition (Indicator 12). The absence of any evidence of association between student
heterogeneity and performance indicators that explicitly measure racial/ethnic disparities such as
discipline (4b) and disproportionality (9 and 10), further suggests a failure to reject the null
hypothesis. In addition, the generalized estimating equations found that Bowman and Kearney’s
updated centralization scores were negatively associated with performance on Indicator 3a and 3c
(performance on statewide mathematics assessments.)

These results alone do not provide a

sufficient basis to build on the authors’ discussion of “second order devolution” (2012).

34

The statistically significant relationships described in this section are significant at the (p < 0.05) level (see
Chapter Five).
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The within-state analyses did confirm much of the earlier analyses’ findings with regard to
states’ improvement and maintenance of effort. For example, the GEE analyses found that states
improved their performance for 13 performance indicators over time (including four compliance
indicators) but fell behind on two indicators.35 In sum, however, the state-level analysis did not
reveal evidence that the state characteristics such as per pupil expenditures, student diversity, or
even the governor’s party were able to bring about predictable and consequential effects on their
performance under the IDEA monitoring system.
Conclusion
This and the previous chapter have summarized and discussed the results of several analyses
conducted to answer the key research questions in this study.
hypotheses associated with the study’s research questions.

Both chapters assessed the

A formal discussion of the scientific

relevance and policy implications of these findings is a central theme of the final chapter, along with
a discussion of the study’s limitations and directions for future research.

35

These two indicators (AYP and Post-School Outcomes (a)) garnered relatively low frequencies when
considering how often states met or exceeded their targets (25.53% and 34.72%, respectively).
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The previous two chapters presented findings on the key research questions guiding this
inquiry. This final chapter discusses the broader implications of those findings, limitations of this
study, and directions for future research, and public policy implications of the findings.

The

discussion will focus attention on the intersection of performance measurement, federalism, and
American special education.
Implications for Public Policy and Rationalization
The early chapters of this study attempted to describe the growth of performance
measurement (Chapter Two) and the expansion of the federal government’s role in education policy
(Chapter Three) as two key forces behind the development and implementation of IDEA 2004
(Chapter Four). This overview found that, since the 2004 reauthorization of IDEA, the performance
system and standards established by No Child Left Behind (NCLB) came under criticism from both
sides of the political spectrum, leading to a system of state waivers under the Obama Administration
and ultimately replacement of NCLB with the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2015. In many
ways, the ESSA was clearly a reaction to the perceived federal overreach of NCLB, in the sense that
the reauthorization attempted to “return power” to state education authorities.

At its core,

however, ESSA remains a federal grant to states, and the states are required to perform certain
actions—such as crafting performance plans that address certain performance indicators—that they
would not otherwise have to do. Yet ESSA is not the only education statute affecting children,
families, and schools. The Higher Education Act and, of course, IDEA are key components of federal
education policy in the United States, and both of these statutes are subject to reauthorization in the
coming years.
One of IDEA’s most direct expressions of federal control is the empowerment of OSEP to
make annual determinations based on states’ compliance with the laws’ key provisions. It is through
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this determinations process that the federal government appears to exert its authority under IDEA
most directly. The findings in this study suggest that the office has used the compliance indicators as
the key method for ensuring that states are meeting the law’s explicit provisions for discipline,
disproportionality, and effective general supervision. The findings also suggest that the states have
taken these compliance indicators seriously, demonstrating not only improvement over time but also
increasing levels of “meets requirements” determinations over the first seven years of
implementation.
Can an Effort to Systematically Assess Programs Improve Performance?
In the first chapter of this study, this central question was proposed, along with the
hypothesis that “efforts to systematically assess program performance in the special education realm
will have mixed results with regard to improvement.” The analyses in Chapters Six and Seven
uncovered evidence of performance improvement across the indicators, but the nature of that
improvement appears to have been highly contingent on the nature and conceptualization of the
performance indicators. The indicators, after all, provided the mechanism with which the federal
government implemented this complex intergovernmental performance system. As the monitoring
authority, OSEP was able to construct diverse performance indicators that responded to the
constitutional, legal, and evidence-based requirements of special education policy in a way that
permitted adjustable levels of policy control based on preferences for devolution, technocratic
adjustments, and policy priorities. In short, given the American political and technical environment
in the early 21st century, the performance indicators have become the embodiment of policy
rationalization under IDEA 2004.
More specifically, as it pertains to performance indicators, this study suggests that the
federal authority’s effort to systematically assess programs can affect state-level performance in at
least three ways: (1) using the indicators as a means of establishing a desired level of central or state
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control over performance through applying different concept definitions, measurement resources,
and data sources; (2) using indicators for purposes of enforcement, especially those linked to
statutory requirements (IDEA 2004) and agency priorities (RDA), and particularly when assessing and
judging overall performance; and (3) engaging in a continuous review of the indicators’ face validity.
Importantly, these approaches have proven to be adjustable, allowing the IDEA performance system
to gradually adapt to shifts in research, demands of stakeholders, and politics.
For example, through the construction and refinement of performance indicators, OSEP
appears to have struck a balance between monitoring the federal obligations of IDEA (e.g., FAPE in
the LRE) and state level and party/ideological demands to give states more authority and thus
discretion in performance measurement design and implementation. Although the office seems to
have applied pressure through the compliance indicators and the annual determinations process, the
bulk of the performance indicators have relied on state-designated targets, based on state baseline
data, and approved by state special education advisory committees. States were also permitted to
select their own data sources for measuring parental involvement (8) and post-school outcomes
(14).36 This flexibility appears to have accommodated the wide variation in states’ baseline data and
performance that this study observed across the results indicators. From this perspective, the results
indicators were instruments of devolution. OSEP’s authority with regard to these indicators was to
define the indicators, decide what they measure, and provide guidance and feedback for
improvement. To the extent the office permitted devolution, it was less willing to permit variation
when it came to compliance

36

Despite this flexibility, the frequency with which states met their targets or improved/maintained
performance on these particular indicators was not notably higher than the other results indicators. One
explanation for this may be states’ use of survey data (and associated sampling plans), which is unique in
comparison to most of the other IDEA performance indicators. This is fertile ground for additional research.
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Yet even three of the six compliance indicators (discipline and both disproportionality
indicators), while holding the states to a common federal standard, permitted the states to use a
combination of composition- or risk-based methods; “thresholds”; “minimum n-sizes”; single or
multiple years of data, and state-selected definitions of “inappropriate identification” in the case of
Indicators 9 and 10. This study found that the states met the federal targets and improved or
maintained their performance on these three compliance indicators to a far greater degree than the
other three compliance indicators (effective general supervision). Yet, given states’ ability to adjust
measurement criteria on these three indicators, the meaningfulness of their meeting the compliance
standard is uncertain.
Proponents of devolution would likely point to this flexibility as a desirable aspect of the
performance system; one that accommodates interstate variation by leaving states in control of
performance and improvement at the local level. Yet this flexibility poses challenges. For example,
while the effective general supervision ceiling effect was interesting, in reality the ceiling effect is
probably not going to be observed much when the states can set their own targets. The only
exceptions this study found were the handful of results indicators noted above. Moreover, the use
of multiple state baselines and methodologies militates against an effort to establish national
performance standards and may cause problems when these standards are tied to constitutional
protections. Nevertheless, the range and scope of the IDEA performance indicators have offered
multiple presidential administrations the means to exert their desired level of federal control over
this policy area.
Returning to the disproportionality example, after years of ambiguity over the federal
definition of “significant disproportionality”, OSEP under the Obama Administration reviewed and
eventually developed a standard methodology for calculating this phenomenon, the final rule for
which was published in the Federal Register in December 2016. And under the new administration,
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OSEP in March 2017 proposed a standard definition for which states could define their denominators
for Indicator 4a, 4b, 9, and 10.
The performance measurement system that was authorized under IDEA 2004 and evolved
over time has also permitted OSEP to change its emphasis on different elements of performance.
The office was able to construct and use performance indicators to emphasize technical components
of performance measurement, such as the accuracy and means by which the data were reported—
especially in the early years of IDEA 2004 implementation. It could do this while emphasizing
compliance with monitoring priorities that the federal authority interpreted as statutory priorities.
The IDEA legislative and regulatory framework also allowed OSEP to fulfill its Results Driven
Accountability (RDA) vision starting in 2014. This shift to RDA did not require additional legislation or
reauthorization, but adjustment of the performance indicators and their meaning within the overall
IDEA accountability framework. The office ultimately dropped certain indicators that it considered
redundant; reduced certain paperwork burdens; and included graduation, dropout, and assessment
indicators within the overall determinations process.
Finally, OSEP has continued to review the indicators and periodically propose new measures
and definitions. For example, the definitions and measurement of Indicator 4B (discipline by
race/ethnicity) and 14a-c (post-school outcomes) were refined and delayed in reporting year 2011.
The office has long asked states to report on the representativeness of any sampling methodologies
they adopt for indicators 8 (parent involvement), 13 (transition goals), and 14 (post-school
outcomes). Indicators 9 and 10 (disproportionality) are constructed in such a way that examines
both statistical disproportionality and “inappropriate identification”, per the statutory wording of
IDEA. OSEP then continued to review and propose refinements to the performance indicators. In
March 2017—under the new administration—the office requested public comments on proposed
minor changes to 21 of the 31 performance indicators.
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This study has uncovered evidence of the prominence and versatility of performance
indicators as a key mechanism of federal control in a complex intergovernmental performance
measurement system. OSEP appears to have used this performance measurement and performance
management system to successfully achieve its aims, in part because it constructed sophisticated
performance indicators rooted in decades of experience with collecting and analyzing the relevant
data.
Yet, if improperly constructed, performance indicators may not achieve their stated aims. As
Robert Behn has written:
“What gets measured gets done” is, perhaps, the most famous aphorism of performance
measurement. If you measure it, people will do it. Unfortunately, what people measure is
often not precisely what they want done. And people responding to the explicit or implicit
incentives of the measurement will do what people are measuring, not what these people
actually want done. (…) Thus, although performance measures shape behavior, they may
shape behavior in both desirable and undesirable ways” (2003, 599).

As political winds shift, and as schools respond to the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous
decision requiring an expanded set of expectations for educating students with IEPs (Endrew vs.
Douglas County School District (2017)), performance measurement will likely remain part of the
effort to rationalize public policymaking.

Whether these directions themselves are rational is

debatable. What is not debatable is that performance measurement may be a rational mechanism
for channeling public policy implementation. As long as performance indicators remain a means of
holding states accountable, federal authorities will possess the tools to define their political and
policy priorities and mandate (through federal law and regulation) and induce (through federal
money) states to respect and pursue those priorities. But with this discretion comes the risk of
federal officials neglecting their most basic obligation—fulfilling their constitutional obligations.
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These obligations, such as those required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses, lay the foundation for providing students with disabilities and their families access to
a Free and Appropriate Public Education. This research has shed some light on how one federal
agency has tried to strike this balance in the U.S. political system of the early 21st century.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This study has several limitations, and it is necessary to discuss them in order to identify ways
to build on its findings in future studies.

First, part of the study relies on the collection,

interpretation, and categorization of written information provided by OSEP to the states. This
necessitated the use of coding. Although I created and maintained a coding memo during my coding
efforts, I am the sole author of this study, and the coding decisions are ultimately my own. Future
investigations into OSEP’s feedback to the states should consider using multiple coders to establish
intercoder reliability.
Second, this study uses secondary data sources that are only as reliable as the entities that
produced and reported those data. In addition, some data were not available for all years of the
study. For example, educational expenditure data were not available for 2015, and OSEP did not
provide response spreadsheets with the same level of feedback after RDA implementation. There is
also a need to extend this study if a more complete assessment of RDA implementation is desired
because, at present, only two years of RDA implementation are considered.
Third, the centralization scores might have more power as independent variables in the
generalized estimating equations if the scores were recalculated to (1) include some measure of
state and local educational cooperation and (2) cover multiple years. Such an effort would, of
course, constitute a separate study in and of itself.
Fourth, there are many other variables that could be included in the generalized estimating
equations; for example, some measure of how the state boards of education are selected. Future
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studies may consider constructing these independent variables as lagged variables, given the
reporting delays associated with some performance indicators. In addition, future studies that
include the generalized estimating equations with the variables considered here should consider
interactions between the independent variables. This problem would have been more consequential
in the present study had the GEE produced more statistically significant results, but future research
into state-level factors that might affect performance in an intergovernmental monitoring system
would be strengthened by a separate analysis of interactions among the independent variables
considered.
Fifth, OSEP permitted methodological changes for some of the performance indicators.
Future explorations into the IDEA performance system should identify these changes, assess their
relationship with the state’s overall result for the indicator(s) in question, and decide whether those
cases should be removed from consideration.
Lastly, future research should consider OSEP’s State Systemic Improvement Plans (SSIPs).
The SSIPs were a key feature of OSEP’s RDA framework and, in fact, constitute a new indicator (17)
on the Annual Performance Report. A systematic assessment of these plans would likely contribute
additional insight into how the states are approaching the IDEA performance system after 2014.
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APPENDIX: FULL DATA TABLES
Table A.1: Issues Addressed in OSEP Requests for Specific State Actions, 2007 - 2014
Indicator

Percentage of Requests Associated with Particular Issues
Number of
observations

Information
deficiency

Data not made
available

Technical
problem

Attention to
improvement
strategies

Comment about
target
adjustment

1
26
92.3%
7.7%
2
24
95.8%
4.2%
3a
13
84.6%
15.4%
3b
40
37.5%
60.0%
2.5%
2.5%
Reading
3bMath
40
37.5%
60.0%
2.5%
2.5%
3c
33
48.5%
42.4%
6.1%
3.0%
12.1%
Reading
3cMath
32
50.0%
43.8%
3.2%
3.2%
9.4%
4a
149
50.3%
5.4%
2.6%
4b
20
80.0%
30.0%
5 (a-b)
8
75.0%
37.5%
5c
7
85.0%
28.6%
6a
1
100%
6b
0
7 (a1-b1) 394
4.3%
2.5%
1.5%
7b2
394
4.3%
2.5%
1.55%
7c1
394
4.3%
2.5%
1.5%
7c2
394
4.3%
2.5%
1.55%
8
75
88.0%
17.3%
1.3%
9
62
93.6%
33.9%
8.1%
10
79
74.7%
1.3%
31.6%
12.7%
11
63
49.2%
7.9%
63.5%
12
80
38.8%
15.0%
76.3%
13
109
15.6%
0.92%
4.6%
50.0%
14a
168
22.0%
4.2%
14 (b-c)
168
22.0%
4.2%
15
8
87.5%
25.0%
16
4
50.0%
25.0%
Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

General
reminder of
APR
requirements

40.9%
5.0%

93.1%
93.1%
93.1%
93.1%
3.2%
3.8%
1.3%
42.2%
76.2%
76.2%
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Table A.2: Issues Raised with OSEP Requests for Correction of Non-Compliance, 2007 - 2014
Complia
Percentage of Particular Issues Raised Simultaneously with Compliance Requests
No issues raised
nce
Attention to
Comment
simultaneously
Number of
Information
Data not made
Technical
Improvement
about target
Indicato observations deficiency
with compliance
available
problem
Strategies
adjustment
r
request
4a
99
13.1%
2.0%
2.0%
82.8%
4b
83
8.4%
3.6%
90.4%
9
80
28.8%
13.8%
2.5%
70.0%
10
124
22.6%
10.5%
4.8%
75.0%
11
385
6.8%
1.3%
10.4%
84.9%
12
349
7.5%
2.6%
16.9%
79.4%
13
350
4.3%
0.29%
1.4%
14.0%
82.6%
Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
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Table A.3.1: Percentage of Particular State Responses Noted by OSEP in the Reporting Year
Following Explicit OSEP Requests for Specific Actions, 2008 – 2014
Indicator
Number
of OSEP
request
s (20072013
only)

1
2
3a
3bReadin
g
3bMath
3cReading
3cMath
4a
4b
5a
5b
5c
6a
6b
7a1*
7a2*
7b1*
7b2*
7c1*
7c2*
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 (a-c)
15
16

26
24
12
40
40
33
32
148
19
8
8
7
0
0
348
348
348
348
348
348
65
62
79
63
80
108
161
8
4

…no
further
comment
about the
requeste
d action.

2.5%
2.5%

5.3%

14.3%

28.7%
28.7%
28.7%
28.7%
28.7%
28.7%
6.2%
2.5%

5.6%
25.0%
25.0%

Percentage of explicit OSEP requests followed by…
…acknowledge
…notice …acknowledge
…explicit
…acknowledge
-ment of
that the
-ment that the
statement
-ment of
state’s
state
state
of
state’s failure
performing the
did not
performed the
satisfactio
to meet its
requested
perfor
required
n or praise
target or
action or next
m the
action, but
of the
achieve
step.
action.
further action
state’s
compliance.
is still required.
performance.

92.3%
100%
83.3%
87.5%

3.9%

87.5%
93.9%
93.8%
88.5%
89.5%
75.0%
87.5%
71.4%

5.0%

57.5%
57.5%
57.5%
57.5%
57.5%
57.5%
76.9%
85.5%
79.8%
93.7%
93.8%
99.1%
93.2%
25.0%
50.0%

0.29%
0.29%
0.29%
0.29%
0.29%
0.29%

3.4%
5.3%

1.6%
3.8%
4.8%
2.5%
0.93%

3.9%

8.3%
5.0%

5.0%

5.4%

3.1%
12.9%
13.9%
1.6%
2.5%

5.0%
3.0%
3.1%
2.0%

8.3%

3.0%
3.1%
0.68%

12.5%

12.5%
12.5%
14.3%

8.6%
6.3%
9.2%
6.6%
8.6%
6.7%
4.6%

4.9%
7.2%
4.3%
6.9%
4.9%
6.9%
7.7%

1.3%

1.2%
12.5%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
* As noted in Table 6.1, Indicator 7 requests tended to be systemic rather than state-specific.

…stateme
nt of
satisfactio
n AND
acknowled
ge-ment
of failure
to meet
target or
achieve
complianc
e.

37.5%
25.0%

1.5%
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Table A.3.2: Percentage of states that OSEP noted addressed or did not address problems during
the first year of response tables, and the nature of problems that were not addressed (2007 only)
Indicator

1
2
3a
3bReading
3bMath
3cReading
3cMath
4a
5a
5b
5c
7(a1-c2)
8
9
10
12
13
14 (a-c)
16

(n=50)
Acknowledgement
of state’s
performing the
requested action
or next step (2007)

Notice that
the state did
not perform
the action
(2007)

24.0%
26.0%
12.0%
18.0%
18.0%
10.0%
10.0%
44.0%
4.0%
4.0%
6.0%
28.0%
36.0%
10.0%
4.0%
40.0%
10.0%
22.0%
4.0%

4.0% (n=2)
6.0% (n=3)
2.0% (n=1)
4.0% (n=2)
4.0% (n=2)
2.0% (n=1)
2.0% (n=1)
40.0% (n=20)

Issue(s) associated with failure(s) to perform requested actions
Attention
Information
to
deficiency
Attention to
improveme
Information
Technical
and
improvement
nt
deficiency
problem
technical
strategies
strategies
problem
and other
problems
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
85.0%
5.0%
10.0%

6.0% (n=3)

33.3%

2.0% (n=1)
26.0% (n=13)
2.0% (n=1)
18.0% (n=9)

38.5%
100%
100%

66.7%
100%
38.5%

23.1%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

Table A.3.3: Percentage of instances in which OSEP noted states did not address problems, and the
nature of problems that were not addressed, 2008 – 2014
Indicator

3b
Reading
3b Math
4a
4b
7a1
7a2
7b1
7b2
7c1
7c2
9
10
11
12
13
15

Number of
instances in which
a state did not
address a
requested issue

Problems associated with failures to address requested issues
Information
deficiency

2
2
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1

Data not made
available

Attention to improvement
strategies

Technical
problem

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
66.7%
100%
50.0%
100%
100%

100%

100%
66.7%
33.3%
50.0%
100%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
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Table A.3.4: Percentage of instances in which OSEP noted states only partially addressed problems,
and the nature of problems that were only partially addressed, 2008 – 2014
Indicator

4a
8
9
10
11
12
14 (a-c)

Number of
instances in which a
state did not fully
address a
requested issue

8
2
8
11
1
2
2

Problems associated failures to fully address requested issues
Information
deficiency

87.5%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%*

Technical problem

Unspecific issue or acknowledgement
of failure to meet target or achieve
compliance

12.5%
37.5%
45.5%
50.0%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*The previous year had no feedback except for the OSEP request, so the current year’s code is used.

Table A.4: Percentage of Particular State Responses Noted by OSEP in the Reporting Year Following
Explicit OSEP Requests for Correction of Non-Compliance, 2008 – 2014
Compliance
Indicator

4a
4b
9
10
11
12
13

Number
of OSEP
requests
(20072013
only)

83
66
74
112
335
307
308

Percentage of requests for correction of non-compliance followed by…
…no
further
comment
about the
requested
action.

1.5%
1.4%
2.1%
2.0%

…acknowledgement of state’s
performing the
requested
action or next
step.

…notice
that the
state did
not
perform
the
action.

…acknowledgement that the
state
performed the
required
action, but
further action
is still required.

…explicit
statement
of
satisfaction
or praise of
the state’s
performance.

91.6%
89.4%
90.5%
91.7%
96.1%
97.1%
96.1%

6.0%
7.6%
1.4%
1.8%
0.60%
1.3%
1.4%

2.4%
1.5%
4.1%
5.4%
0.60%
0.65%

2.7%
0.90%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities

…acknowledgeme
nt of state’s failure
to meet its target
or achieve
compliance.

0.60%
0.98%
0.65%
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Table A.5.1: Percentage of States Whose Results Exhibited Declines, Steady Progress, or
Improvement Following OSEP Requests for Particular Actions, 2008 – 2015
Ind.

1
2
3a
3bRea
ding
3bMa
th
3cRea
ding
3cMa
th
4a
5a
5b
5c
7a1*
7a2*
7b1*
7b2*
7c1*
7c2*
8
14a*
14b*
14c*
15
16

Number of
states that
received an
OSEP request
in the year
preceding
baseline data
Comparison
group, using
the same
baseline
year**
17 (2008)
29
19 (2008)
28
7 (2008)
23
10 (2008)
32
10 (2008)
32
9 (2008)
25
9 (2008)
25
46 (2008)
4
5 (2008)
45
5 (2008)
45
5 (2008)
45
50 (2011)
50 (2011)
49 (2011)
49 (2011)
50 (2011)
50 (2011)
16 (2008)
21
50 (2012)
50 (2012)
50 (2012)
3 (2008)
39
2 (2008)
40

Number of states
that received at
least one OSEP
request in
subsequent years
(subset of left)
Comparison group
states receiving
OSEP requests in
subsequent years
5 (29.4%)
0
3 (15.8%)
0
0
1 (4.3%)
6 (60.0%)
9 (28.1%)
6 (60.0%)
9 (28.1%)
4 (44.4%)
7 (28.0%)
4 (44.4%)
7 (2.3%)
46 (100%)
4 (100%)
0
3 (66.7%)
1 (20.0%)
1 (2.2%)
2 (40.0%)
0
50 (100%)
50 (100%)
49 (100%)
49 (100%)
50 (100%)
50 (100%)
8 (50.0%)
9 (42.9%)
9 (18.0%)
9 (18.0%)
9 (18.0%)
1 (33.3%)
0
0
0

Number of
states that
reached
the
indicator
ceiling
(during or
after the
baseline
year only)

0
0
0
0
0
1 (4.3%)
0
3 (9.4%)
0
2 (6.3%)
0
0
0
0
19 (41.3%)
2 (50.0%)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 (4.0%)
0
10 (25.6%)
0
10 (25.0%)

Average percentage of states receiving OSEP requests exhibiting
improvement
Average percentage of comparison group states exhibiting
improvement

Subsequent Year

Improvement
52.9%
55.2%
36.8%
52.6%
14.3%
47.8%
70.0%
43.8%
60.0%
37.5%
55.6%
88.0%
66.7%
76.0%
54.3%
50.0%
80.0%
62.2%
40.0%
66.7%
20.0%
57.8%
54.0%
44.0%
55.1%
49.0%
56.0%
54.0%
68.8%
66.7%
50.0%
48.0%
54.0%
0.0%
41.0%
100%
42.5%
51.0%
56.3%

Decline
or
Steady
47.1%
44.8%
63.2%
46.4%
85.7%
52.2%
30.0%
56.3%
40.0%
62.5%
44.4%
12.0%
33.3%
24.0%
45.7%
50.0%
20.0%
37.8%
60.0%
33.3%
80.0%
42.2%
46.0%
48.0%
44.9%
51.0%
44.0%
46.0%
31.2%
33.3%
50.0%
42.0%
46.0%
100%
59.0%
0.0%
57.5%

Subsequent Two
Years

Improvement
58.8%
48.3%
52.6%
42.9%
14.3%
34.8%
60.0%
50.0%
60.0%
56.3%
55.6%
80.0%
77.8%
76.0%
60.9%
50.0%
80.0%
68.9%
80.0%
71.1%
60.0%
51.1%
66.0%
42.0%
67.3%
49.0%
62.0%
52.0%
75.0%
71.4%
32.0%
44.0%
54.0%
0.0%
46.2%
100%
40.0%
56.7%
56.2%

Decline
or
Steady
41.2%
51.7%
47.4%
57.1%
85.7%
65.2%
40.0%
50.0%
40.0%
43.8%
44.4%
20.0%
22.2%
24.0%
39.1%
50.0%
20.0%
31.1%
20.0%
28.9%
40.0%
48.9%
34.0%
58.0%
32.7%
51.0%
38.0%
48.0%
25.0%
28.6%
68.0%
56.0%
46.0%
100%
53.8%
0.0%
60.0%

Through 2015

Improvement
52.9%
44.8%
47.4%
64.3%
28.6%
13.0%
40.0%
50.0%
50.0%
56.9%
33.3%
64.0%
55.6%
56.0%
73.9%
75.0%
60.0%
86.7%
60.0%
82.2%
80.0%
73.3%
56.0%
42.0%
67.3%
38.8%
60.0%
34.0%
68.8%
81.0%
30.0%
68.0%
60.0%
0.0%
41.0%
50.0%
45.0%
50.3%1

Decline
or
Steady
47.1%
55.2%
52.6%
35.7%
71.4%
87.0%
60.0%
50.0%
50.0%
53.1%
66.7%
36.0%
44.4%
44.0%
26.1%
25.0%
40.0%
13.3%
40.0%
17.8%
20.0%
26.7%
44.0%
58.0%
32.7%
61.2%
40.0%
66.0%
31.2%
19.0%
70.0%
32.0%
40.0%
100%
59.0%
50.0%
55.0%

59.5%1

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*OSEP requests were ubiquitous across states; there is no basis for constructing a comparison group.
**The sum of the treatment and comparison groups may not always equal 50; some states reported no data during the baseline year.
1Statistically significantly different (Z = -2.9391; (p=0.00328))
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Table A.5.2: Percentage of States That Met Compliance Targets for Certain Proportions of the Time
Frame Following OSEP Requests for Corrections of Non-Compliance, 2008 – 2015
Compliance
Indicat
or

4b
9
10***
11
12
13

Number of
states that
received an
OSEP request
for correction
of noncompliance in
the year
preceding
baseline data
Comparison
group

Additional
compliance
requests
(during or
beyond
baseline year
only)

21 (2012)
29
19 (2008)
31
18 (2008)
31
44 (2008)
6
42 (2008)
8
49 (2012)
1

19 (90.5%)
10 (34.5%)
8 (42.1%)
12 (38.7%)
10 (55.6%)
19 (61.3%)
44 (100%)
6 (100%)
41 (97.6%)
6 (75.0%)
49 (100%)
1 (100%)

Proportion of reporting years following the baseline year

0.0%
47.6%
6.9%
5.3%
3.2%
11.1%
9.7%
93.2%
66.7%
69.0%
50.0%
85.7%
100%

12.5%

25.0%

37.5%

14.3%
10.3%
5.2%

6.9%
9.7%
5.6%
3.2%
2.3%
33.3%
14.3%
12.5%

5.6%*
3.2%
2.3%

50.0%

11.1%
6.5%
2.3%

9.5%

62.5%

75.0%

10.5%
12.9%
11.1%
3.2%

23.8%
13.8%
5.3%
3.2%
5.6%
12.9%

4.8%
12.5%

8.2%

4.1%

Source: author’s interpretation of OSEP’s annual response tables to state education authorities
*28.57% rounded.
**one case of 85.71% rounded
***one state was exempt from Indicator 10 reporting.

2.0%

87.5%

100.0%

21.0%
3.2%
11.1%
9.7%**

14.3%
62.0%
52.6%
67.8%
38.9%
51.6%

2.4%
12.5%

12.5%
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Table A.6.1: Descriptive Statistics of States’ Targets on OSEP Performance Indicators, 2008 – 2015
Indicator

1 (>=)
2 (<=)
3a (>=)
3bReading
(>=)
3bMath (>=)
3cReading
(>=)
3cMath (>=)
4a (<=)
4b*
5a (>=)
5b (<=)
5c (<=)
6a (>=)
6b (<=)
7a1 (>=)
7a2 (>=)
7b1 (>=)
7b2 (>=)
7c1 (>=)
7c2 (>=)
8 (>=)
9*
10*
11*
12*
13*
14a (>=)
14b (>=)
14c (>=)
15 (>=)
16 (>=)

Initial
Year of
Target**
2008
2008
2008
2008

Number of
observations

Minimum
(freq)

Maximum
(freq)

Range

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

388
390
290
367

10.50% (1)
0.67% (1)
0.00% (2)
95.00% (232)

95.00% (1)
87.00% (1)
100.0% (18)
100.0% (19)

84.50
86.33
100.0
5.00

77.07%
5.00%
56.50%
95.00%

71.15%
8.56%
55.18%
96.16%

16.73183
9.53912
29.44715
1.72421

2008
2008

361
331

95.00% (230)
11.17% (1)

100.0% (20)
100.0% (5)

5.00
88.83

95.00%
58.50%

96.14%
56.48%

1.72457
21.22869

2008
2008
2011
2008
2008
2008
2014
2014
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2011
2012
2012
2012
2008
2008

331
386
250
398
398
397
106
100
244
244
243
244
244
244
387
400
400
400
401
250
199
200
200
326
341

9.00% (1)
0.00% (101)
0.00%
25.00% (2)
3.30% (3)
0.80% (5)
9.80% (1)
3.00% (2)
32.00% (1)
22.00% (1)
35.00% (1)
15.00% (1)
38.00% (1)
16.50% (1)
20.40% (1)
0.00%
0.00%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
13.00% (2)
31.00% (1)
50.24% (1)
0.00% (6)
32.00% (1)

100.0% (5)
91.00% (1)
0.00%
82.00% (2)
62.33% (1)
100.0% (1)
85.50% (1)
54.30% (2)
100.0% (1)
90.80% (1)
100.0% (1)
90.20% (1)
100.0% (1)
93.70% (1)
97.00% (3)
0.00%
0.00%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
52.30% (1)
92.00% (1)
100.0% (4)
100.0% (6)
100.0% (7)

91.00
91.00
0.00
57.00
59.03
9.20
75.70
51.30
68.00
68.80
65.00
75.20
62.00
77.20
76.60
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
39.30
61.00
49.76
0.00
68.00

54.00%
2.00%
0.00%
60.39%
12.00%
2.60%
42.50%
24.20%
78.90%
61.00%
78.00%
54.82%
78.00%
67.75%
68.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
29.80%
59.70%
73.50%
54.00%
75.00%

53.06%
5.00%
0.00%
60.44%
12.63%
3.05%
43.96%
25.30%
77.38%
61.59%
76.72%
53.60%
76.20%
66.80%
62.65%
0.00%
0.00%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
31.43%
60.15%
74.54%
52.48%
74.75%

20.54069
8.79443
0.00000
9.06414
5.25305
1.71790
14.96735
12.59184
11.88493
12.51332
11.92561
12.82435
13.51945
12.39844
22.39673
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
9.80667
10.57498
9.62113
21.20745
12.74977

Source: State Annual Performance Reports to OSEP.
*Compliance indicators. Although these targets have been the same for all states since 2008, the baseline year is the first
year in which the target applied to the data. For indicators 4b and 13, this is the same year as—not the year following—the
baseline year of data described for each indicator in Table 5.10.2.)
**Generally, the initial year of target is the year following the initial year of data (e.g., the baseline year of data).
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Table A.6.2: Descriptive Statistics of States’ Results on OSEP Performance Indicators, 2007 – 2015
Indicator

1
2
3a
3bReading
3bMath
3cReading
3cMath
4a
4b
5a
5b
5c
6a
6b
7a1
7a2
7b1
7b2
7c1
7c2
8
9
10
11
12
13
14a
14b
14c
15
16

Initial
Year of
Data**
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2011
2007
2007
2007
2013
2013
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2011
2011
2011
2011
2007
2007

Number of
observations
445
445
332
418
412
383
383
450
256
449
449
449
149
148
299
299
298
298
299
299
431
448
436
444
447
274
250
251
251
413
435

Minimum
(freq)

Maximum
(freq)

13.60% (1)
0.35% (2)
0.00% (27)
62.90% (1)
61.32% (1)
0.00% (1)
0.00% (1)
0.00% (107)
0.00% (158)
18.00% (1)
2.50% (1)
0.09% (1)
8.42% (1)
2.19% (1)
24.00% (1)
19.83% (1)
37.00% (1)
10.27% (1)
31.70% (1)
11.00% (1)
19.50% (1)
0.00% (367)
0.00% (308)
37.10% (1)
29.43% (1)
5.50% (1)
8.69% (1)
31.00% (1)
45.50% (1)
0.00% (30)
0.00% (12)

96.60% (1)
98.05% (1)
100.0% (6)
100.0%* (5)
100.0% (3)
83.00% (1)
75.44% (1)
87.30% (2)
21.05% (1)
84.82% (1)
35.00% (1)
10.30% (1)
85.30% (1)
61.67% (1)
96.50% (1)
89.80% (1)
97.60% (1)
89.20% (1)
95.93% (1)
92.70% (1)
99.19% (1)
22.22% (1)
20.00% (1)
100.0% (9)
100.0% (51)
100.0% (11)
83.17% (1)
92.26% (1)
100.0% (4)
100.0% (51)
100.0% (42)

Range

83.00
97.70
100.0
37.10
38.68
83.00
75.44
87.30
21.05
66.82
32.50
10.21
76.88
59.48
72.50
69.97
60.60
78.93
64.23
81.70
79.69
22.22
20.00
62.90
70.57
94.50
74.48
61.26
54.50
100.0
100.0

Median

67.33%
5.20%
30.59%
98.20%
98.20%
36.40%
34.70%
2.20%
0.00%
61.10%
12.50%
2.61%
40.66%
24.10%
79.78%
59.40%
80.50%
54.77%
80.50%
67.00%
69.90%
0.00%
0.00%
97.00%
97.59%
89.71%
28.00%
59.41%
73.60%
52.92%
78.05%

Mean

63.32%
8.65%
37.36%
97.80%
97.66%
38.69%
36.48%
5.83%
1.00%
60.54%
12.86%
3.25%
42.95%
25.17%
78.06%
59.90%
78.15%
52.80%
76.94%
65.03%
64.19%
0.47%
0.88%
94.30%
93.51%
83.86%
30.15%
59.43%
73.73%
53.08%
74.64%

Standard
Deviation
17.17011
10.14318
30.44318
2.47855
2.78675
17.03162
16.09116
10.45357
2.37405
9.21359
5.10931
1.91709
16.04213
13.14228
11.60322
12.93893
10.99875
13.07109
13.61920
13.68251
23.26675
1.92397
2.12912
7.18426
9.93897
17.93039
11.19473
10.44356
10.07620
28.95165
19.39785

Source: State Annual Performance Reports to OSEP.
*One case was reported as 104.20%; rounded to 100%.
**Without regard to baseline changes (see note below). Some states may have reported data before this baseline year; in
these cases, such data are included in this chart. Typically, for results indicators, no targets exist for the baseline years
indicated.
Note: Changes due to baseline resets are not considered, because baseline changes are not necessarily associated with
numerical deviations pre- and post-baseline year, do not necessarily imply changes to methodology.
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Table A.7.1: Frequency of States that Met or Exceeded Targets, 2007 – 2015
Indicator
Initial Year of Target
Number of
Met or Exceeded
observations
Target
1
2008
387
28.94%
2
2008
378
52.65%
3a
2008
282
25.53%
3bReading
2008
365
83.56%
3bMath
2008
359
82.68%
3cReading
2008
321
17.45%
3cMath
2008
317
17.67%
4a
2008
384
68.75%
4b
2011
257
62.65%
5a
2008
393
58.02%
5b
2008
393
57.25%
5c
2008
394
47.21%
6a
2013
95
49.47%
6b
2013
90
51.11%
7a1
2010
234
56.84%
7a2
2010
233
43.35%
7b1
2010
233
61.37%
7b2
2010
232
50.00%
7c1
2010
235
58.30%
7c2
2010
235
46.38%
8
2008
382
63.35%
9
2007
399
82.96%
10
2007
391
72.63%
11
2007
398
2.01%
12
2007
400
12.00%
13
2011
269
4.09%
14a
2011
193
34.72%
14b
2011
194
51.03%
14c
2011
192
50.00%
15
2008
382
54.88%
16
2008
335
57.91%
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Table A.7.2: Frequency of States that Improved their Results, 2008 – 2015
Indicator
Initial Year of Data
Number of
Improvement or
observations
Maintenance*
1
2007
395
64.81%
2
2007
395
64.30%
3a
2007
292
41.10%
3bReading
2007
365
55.89%
3bMath
2007
359
54.60%
3cReading
2007
335
58.21%
3cMath
2007
331
59.21%
4a
2007
400
72.50%
4b
2011
209
82.30%
5a
2007
399
73.18%
5b
2007
400
71.00%
5c
2007
400
61.50%
6a
2013
98
56.12%
6b
2013
99
60.61%
7a1
2010
250
55.20%
7a2
2010
250
43.20%
7b1
2010
249
60.24%
7b2
2010
249
49.40%
7c1
2010
250
58.40%
7c2
2010
250
45.60%
8
2007
380
67.37%
9
2007
399
90.73%
10
2007
388
86.86%
11
2007
394
73.86%
12
2007
397
71.79%
13
2011
219
62.56%
14a
2011
199
45.73%
14b
2011
201
55.72%
14c
2011
201
54.23%
15
2007
356
54.21%
16
2007
380
52.37%
*Maintenance is considered in order to account for the ceiling effect, particularly of compliance indicators.
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Table A.8: Percentage of States Receiving Particular OSEP Determinations, 2007-2015
Reporting Year
Meets Requirements
Needs Assistance
Needs Intervention
2007
18.0% (9)
72.0% (36)
10.0% (5)
2008
26.0% (13)
64.0% (32)
10.0% (5)*
2009
56.0% (28)
38.0% (19)
6.0% (3)
2010
56.0% (28)
42.0% (21)
2.0% (1)
2011
56.0% (28)
40.0% (20)
4.0% (2)
2012
60.0% (30)
24.0% (12)
16.0% (8)
2013
76.0% (38)
24.0% (12)
0.0% (0)
2014
30.0% (15)
64.0% (32)
6.0% (3)
2015
40.0% (20)
58.0% (29)
2.0% (1)
Source: OSEP annual determinations letters
*One state appealed its determination of “Needs Intervention” in 2008, which OSEP subsequently changed to “Needs
Assistance”.

167

Table A.9.1: State Performance on Key Results Indicators under the ResultsDriven Accountability Framework, 2014

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Table A.9.1 (cont.) State Performance on Key Results Indicators under the
Results-Driven Accountability Framework, 2014

Source: author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Table A.9.2: State Performance on Compliance Indicators under the ResultsDriven Accountability Framework, 2014

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.

170

Table A.9.2 (cont.) State Performance on Compliance Indicators under the
Results-Driven Accountability Framework, 2014

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Table A.9.3: State Performance on Key Results Indicators under the ResultsDriven Accountability Framework, 2015

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.

172

Table A.9.3 (cont.) State Performance on Key Results Indicators under the
Results-Driven Accountability Framework, 2015

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Table A.9.4: State Performance on Compliance Indicators under the ResultsDriven Accountability Framework, 2015

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Table A.9.4 (cont.) State Performance on Compliance Indicators under the
Results-Driven Accountability Framework, 2015

Source: Author’s compilation of OSEP responses to states.
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Performance measurement has emerged as a management tool that, accompanied by
advances in technology and data analysis, has allowed public officials to control public policy at
multiple levels of government. In the United States, the federal government has used performance
measurement as part of an accountability strategy that enables Congress and the Executive Branch
to control areas of public policy historically driven by state and local governments. In special
education, Congress through the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) of 2004 enabled
the President to implement a wide-ranging and highly developed performance measurement system
in which the states were asked to participate in exchange for federal funding.
This study first reviews some of the theoretical assumptions and problems associated with
the widespread adoption of public sector performance measurement in the United States. It
continues with a review of literature, reports, documents, memoranda, and statutes pertaining to
the background, development, and implementation of IDEA 2004. It then explores the role states
play in this federal performance measurement system; the characteristics of that system, including
the nature and effect of federal feedback on state behaviors; the characteristics of the performance
indicators; and the role of state-level characteristics.
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The study finds that states have been responsive to federal feedback and, by and large, have
improved their performance on most of the indicators over the nine years of consideration. The data
suggest that states have set ambitious performance targets and strive to meet those targets under
this system, but they have focused relatively greater attention to the compliance indicators, which
are controlled more closely by the federal government, than the more devolutionary results
indicators. The study also finds that the states have been responsive to changes in the federal
monitoring system. The analysis showed little support for the influence of certain state-level factors
on improvement. The dissertation concludes that the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP)
implemented the law using a combination of centralizing and devolutionary techniques, which the
states generally accepted despite meager congressional appropriations.

I conclude that OSEP

accomplished and maintained this consensus chiefly through its design of the performance
indicators.
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